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IEEE International Conference on Communications workshops

Static and Dynamic Finite Constellation Decomposition for Wireless Physical Layer Security

Eyyüp Taşçı, Arman Tan, Timur Zirtiloglu, Mutlu Koca, Nir Shlezinger, Rabia Tugce Yazicigil

Published Jun 8, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Security is a critical element in the design of communication systems. However, despite its essential role in enabling low-cost implementations and robust theoretical foundations, physical layer security is often overlooked in developing countermeasures against eavesdropping. In this work, we propose practical physical-layer countermeasures that enhance secrecy with low computational overhead. Our approach decomposes the constellation diagram using basis vectors, constructing the original message symbol in the main lobe aimed at the intended receiver, while projecting randomized constellation points in other directions to mislead potential eavesdroppers. When the eavesdropper’s location is known, we use static basis vectors, achieving a higher level of secrecy in that direction. When the location is unknown, we dynamically change the basis vectors to provide information-theoretic security in all directions through basis vector randomization. This design enables the intended receiver to operate without knowledge of the basis vectors, reducing receiver overhead. We evaluate the scheme’s secrecy performance through bit error rate and secrecy rate analyses, demonstrating its potential to improve physical layer security.

DOI
10.1109/iccworkshops67674.2025.11162481

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Security is a critical element in the design of communication systems. However, despite its essential role in enabling low-cost implementations and robust theoretical foundations, physical layer security is often overlooked in developing countermeasures against eavesdropping. In this work, we propose practical physical-layer countermeasures that enhance secrecy with low computational overhead. Our approach decomposes the constellation diagram using basis vectors, constructing the original message symbol in the main lobe aimed at the intended receiver, while projecting randomized constellation points in other directions to mislead potential eavesdroppers. When the eavesdropper’s location is known, we use static basis vectors, achieving a higher level of secrecy in that direction. When the location is unknown, we dynamically change the basis vectors to provide information-theoretic security in all directions through basis vector randomization. This design enables the intended receiver to operate without knowledge of the basis vectors, reducing receiver overhead. We evaluate the scheme’s secrecy performance through bit error rate and secrecy rate analyses, demonstrating its potential to improve physical layer security.
A common approach for introducing security at the physical layer is to rely on the channel variations of the wireless environment. This type of approach is not always suitable for wireless networks where the channel remains static for most of the network lifetime. For these scenarios, a channel independent physical layer security technique is more appropriate which will rely on a secret known to the sender and the receiver but not to the eavesdropper. In this paper, we propose CD-PHY, a physical layer security technique that exploits the constellation diversity of wireless networks which is independent of the channel variations. The sender and the receiver use a custom bit sequence to constellation symbol mapping to secure the physical layer communication which is not known a priori to the eavesdropper. Through theoretical modeling and experimental simulation, we show that this information theoretic construct can achieve Shannon secrecy and any brute force attack from the eavesdropper incurs high overhead and minuscule probability of success. Our results also show that the high bit error rate also makes decoding practically infeasible for the eavesdropper, thus securing the communication between the sender and receiver.
The current research on physical layer security is far from implementations in practical networks, arguably due to impractical assumptions in the literature and the limited applicability of physical layer security. Aiming to reduce the gap between theory and practice, this thesis focuses on wireless physical layer security towards practical assumptions and requirements. In the first half of the thesis, we reduce the dependence of physical layer security on impractical assumptions. The secrecy enhancements and analysis based on impractical assumptions cannot lead to any true guarantee of secrecy in practical networks. The current study of physical layer security was often based on the idealized assumption of perfect channel knowledge on both legitimate users and eavesdroppers. We study the impact of channel estimation errors on secure transmission designs. We investigate the practical scenarios where both the transmitter and the receiver have imperfect channel state information (CSI). Our results show how the optimal transmission design and the achievable throughput vary with the amount of knowledge on the eavesdropper's channel. Apart from the assumption of perfect CSI, the analysis of physical layer security often ideally assumed the number of eavesdropper antennas to be known. We develop an innovative approach to study secure communication systems without knowing the number of eavesdropper antennas by introducing the concept of spatial constraint into physical layer security. That is, the eavesdropper is assumed to have a limited spatial region to place (possibly an infinite number of) antennas. We show that a non-zero secrecy rate is achievable with the help of a friendly jammer, even if the eavesdropper places an infinite number of antennas in its spatial region. In the second half of the thesis, we improve the applicability of physical layer security. The current physical layer security techniques to achieve confidential broadcasting were limited to application in single-cell systems. The primary challenge to achieve confidential broadcasting in the multi-cell network is to deal with not only the inter-cell but also the intra-cell information leakage and interference. To tackle this challenge, we design linear precoders performing confidential broadcasting in multi-cell networks. We optimize the precoder designs to maximize the secrecy sum rate with based on the large-system analysis. Finally, we improve the applicability of physical layer security from a fundamental aspect. The analysis of physical layer security based on the existing secrecy metric was often not applicable in practical networks. We propose new metrics for evaluating the secrecy of transmissions over fading channels to address the practical limitations of using existing secrecy metrics for such evaluations. The first metric establishes a link between the concept of secrecy outage and the eavesdropper's ability to decode confidential messages. The second metric provides an error-probability-based secrecy metric which is often used for the practical implementation of secure wireless systems. The third metric characterizes how much or how fast the confidential information is leaked to the eavesdropper. We show that the proposed secrecy metrics enable one to appropriately design secure communication systems with different views on how secrecy is measured.
Physical layer security for wireless communication is broadly considered as a promising approach to protect data confidentiality against eavesdroppers. However, despite its ample theoretical foundation, the transition to practical implementations of physical-layer security still lacks success. A close inspection of proven vulnerable physical-layer security designs reveals that the flaws are usually overlooked when the scheme is only evaluated against an inferior, single-antenna eavesdropper. Meanwhile, the attacks exposing vulnerabilities often lack theoretical justification. To reduce the gap between theory and practice, we posit that a physical-layer security scheme must be studied under multiple adversarial models to fully grasp its security strength. In this regard, we evaluate a specific physical-layer security scheme, i.e. orthogonal blinding, under multiple eavesdropper settings. We further propose a practical "ciphertext-only attack" that allows eavesdroppers to recover the original message by exploiting the low entropy fields in wireless packets. By means of simulation, we are able to reduce the symbol error rate at an eavesdropper below 1% using only the eavesdropper's receiving data and a general knowledge about the format of the wireless packets.
Physical layer security schemes for wireless communication systems have been broadly studied from an information theory point of view. In contrast, there is a dearth of attack methodologies to analyze the achievable security on the physical layer. To address this issue, we develop a novel attack model for physical layer security schemes, which is the equivalent to known-plaintext attacks in cryptoanalysis. In particular, we concentrate on analyzing the security of orthogonal blinding schemes that disturb an eavesdropper’s signal reception using artificial noise transmission. We discuss the theory underlying our attack methodology and develop an adaptive filter trained by known-plaintext symbols to degrade the secrecy of orthogonal blinding. By means of simulation and measurements on real wireless channels using software-defined radios with OFDM transceivers, we obtain the operating area of our attack and evaluate the achievable secrecy degradation. We are able to reduce the secrecy of orthogonal blinding schemes to Symbol Error Rates (SERs) below 10% at an eavesdropper, with a knowledge of only a 3% of the symbols transmitted in typical WLAN frames.
This paper proposes a physical-layer security scheme for wireless networks, aiming to achieve communication secrecy by making the eavesdropper incapable of decoding the secret wireless message. The considered scenario features one user within the range of two access points, API and AP2. The APs are assumed to be connected through an alternative secure (e.g. wired) connection. The goal is to secure the wireless link between the user and API. While the user transmits to API, AP2 simultaneously transmits an interfering signal, which is a priori provided to API, such that API is likely the only node capable of decoding the user's entire transmission. Evaluation is done through simulation by measuring the upper bound of the information-theoretic secrecy and error performance. In the latter case it is shown that the eavesdropper experiences significantly higher error rates than the intended receiver, thus providing evidence of practical security.
Eavesdropping in wireless communication environment should be suppressed. However, most existing schemes ordinarily focus on secrecy rate enhancement, which may not be achieved with the non-Gaussian signals. Therefore, we consider this security problem from the actual signal point of view. On the basis of this premise, a novel scheme is proposed. In our scheme, each original signal in one constellation is converted as a transmitted signal in another constellation, and the principle of this variation can be safely told to the user without being learned by others. With this conversion, the eavesdropper is difficult to restore the original signals. Performance analysis and simulation results illustrate that the proposed scheme is efficient for physical layer security improvement.