Abstract Fifth-generation (5G) network technology is not just an improved extension of the fourth generation; it possesses several key properties, including high capacity, network slicing, low latency, high throughput, and network virtualisation.5G aims to provide a better-quality network. Users can access a variety of web services from any location at any time, thanks to the rapid advancements in wireless communication technologies and the increasing popularity of mobile devices. To provide secure communication, numerous schemes have been developed using the elliptic curve and problems based on the hardness of integer factorisation. However, these problems can be solved by quantum computers in polynomial time. Hence, these protocols are no longer safe on quantum computers. This article proposes a quantum-safe and efficient 5G cross-network slice authentication scheme to counter quantum adversaries. We have utilised the CSIDH-based key exchange protocol to enhance its security against quantum attacks. This scheme is based on the mathematical hard problem of computing the action of an ideal over an elliptic curve that is a commutative isogeny Diffie-Hellman problem (CSIDH). The security of the protocol is proved on the BPR model. Additionally, a comparison of all possible post-quantum 5G solutions using key exchange protocols such as Kyber, Classic McEliece, and SPHINCS+5G has been made.
Abstract Fifth-generation (5G) network technology is not just an improved extension of the fourth generation; it possesses several key properties, including high capacity, network slicing, low latency, high throughput, and network virtualisation.5G aims to provide a better-quality network. Users can access a variety of web services from any location at any time, thanks to the rapid advancements in wireless communication technologies and the increasing popularity of mobile devices. To provide secure communication, numerous schemes have been developed using the elliptic curve and problems based on the hardness of integer factorisation. However, these problems can be solved by quantum computers in polynomial time. Hence, these protocols are no longer safe on quantum computers. This article proposes a quantum-safe and efficient 5G cross-network slice authentication scheme to counter quantum adversaries. We have utilised the CSIDH-based key exchange protocol to enhance its security against quantum attacks. This scheme is based on the mathematical hard problem of computing the action of an ideal over an elliptic curve that is a commutative isogeny Diffie-Hellman problem (CSIDH). The security of the protocol is proved on the BPR model. Additionally, a comparison of all possible post-quantum 5G solutions using key exchange protocols such as Kyber, Classic McEliece, and SPHINCS+5G has been made.
The rapid expansion of 5G wireless networks has introduced unprecedented security challenges, particularly in the face of emerging quantum computing threats. Traditional cryptographic schemes, including Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), face vulnerabilities against quantum-based attacks, necessitating a transition toward quantum-resistant security solutions. A hybrid cryptographic framework incorporating CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation is proposed to mitigate these threats. CRYSTALS-Kyber, a lattice-based post-quantum cryptographic algorithm, enhances key exchange mechanisms by resisting quantum decryption attempts while maintaining computational efficiency. The proposed framework integrates CRYSTALS-Kyber with conventional ECC to establish a dual-layer security model that ensures backward compatibility while progressively adapting to quantum security standards. Simulation results demonstrate that the hybrid approach significantly enhances key exchange security while maintaining a low computational overhead. In particular, latency is reduced by 18.4% compared to standalone ECC-based key exchange, while key generation time improves by 22.7% due to CRYSTALS-Kyber’s efficient polynomial arithmetic operations. Furthermore, encryption throughput increases by 31.2%, demonstrating the model''s capability to secure high-speed 5G transmissions with minimal performance trade-offs.
Security is crucial for wireless communication networks, especially as quantum computing advances rapidly. It won’t be long before quantum attacks become feasible, potentially crippling large wireless networks within minutes. Current methods for securing connections and transactions—such as keys, certificates, and data—could be compromised by quantum computers. One concern is the use of fake base stations with stronger signal strengths to lure users into connecting with them in wireless communication network. A quantum-powered attacker could easily break traditional encryption algorithms and launch various attacks almost instantly. An example of this is the "bidding down" attack, where an attacker convinces both the user and network entities that security features are not upheld, despite their actual presence. This type of attack exploits the security weaknesses of older mobile networks. This paper explores security advancements and challenges related to contemporary public key cryptography, including RSA algorithms based on factorization and discrete logarithm problems with Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC). While these methods provide adequate protection today, quantum computers could potentially break these algorithms or weaken cryptographic keys and hashes within minutes. Quantum cryptography, or quantum-resistant cryptography, objectives to develop algorithms and protocols resilient to quantum computing threats. This paper examines security vulnerabilities in wireless communication networks, focusing on key confirmation and authentication mechanisms. We propose a robust authentication and key agreement protocol for 5G networks using quantum-resistant cryptography. Our proposed protocol, verified with a verification tool, enhances the security of the authentication and key agreement procedures in wireless communication networks.
5G technology addresses user privacy concerns in cellular networking by encrypting subscriber identifier with ellip-tic curve-based encryption and then transmitting it as ciphertext known as Subscriber Concealed Identifier (SUCI). However, an adversary equipped with a quantum computer can break a discrete logarithm-based elliptic curve algorithm and the user privacy in 5G is at stake against quantum attacks. In this paper, we study the incorporation of the post-quantum ciphers in the SUCI calculation both at the user equipment and at the core network, which involves the shared key exchange and then using the resulting key for the ID encryption. We experiment on different hardware platforms to analyze the PQC key exchange and encryption using NIST-standardized CRYSTALS-Kyber. Our analyses focus on the performances and compare the Kyber-based key exchange and encryption with the current (pre-quantum) Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). The performance analyses are critical because mobile networking involves resource-limited and battery-operating mobile devices. We measure and analyze not only the time and CPU-processing performances but also the energy and power performances. Our results show that Kyber-512 is the most efficient and even has better performance (i.e., faster computations, and lower energy consumption) than ECDH.
5G is a fifth-generation mobile network that provides efficient wireless communication over the previous generation. It provides faster data speeds, lower delays, and more capacity to connect with many devices simultaneously. In this work, network slicing in 5G networks is discussed with regard to security measures which include QKD(Quantum Key Distribution) and PQC(Post-Quantum Cryptographic). It allows for the formation of numerous granular and independent virtual networks based on a shared physical network. The model explores security where QKD keys address links and encompass PQC to counter other quantum technology threats in the future. Furthermore, there are reliability measures introduced, including route adjustments, with a self repairing capability for link failure in multi-slice networks. In this approach, the security and reliability features are incorporated in 5G network slicing to address the delivery of the services in the next-generation networks.
The Service-Based Architecture (SBA) of the fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks introduced great advancements in flexibility, efficiency, and performance of modern networks, thanks to the distribution and softwarization of core network entities called Network Functions (NFs). Due to the distributed nature of 5G systems, these NFs are usually located in different sites to provide better Quality of Service (QoS) or specific services, which poses a great challenge regarding security. However, even though the 3GPP standard identifies security requirements by leveraging Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication and OAuth2.0 authorization, current experimental and commercial deployments often disregard these aspects for the sake of simplicity and performance. In fact, even though data and communication protection is crucial, the implementation of security protocols and mechanisms complicates the deployments and may reduce the efficiency of 5G systems. This paper presents a novel solution that implements TLS for authentication and encryption leveraging entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), ensuring that all the communications between NFs in the 5G core network are secured by QKD keys, and are therefore quantum-safe. Additionally, this paper presents a QKD key repository using the Network Repository Function (NRF), which stores and relays TLS session keys to authenticated consumer NFs to access producer NFs in a fast but quantum-safe process. The solution was validated in a real hardware environment, and obtained results demonstrate that the proposed solution enhances the security of the SBA communications in an efficient way, reducing an 85% the service request time compared to the traditional TLS-based procedure, as well as 29.96% fewer bytes transmitted throughout the process.
The digitization of distribution networks necessitates robust, quantum-resistant communication protocols to secure end-to-main-station interactions amid escalating connectivity and quantum computing threats. Traditional cryptographic schemes, susceptible to Shor’s algorithm, prove inadequate in wireless settings marred by fading and interference, while prior QKD-5G hybrids neglect hierarchical architectures and service diversity. This paper proposes an innovative framework that fuses quantum key distribution (QKD) with 5G primitives—such as beamforming and network slicing—to realize stratified authentication, adaptive one-time-pad key distribution, and service-tailored protocols. Core innovations encompass threshold-based edge key pooling for enhanced scalability, channel state information (CSI)-driven QKD adaptations for noise mitigation, and convex-optimized slicing for isolating ultra-reliable low-latency (URLLC) and enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) services. Security analysis establishes information-theoretic assurances against semi-honest adversaries, with simulations demonstrating superior key rates, low latencies, and large-scale terminal support—outperforming baselines in resilience. This framework propels quantum-secure smart grids forward, alleviating post-quantum vulnerabilities and promoting resilient energy systems.