Post Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (PKEM) is used to securely exchange symmetric keys over an insecure channel. It allows two parties to establish a shared secret key, which can then be used for symmetric encryption, ensuring confidentiality against quantum attacks. By encapsulating the key, it reduces the need to directly encrypt large amounts of data with the public key, which is computationally expensive. Traditional cryptographic tools, while effective, are complex and susceptible to quantum attacks. This paper contains a robust and lightweight post-quantum security solution, and their performance analysis. The authentication scheme, based on Ring-Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE), uses Bernstein reconstruction in polynomial multiplication to significantly lower computational costs, enabling even resource-limited mobile devices to achieve secure mutual authentication. This paper also contains an analysis of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (PKEM), and it also covers design, security, and real-world implementation issues and provides a prospective outlook on PKEM, taking into account current investigations, possible innovations, and the changing field of quantum computing. The proposed work also offers a thorough investigation of the security features of post-quantum KEMs, together with theoretical and practical concerns.
Post Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanism (PKEM) is used to securely exchange symmetric keys over an insecure channel. It allows two parties to establish a shared secret key, which can then be used for symmetric encryption, ensuring confidentiality against quantum attacks. By encapsulating the key, it reduces the need to directly encrypt large amounts of data with the public key, which is computationally expensive. Traditional cryptographic tools, while effective, are complex and susceptible to quantum attacks. This paper contains a robust and lightweight post-quantum security solution, and their performance analysis. The authentication scheme, based on Ring-Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE), uses Bernstein reconstruction in polynomial multiplication to significantly lower computational costs, enabling even resource-limited mobile devices to achieve secure mutual authentication. This paper also contains an analysis of post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (PKEM), and it also covers design, security, and real-world implementation issues and provides a prospective outlook on PKEM, taking into account current investigations, possible innovations, and the changing field of quantum computing. The proposed work also offers a thorough investigation of the security features of post-quantum KEMs, together with theoretical and practical concerns.
In emerging environments such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT), secure authentication and key negotiation play a crucial role in protecting data transmitted over public networks. However, many existing authentication protocols are still designed based on classical public-key cryptography primitives, and quantum computing may threaten their security. To address this challenge, we propose a post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol that uses the lattice-based Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Our proposed protocol integrates cryptographic authentication, smart card protection, and post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms, enabling mutual authentication between users and servers and securely establishing session keys. The security of the protocol is formally analyzed in the Real-or-Random (ROR) model under the random oracle assumption and the IND-CCA security of the underlying KEM scheme. Furthermore, through informal security analysis, we have further demonstrated that the protocol possesses important security properties, including anonymity, untraceability, perfect forward confidentiality, and resistance to known attacks. In addition, the computational cost and communication overhead of the proposed scheme are evaluated and compared with several representative authentication protocols. The results show that the proposed protocol can provide strong security while maintaining low computational cost and communication overhead.
ABSTRACT A three‐party post‐quantum key agreement protocol involves server with two communicating parties securely agreeing on a shared secret key in a way that is resistant to quantum attacks. Once the shared secret key is shared using authenticated key agreement protocol, then user (A), and user (B) can use it for securing communication channel using symmetric‐key encryption AES‐256 algorithm. Although there are few third‐party post‐quantum authenticated and key agreement schemes exist, but the recent studies in this paper illustrates that they are not satisfying properties like unlinkability, anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and signal leakage attacks. Therefore, the proposed protocol ensures anonymity, unlinkablity, perfect forward secrecy, and resistant against signal leakage attacks. The proposed protocol uses different random numbers for each of sessions and ensures freshness of the session key to maintain forward secrecy. In this protocol, the user (A) only communicates with server, and establish an authenticated session key with user (B) which avoids server overheads. The use of ring learning with errors (RLWE) instead of the simpler learning with errors (LWE) is primarily motivated by the need for efficiency, compactness, and scalability in cryptographic applications. A comparative study, including both performance and security assessments, demonstrates that the proposed design is more secure and efficient.
Quantum computing is a potentially significant threat to classical cryptographic methods, commonly influenced for mobile communication security. In this paper, we propose one secure channel for private, personal mobile devices that are based not only on post-quantum cryptographically algorithm but also to secure communications in the quantum era. NIST-spec kemsKyber2 and Saber represent for irreplaceable session keys in communication against prospective quantum threats. The keys are periodically replaced in order to provide forward secrecy and to protect against an eventual compromise. In addition to the features of mobile platforms, the scheme employs a lightweight authentication protocol applied to lattice-based cryptography which has been shown to be secure and low resource overhead. Testing the proposed solution was practicable and wielded manageable results since it was performed on Android devices with an average key exchange latency of less than 250 milliseconds and a secure message delivery of below 500 milliseconds without compromising the AES-256 equivalence level of privacy. The engineers and software developers with the results from this study could safely claim that practically, it is indeed doable to transfer secure messages on mobile platforms in the post-quantum era and they’d have that same level of confidence with respect to the adoption of cipher suites based on post-quantum standards within any future communication systems.Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography, quantum-resistant encryption, key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), end-to-end encryption (E2EE), quantum key distribution (QKD), mobile communication security, lattice-based cryptography, publickey infrastructure (PKI), quantum computing threats.
With the fast-paced development of quantum computing, classical cryptographic techniques are under severe security threats, prompting the need for post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms for secure data exchange in next-generation network communications. Post-quantum cryptography seeks to protect sensitive data against quantum attacks to provide long-term data confidentiality. But all current cryptographic techniques, including RSA and ECC, are susceptible to quantum algorithms like Shor's algorithm, which can factor large integers efficiently and break discrete logarithm problems, making classical cryptography useless. There is thus a pressing need for quantum attack-resistant encryption mechanisms. To meet these challenges, we introduce the Lattice-Based Cryptography with Hybrid Key Exchange (L-CHKE) framework, which combines lattice-based encryption with a hybrid key exchange mechanism. Lattice-based cryptography provides quantum resistance because it is based on hard mathematical problems such as Learning with Errors (LWE), which provides greater security and efficiency. The designed L-CHKE algorithm strengthens secure key distribution and authentication for next-generation networks, especially for applications needing strong security like financial transactions, IoT, and military communications. Experimental results verify that L-CHKE noticeably boosts computational efficiency by 98.45%, decreases key exchange latency by 42.56%, and guarantees robustness by 97.64% against quantum attacks, indicating it is an appropriate solution for post-quantum secure communication.
In this paper, we have proposed a two-party authenticated key establishment (AKE), and authenticated key transport protocols based on lattice-based cryptography, aiming to provide security against quantum attacks for secure communication. This protocol enables two parties, who may share long-term public keys, to securely establish a shared session key, and transportation of the session key from the server while achieving mutual authentication. Our construction leverages the hardness of lattice problems Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE), ensuring robustness against quantum and classical adversaries. Unlike traditional schemes whose security depends upon number-theoretic assumptions being vulnerable to quantum attacks, our protocol ensures security in the post-quantum era. The proposed protocol ensures forward secrecy, and provides security even if the long-term key is compromised. This protocol also provides essential property key freshness and resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and key mismatch attacks. On the other hand, the proposed key transport protocol provides essential property key freshness, anonymity, and resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonation attacks, replay attacks, and key mismatch attacks. A two-party key transport protocol is a cryptographic protocol in which one party (typically a trusted key distribution center or sender) securely generates and sends a session key to another party. Unlike key exchange protocols (where both parties contribute to key generation), key transport protocols rely on one party to generate the key and deliver it securely. The protocol possesses a minimum number of exchanged messages and can reduce the number of communication rounds to help minimize the communication overhead.
A three-party authenticated key exchange protocol enables two entities to agree on a session key with the help of a dedicated server over public channel. Shor’s algorithm is a big threat for existing authenticated key exchange protocols. Lattice based cryptography plays a very important role in designing authentication and key agreement secure against the threat of quantum attacks. However, it is not easy job to design quantum resistant password based three party protocol due to the high demand for security requirements and the limited resources nature of mobile devices. In this article, we have proposed a new post quantum three party key exchange based on ring learning with errors assumption. This protocol is motivated from Islam et al.’s authenticated key exchange protocol. Their protocol is not secure against stolen smartcard attack, password guessing attack, and can’t provide user anonymity. The anonymous communication is a big requirement for practical applications like e-healthcare services/smart vehicular communication. This paper also contains the performance analysis of the proposed protocol along with other relevant protocols.