Abstract Panmicropsychism is the hypothesis that the physical ultimates of our universe (i.e., its fundamental physical ingredients) are also its phenomenal ultimates (i.e., its fundamental phenomenal ingredients). In this paper, I argue that, just as the mathematical description of the physical ultimates of our universe displays simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should similarly expect the mathematical description of the phenomenal ultimates to reflect these same qualities. I exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities – color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems (qubits) in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems.
Abstract Panmicropsychism is the hypothesis that the physical ultimates of our universe (i.e., its fundamental physical ingredients) are also its phenomenal ultimates (i.e., its fundamental phenomenal ingredients). In this paper, I argue that, just as the mathematical description of the physical ultimates of our universe displays simplicity, symmetry, and beauty, panmicropsychists should similarly expect the mathematical description of the phenomenal ultimates to reflect these same qualities. I exemplify this claim using what is arguably the simplest of all types of phenomenal qualities – color. Specifically, I utilize phenomenological data on color to construct the maximally symmetric mathematical description of phenomenal color space. I then show that this mathematical description is isomorphic to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems (qubits) in a mixed state. Based on this isomorphism, I suggest that color may be the phenomenal dual aspect of two-state quantum systems.
We will argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness, similar to that of Husserl, shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events, with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain.
We argue that a phenomenological analysis of consciousness similar to that of Husserl shows that the effects of phenomenal qualities shape our perception of the world. It also shows the way the physical and mathematical sciences operate, allowing us to accurately describe the observed regularities in terms of communicable mathematical laws. The latter say nothing about the intrinsic features of things. They only refer to the observed regularities in their behaviors, providing rigorous descriptions of how the universe works, to which any viable ontology must conform. Classical mechanistic determinism limits everything that can occur to what happens in an instant and leaves no room for novelty or any intrinsic aspect that is not epiphenomenal. The situation changes with quantum probabilistic determinism if one takes seriously the ontology that arises from its axioms of objects, systems in certain states, and the events they produce in other objects. As Bertrand Russell pointed out almost a century ago, an ontology of events with an internal phenomenal aspect, now known as panprotopsychism, is better suited to explaining the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. The central observation of this paper is that many objections to panpsychism and panprotopsychism, which are usually called the combination problem, arise from implicit hypotheses based on classical physics about supervenience. These are inappropriate at the quantum level, where an exponential number of emergent properties and states arise. The analysis imposes conditions on the possible implementations of quantum cognition mechanisms in the brain.
Quantum mechanics is often perceived as conceptually paradoxical because it appears to conflict with deeply rooted intuitions about fixed reality, determinism, and observation. This paper does not propose a new physical theory. Instead, it offers an epistemological reframing of quantum mechanics: not as a direct mathematical unveiling of a fully fixed pre-existing reality, but as a highly precise description of phenomenological structures emerging through observational conditions and interaction. The paper explores: the distinction between mathematical predictive success and ontological completeness, the role of human perception in constructing “fixed reality” intuitions, the phenomenological nature of qualities such as color and temperature, the possibility that some conceptual tensions in quantum mechanics arise from assumptions inherited from macroscopic cognition, and how quantum theory may be interpreted as describing observable structures rather than fixed hidden states. The work intentionally avoids mystical, anti-scientific, or consciousness-centric interpretations of quantum mechanics. It does not deny the existence of reality, nor reject modern physics. Rather, it attempts to clarify what exactly mathematical models are describing when applied to quantum phenomena. This text is positioned as a conceptual and phenomenological reorganization of perspective — a small doorway toward reconsidering how humans frame “reality” itself.
FINDING: Panpsychism discourse centers on whether consciousness is fundamental physics, but the provided sources contain no quantitative mathematical models, equations, or constants — only philosophical arguments and video summaries. | MATH: None extracted — no equations, constants, or ratios appear in the search results. The closest is a reference to "quantum information panpsychism" (Faggin/D'Ariano), but no formal mathematical formalism (e.g., quantum state vectors, information-theoretic entropy, or operator algebras) is given. | CONNECTION: No geometric harmony, golden ratios, base-60, or crystallographic symmetries are present. The only structural hint is the implicit binary opposition (material vs. phenomenal) — not a mathematical symmetry. | DEPTH: 1 — The findings are qualitative philosophical claims, not mathematical physics. No testable equations, no constants, no geometric structure. The depth rating reflects absence of mathematical content, not the philosophical interest of Author: Andrew Stewart Caldin, Independent Researcher, UK. Part of the E8 Intelligence Research series. Platform: e8intelligence.com
This preprint develops Dual-Aspect Quantum Theory (DAQT), a framework that interprets the two fundamental dynamical modes of quantum mechanics, unitary evolution and collapse, as possessing intrinsic subjective aspects. The theory is motivated by the attempt to place phenomenology, evolutionary constraints, and physical processes within a single coherent ontology. Beginning from the conditional hypothesis that consciousness is real and not wholly epiphenomenal, the paper argues that consciousness has a dual functional structure: qualia modulate probabilistic tendencies, while agency resolves open alternatives into actual behavior. DAQT then proposes that quantum theory provides the clearest known structural match for this architecture. On that basis, it advances a dual-aspect interpretation in which unitary evolution has a qualitative interior and collapse an agential interior. Within this framework, several major problems in the philosophy of mind, including the Hard Problem, the conceivability of philosophical zombies, and the Combination Problem, are not treated as isolated puzzles but are reformulated as internal consequences of the same psychophysical structure. The paper also explores the mathematical characterization of qualia, the role of entanglement in unified consciousness, and the possibility of a biologically plausible mechanism capable of exploiting these dynamics. Rather than claiming a deductive proof or a completed empirical model, DAQT is presented as a coherent explanatory program for the functional role, physical locus, and ontological status of consciousness.
What is the proper metaphysics of quantum mechanics? In this dissertation, I approach the question from three different but related angles. First, I suggest that the quantum state can be understood intrinsically as relations holding among regions in ordinary space-time, from which we can recover the wave function uniquely up to an equivalence class (by representation and uniqueness theorems). The intrinsic account eliminates certain conventional elements (e.g. overall phase) in the representation of the quantum state. It also dispenses with first-order quantification over mathematical objects, which goes some way towards making the quantum world safe for a nominalistic metaphysics suggested in Field (1980, 2016). Second, I argue that the fundamental space of the quantum world is the low-dimensional physical space and not the high-dimensional space isomorphic to the ``configuration space.'' My arguments are based on considerations about dynamics, empirical adequacy, and symmetries of the quantum mechanics. Third, I show that, when we consider quantum mechanics in a time-asymmetric universe (with a large entropy gradient), we obtain new theoretical and conceptual possibilities. In such a model, we can use the low-entropy boundary condition known as the Past Hypothesis (Albert, 2000) to pin down a natural initial quantum state of the universe. However, the universal quantum state is not a pure state but a mixed state, represented by a density matrix that is the normalized projection onto the Past Hypothesis subspace. This particular choice has interesting consequences for Humean supervenience, statistical mechanical probabilities, and theoretical unity.