Revisiting Quantum Entanglement and Consciousness

John Steven Torday, Robert G. Sacco

Ping Sun, Ravi Prakash

We read with interest the theory of consciousness propounded by Mensky (2011), based on the many-worlds view by Everett. The work done by the author to mathematically frame the many-worlds theory in the field of consciousness is commendable. NeuroQuantology | June 2012 | Volume 10 | Issue 2 | Page 346-347

David L. Wilson

Paavo Pylkkänen, Gustaf Malmberg

Abstract The idea that consciousness is somehow needed to collapse the wave function was emphasized especially by Eugene Wigner in 1961 and has recently been discussed by e.g. David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen. We revisit the reasons why the idea was proposed in the first place and briefly consider Chalmers and McQueen’s discussion.

Paavo Pylkkänen

Michel Bitbol

Abstract Two questions standardly arise about the connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness: “how can consciousness impose a reduction of the physical system’s quantum state?”; and, conversely, “how can consciousness be produced by a quantum process?”. In this paper, such questions are not answered, but considered as symptoms of a cultural bias. Indeed, they involve two terms, consciousness and physical systems, which make the mental attractor of dualism irresistible. As an antidote, the monistic standpoint of phenomenology is adopted. According to phenomenology, consciousness is no thing or property that may exist, but a misleading name for the precondition for any ascription of existence. Several standard conundrums of quantum mechanics are revisited from this standpoint. In particular, the measurement problem (with its concept of state reduction) is immediately dissolved if one adopts a phenomenology-compatible interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is the case of QBism, which starts everything afresh from a first-person standpoint.