Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Information Security and Applications

LR-CAKA: A leakage-resilient compatible authenticated key agreement protocol for heterogeneous public-key cryptosystems

Ting-Chieh Ho, Yuh‐Min Tseng, Sen‐Shan Huang

Published Sep 10, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.jisa.2025.104222

Related papers

CLR-MAKA: A Compatible and Leakage-Resilient Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for Heterogeneous Client-Server Systems

Ting-Chieh Ho, Yuh‐Min Tseng, Sen-Shan Huang

•Jan 1, 2025•0 citations

An efficient and compatible authenticated key exchange protocol with leakage resilience for heterogeneous client–server environments

Ting-Chieh Ho, Yuh‐Min Tseng, Sen‐Shan Huang

Journal of Systems Architecture•Nov 13, 2025•1 citation

After-the-Fact Leakage-Resilient Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Ou Ruan, Yuanyuan Zhang, Mingwu Zhang +2 more

Authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme is one of the most widely used cryptographic primitives in practice, even in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) environments. In order to resist side-channel attacks, several works have been proposed for defining leakage-resilient (LR) security models and constructing LR-AKE protocols. However, all these LR-AKE schemes employed the traditional X.509 certificate-based public-key infrastructure authentication framework, where the online transmission and verification of the public-key certificate are the major drawbacks. In this paper, we first propose a general framework for constructing identity-based AKE protocols in the bounded after-the-fact LR extended-Canetti–Krawczyk security model, and show a formal proof in the standard model. Our proposed scheme offers a flexible approach to simplify the certificate management. Moreover, our result could be extended to the bounded-retrieval model, yielding the first LR-AKE protocol in this model.

IEEE Systems Journal•Apr 12, 2017•38 citations

RAKA: New Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol Based on Ring-LWE

Yatao Yang, Zhang Yaze, Zichen Li +2 more

Journal of Computer Research and Development•Oct 1, 2017•2 citations

New approach to practical leakage-resilient public-key cryptography

Suvradip Chakraborty, Janaka Alawatugoda, Rangan Chandrasekaran Pandu

We present a new approach to construct several leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, including leakage-resilient public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols. To this end, we introduce a new primitive called leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange (LR-NIKE) protocol. We introduce an appropriate security model for LR-NIKE protocols in the bounded memory leakage (BML) settings. We then show a secure construction of the LR-NIKE protocol in the BML setting that achieves an optimal leakage rate, i.e., 1 – o(1). Our construction of LR-NIKE requires a minimal use of a leak-free hardware component. We argue that the use of such a leak-free hardware component seems to be unavoidable in any construction of an LR-NIKE protocol, even in the BML setting. Finally, we show how to construct the aforementioned leakage-resilient primitives from such an LR-NIKE protocol as summarized below. All these primitives also achieve the same (optimal) leakage rate as the underlying LR-NIKE protocol. We show how to construct a leakage-resilient (LR) IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme in the BML model generically from a bounded LR-NIKE (BLR-NIKE) protocol. Our construction of LR-IND-CCA-2 secure PKE differs significantly from the state-of-the-art constructions of these primitives, which mainly use hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resilience. Moreover, our transformation preserves the leakage-rate of the underlying BLR-NIKE protocol. We introduce a new leakage model for AKE protocols, in the BML setting, and present a leakage-resilient AKE protocol construction from the LR-NIKE protocol. We introduce the first-ever leakage model for LLKE protocols in the BML setting and the first construction of such a leakage-resilient LLKE from the LR-NIKE protocol.

•Jul 1, 2020•1 citation

New approach to practical leakage-resilient public-key cryptography

Suvradip Chakraborty, Janaka Alawatugoda, Chandrasekaran Pandu Rangan

Abstract We present a new approach to construct several leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, including leakage-resilient public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols. To this end, we introduce a new primitive called leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange (LR-NIKE) protocol. We introduce an appropriate security model for LR-NIKE protocols in the bounded memory leakage (BML) settings. We then show a secure construction of the LR-NIKE protocol in the BML setting that achieves an optimal leakage rate, i.e., 1 – o (1). Our construction of LR-NIKE requires a minimal use of a leak-free hardware component. We argue that the use of such a leak-free hardware component seems to be unavoidable in any construction of an LR-NIKE protocol, even in the BML setting. Finally, we show how to construct the aforementioned leakage-resilient primitives from such an LR-NIKE protocol as summarized below. All these primitives also achieve the same (optimal) leakage rate as the underlying LR-NIKE protocol. We show how to construct a leakage-resilient (LR) IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme in the BML model generically from a bounded LR-NIKE (BLR-NIKE) protocol. Our construction of LR-IND-CCA-2 secure PKE differs significantly from the state-of-the-art constructions of these primitives, which mainly use hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resilience. Moreover, our transformation preserves the leakage-rate of the underlying BLR-NIKE protocol. We introduce a new leakage model for AKE protocols, in the BML setting, and present a leakage-resilient AKE protocol construction from the LR-NIKE protocol. We introduce the first-ever leakage model for LLKE protocols in the BML setting and the first construction of such a leakage-resilient LLKE from the LR-NIKE protocol.

Journal of Mathematical Cryptology•Dec 20, 2019•2 citations
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) scheme is one of the most widely used cryptographic primitives in practice, even in the Internet-of-Things (IoT) environments. In order to resist side-channel attacks, several works have been proposed for defining leakage-resilient (LR) security models and constructing LR-AKE protocols. However, all these LR-AKE schemes employed the traditional X.509 certificate-based public-key infrastructure authentication framework, where the online transmission and verification of the public-key certificate are the major drawbacks. In this paper, we first propose a general framework for constructing identity-based AKE protocols in the bounded after-the-fact LR extended-Canetti–Krawczyk security model, and show a formal proof in the standard model. Our proposed scheme offers a flexible approach to simplify the certificate management. Moreover, our result could be extended to the bounded-retrieval model, yielding the first LR-AKE protocol in this model.
We present a new approach to construct several leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, including leakage-resilient public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols. To this end, we introduce a new primitive called leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange (LR-NIKE) protocol. We introduce an appropriate security model for LR-NIKE protocols in the bounded memory leakage (BML) settings. We then show a secure construction of the LR-NIKE protocol in the BML setting that achieves an optimal leakage rate, i.e., 1 – o(1). Our construction of LR-NIKE requires a minimal use of a leak-free hardware component. We argue that the use of such a leak-free hardware component seems to be unavoidable in any construction of an LR-NIKE protocol, even in the BML setting. Finally, we show how to construct the aforementioned leakage-resilient primitives from such an LR-NIKE protocol as summarized below. All these primitives also achieve the same (optimal) leakage rate as the underlying LR-NIKE protocol. We show how to construct a leakage-resilient (LR) IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme in the BML model generically from a bounded LR-NIKE (BLR-NIKE) protocol. Our construction of LR-IND-CCA-2 secure PKE differs significantly from the state-of-the-art constructions of these primitives, which mainly use hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resilience. Moreover, our transformation preserves the leakage-rate of the underlying BLR-NIKE protocol. We introduce a new leakage model for AKE protocols, in the BML setting, and present a leakage-resilient AKE protocol construction from the LR-NIKE protocol. We introduce the first-ever leakage model for LLKE protocols in the BML setting and the first construction of such a leakage-resilient LLKE from the LR-NIKE protocol.
Abstract We present a new approach to construct several leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, including leakage-resilient public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols. To this end, we introduce a new primitive called leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange (LR-NIKE) protocol. We introduce an appropriate security model for LR-NIKE protocols in the bounded memory leakage (BML) settings. We then show a secure construction of the LR-NIKE protocol in the BML setting that achieves an optimal leakage rate, i.e., 1 – o (1). Our construction of LR-NIKE requires a minimal use of a leak-free hardware component. We argue that the use of such a leak-free hardware component seems to be unavoidable in any construction of an LR-NIKE protocol, even in the BML setting. Finally, we show how to construct the aforementioned leakage-resilient primitives from such an LR-NIKE protocol as summarized below. All these primitives also achieve the same (optimal) leakage rate as the underlying LR-NIKE protocol. We show how to construct a leakage-resilient (LR) IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme in the BML model generically from a bounded LR-NIKE (BLR-NIKE) protocol. Our construction of LR-IND-CCA-2 secure PKE differs significantly from the state-of-the-art constructions of these primitives, which mainly use hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resilience. Moreover, our transformation preserves the leakage-rate of the underlying BLR-NIKE protocol. We introduce a new leakage model for AKE protocols, in the BML setting, and present a leakage-resilient AKE protocol construction from the LR-NIKE protocol. We introduce the first-ever leakage model for LLKE protocols in the BML setting and the first construction of such a leakage-resilient LLKE from the LR-NIKE protocol.