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Quantum Computing and Cryptography: European and U.S. Perspectives

Alexandre Davitaia

Published Jan 1, 2025• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.5276210

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Virtually all asymmetric cryptographic schemes currently in use are threatened by the potential development of powerful quantum computers. Although there is currently no definite answer and it is very unclear when or even if CRQC will ever be built and the gap between modern quantum computers and the envisioned CRQC is huge, the risk of creating CRQC means that currently deployed public key cryptography must be replaced by quantum-resistant ones alternatives. For example, information encrypted using modern public key cryptography can be recorded by cryptanalysts and then attacked if a QRQC can be created. The potential harm that CRQC could cause is the basis of the motivation to seek countermeasures, even though we have uncertainties about when and if these computers can be built. Deployed systems that use public key cryptography can also take years to update. Post-quantum cryptography is one way to combat quantum computer threats. Its security is based on the complexity of mathematical problems that are currently considered unsolvable efficiently – even with the help of quantum computers. Post-quantum cryptography deals with the development and research of asymmetric cryptosystems, which, according to current knowledge, cannot be broken even by powerful quantum computers. These methods are based on mathematical problems for the solution of which neither efficient classical algorithms nor efficient quantum algorithms are known today. Various approaches to the implementation of post-quantum cryptography are used in modern research, including: code-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, hashing-based cryptography, isogeny-based cryptography, and multidimensional cryptography. The purpose of this work is to review the computational model of quantum computers; quantum algorithms, which have the greatest impact on modern cryptography; the risk of creating cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC); security of symmetric cryptography and public key cryptography in the presence of CRQC; NIST PQC standardization efforts; transition to quantum-resistant public-key cryptography; relevance, views and current state of development of quantum-resistant cryptography in the European Union. It also highlights the progress of the most important effort in the field: NIST's standardization of post-quantum cryptography.

Radiotekhnika•Sep 28, 2022•2 citations
Virtually all asymmetric cryptographic schemes currently in use are threatened by the potential development of powerful quantum computers. Although there is currently no definite answer and it is very unclear when or even if CRQC will ever be built and the gap between modern quantum computers and the envisioned CRQC is huge, the risk of creating CRQC means that currently deployed public key cryptography must be replaced by quantum-resistant ones alternatives. For example, information encrypted using modern public key cryptography can be recorded by cryptanalysts and then attacked if a QRQC can be created. The potential harm that CRQC could cause is the basis of the motivation to seek countermeasures, even though we have uncertainties about when and if these computers can be built. Deployed systems that use public key cryptography can also take years to update. Post-quantum cryptography is one way to combat quantum computer threats. Its security is based on the complexity of mathematical problems that are currently considered unsolvable efficiently – even with the help of quantum computers. Post-quantum cryptography deals with the development and research of asymmetric cryptosystems, which, according to current knowledge, cannot be broken even by powerful quantum computers. These methods are based on mathematical problems for the solution of which neither efficient classical algorithms nor efficient quantum algorithms are known today. Various approaches to the implementation of post-quantum cryptography are used in modern research, including: code-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, hashing-based cryptography, isogeny-based cryptography, and multidimensional cryptography. The purpose of this work is to review the computational model of quantum computers; quantum algorithms, which have the greatest impact on modern cryptography; the risk of creating cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC); security of symmetric cryptography and public key cryptography in the presence of CRQC; NIST PQC standardization efforts; transition to quantum-resistant public-key cryptography; relevance, views and current state of development of quantum-resistant cryptography in the European Union. It also highlights the progress of the most important effort in the field: NIST's standardization of post-quantum cryptography.