5G technology addresses user privacy concerns in cellular networking by encrypting subscriber identifier with ellip-tic curve-based encryption and then transmitting it as ciphertext known as Subscriber Concealed Identifier (SUCI). However, an adversary equipped with a quantum computer can break a discrete logarithm-based elliptic curve algorithm and the user privacy in 5G is at stake against quantum attacks. In this paper, we study the incorporation of the post-quantum ciphers in the SUCI calculation both at the user equipment and at the core network, which involves the shared key exchange and then using the resulting key for the ID encryption. We experiment on different hardware platforms to analyze the PQC key exchange and encryption using NIST-standardized CRYSTALS-Kyber. Our analyses focus on the performances and compare the Kyber-based key exchange and encryption with the current (pre-quantum) Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). The performance analyses are critical because mobile networking involves resource-limited and battery-operating mobile devices. We measure and analyze not only the time and CPU-processing performances but also the energy and power performances. Our results show that Kyber-512 is the most efficient and even has better performance (i.e., faster computations, and lower energy consumption) than ECDH.
5G technology addresses user privacy concerns in cellular networking by encrypting subscriber identifier with ellip-tic curve-based encryption and then transmitting it as ciphertext known as Subscriber Concealed Identifier (SUCI). However, an adversary equipped with a quantum computer can break a discrete logarithm-based elliptic curve algorithm and the user privacy in 5G is at stake against quantum attacks. In this paper, we study the incorporation of the post-quantum ciphers in the SUCI calculation both at the user equipment and at the core network, which involves the shared key exchange and then using the resulting key for the ID encryption. We experiment on different hardware platforms to analyze the PQC key exchange and encryption using NIST-standardized CRYSTALS-Kyber. Our analyses focus on the performances and compare the Kyber-based key exchange and encryption with the current (pre-quantum) Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). The performance analyses are critical because mobile networking involves resource-limited and battery-operating mobile devices. We measure and analyze not only the time and CPU-processing performances but also the energy and power performances. Our results show that Kyber-512 is the most efficient and even has better performance (i.e., faster computations, and lower energy consumption) than ECDH.
5G addresses user privacy concerns in cellular networking by encrypting a subscriber identifier with elliptic-curve-based encryption and then transmitting it as ciphertext known as a Subscriber Concealed Identifier (SUCI). However, an adversary equipped with a quantum computer can break a discrete-logarithm-based elliptic curve algorithm. Consequently, the user privacy in 5G is at stake against quantum attacks. In this paper, we study the incorporation of the post-quantum ciphers in the SUCI calculation both at the user equipment and at the core network, which involves the shared-key exchange and then using the resulting key for the ID encryption. We experiment on different hardware platforms to analyze the PQC key exchange and encryption using NIST-standardized CRYSTALS-Kyber (which is now called an ML-KEM after the standardization selection by NIST). Our analyses focus on the performances and compare the Kyber-based key exchange and encryption with the current (pre-quantum) elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH). The performance analyses are critical because mobile networking involves resource-limited and battery-operating mobile devices. We measure and analyze not only the time and CPU-processing performances but also the energy and power performances. Our analyses show that Kyber-512 is the most efficient and even has better performance (i.e., faster computations and lower energy consumption) than ECDH.
5G saw the introduction of an encrypted user identifier, the Subscriber Concealed Identifier (SUCI), to provide confidentiality of the subscriber's whereabouts and identities. The SUCI protects the new generation of cellular networks against tracking devices, so-called IMSI-catchers, which have undermined users' confidentiality ever since the inception of cellular networks. However, the potential advent of large-scale quantum computers in the near future threatens to compromise the confidentiality provided by the SUCI yet again. The security of the public-key cryptography that underpins the SUCI relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Using Shor's algorithm, a quantum adversary could break the SUCI's cryptography and once more gain the capability to track and identify users. Advancements in quantum computing are unpredictable, and a breakthrough might be only a decade away. Given the slow nature of standards and their implementation, it is thus necessary to already integrate now quantum-resistant cryptography into the current and also next-generation (6G) cellular networks. To contribute to this development, we propose a post-quantum secure scheme for the SUCI calculation, \textttKEMSUCI. To this end, we first analyze the weak points in the current SUCI calculation scheme when considering quantum attacks. We then describe an alternative SUCI calculation scheme based on post-quantum secure key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). Our proposed scheme can use any of the KEMs submitted to the NIST call for standardization of post-quantum secure cryptography (PQC) schemes. For the usage in \textttKEMSUCI, the KEM should provide efficient execution on a SIM card and induce little network communication overhead. We evaluate all of the NIST PQC finalists under these aspects and identify Kyber and Saber as the best fit. Instantiated with these KEMs, \textttKEMSUCI can be integrated into 5G and 6G. Compared to the existing SUPI protection schemes, \textttKEMSUCI exhibits faster execution speed and only little communication overhead.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant challenges to traditional cryptographic systems, threatening the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of digital communications. This paper investigates the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms into mobile communication systems to address these challenges. The study focuses on evaluating key PQC algorithms shortlisted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+, within the context of 5G and future mobile network architectures. The research encompasses the design and implementation of an experimental framework involving mobile devices, servers, and cloud-based infrastructure to simulate real-world communication scenarios. Performance metrics such as key generation time, signature generation, encryption and decryption speed, and resource consumption were analyzed across various devices to identify algorithms suitable for mobile environments. The findings reveal that lattice-based algorithms, such as Kyber and Dilithium, offer a promising balance between security and efficiency, making them ideal for resource-constrained devices. In contrast, hash-based algorithms like SPHINCS+ exhibit higher computational demands, limiting their practicality in certain applications. This work highlights the importance of algorithm selection and hardware optimization in ensuring secure and efficient communications in the quantum era. By integrating theoretical advancements in PQC with practical applications, this research lays the foundation for quantum-resistant security in mobile networks, ensuring secure and future-ready digital communications.
The advent of quantum computing poses significant challenges to traditional cryptographic systems, threatening the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of digital communications. This thesis investigates the integration of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms into mobile communication systems to address these challenges. The study focuses on evaluating key PQC algorithms shortlisted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+, within the context of 5G and future mobile network architectures. The research encompasses the design and implementation of an experimental framework involving mobile devices, servers, and cloud-based infrastructure to simulate real-world communication scenarios. Performance metrics such as key generation time, signature generation, encryption and decryption speed, and resource consumption were analysed across various devices to identify algorithms suitable for mobile environments. The findings reveal that lattice-based algorithms, such as Kyber and Dilithium, offer a promising balance between security and efficiency, making them ideal for resourceconstrained devices. In contrast, hash-based algorithms like SPHINCS+ exhibit higher computational demands, limiting their practicality in certain applications. This work highlights the importance of algorithm selection and hardware optimization in ensuring secure and efficient communications in the quantum era. xi By integrating theoretical advancements in PQC with practical applications, this research lays the foundation for quantum-resistant security in mobile networks, ensuring secure and futureready digital communications.
In mobile networking, specifically in 5G networking, embedded SIM (eSIM) does not rely on the hardware chips to deliver the core network’s public key as traditional SIM cards do. Instead, eSIM utilizes remote digital certificates enabled by Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In this research, we study the post-quantum transition of eSIM-based mobile networking by applying and incorporating the post-quantum ciphers to the digital certificates and authentication. While building on the existing mutual authentication between the user equipment and core network, we build quantum resistance in the digital signatures used for the digital certificate and authentication so that they are secure against quantum-computing attackers. We implement our scheme using the NIST-standardized post-quantum ciphers to evaluate the computing/time and battery/power overheads, which are important for resource-constrained mobile devices. We compare the post-quantum ciphers with the current quantum-vulnerable ciphers and show that the lattice-based schemes have comparable or even better overhead performances.
The rapid expansion of 5G wireless networks has introduced unprecedented security challenges, particularly in the face of emerging quantum computing threats. Traditional cryptographic schemes, including Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), face vulnerabilities against quantum-based attacks, necessitating a transition toward quantum-resistant security solutions. A hybrid cryptographic framework incorporating CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation is proposed to mitigate these threats. CRYSTALS-Kyber, a lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic algorithm, enhances key exchange mechanisms by resisting quantum decryption attempts while maintaining computational efficiency. The proposed framework integrates CRYSTALS-Kyber with conventional ECC to establish a dual-layer security model that ensures backward compatibility while progressively adapting to quantum security standards. Simulation results demonstrate that the hybrid approach significantly enhances key exchange security while maintaining a low computational overhead. In particular, latency is reduced by 18.4% compared to standalone ECC-based key exchange, while key generation time improves by 22.7% due to CRYSTALS-Kyber’s efficient polynomial arithmetic operations. Furthermore, encryption throughput increases by 31.2%, demonstrating the model''s capability to secure high-speed 5G transmissions with minimal performance trade-offs.