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Foundations of Physics

Composite Observers, Empirical Adequacy, and the Combination Problem in Relational Quantum Mechanics: a Reply to Adlam

Timotheus Riedel

Published May 28, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract Relational Quantum Mechanics posits that facts about the properties of physical systems are relative to other systems. As recently pointed out by Adlam, this gives rise to the question of the relationship between the facts that obtain relative to complex systems and the facts that obtain relative to their constituents. In this paper, I respond to Adlam’s discussion of what she calls the Combination Problem. My starting point is a maximally permissive default view according to which any collection of systems counts as a new system and composites inherit all facts that obtain relative to their constituents. Subsequently, I advance three main claims: First, that Adlam’s arguments in favour of a more restrictive approach are not compelling. Second, that even if they were, she is wrong to claim that a ‘tamed’ version of RQM with postulated links between perspectives is in a better position to support such a restrictive approach. And third, that the possibly most difficult aspect of the Combination Problem in fact pertains to the combination of quantum states and probabilities. While significant challenges for the permissive solution arise here, I argue that they are likely to arise for any plausible response to the Combination Problem. More tentatively, I propose a strategy to mitigate the difficulty based on the observer-dependence of relative quantum state assignments. Along the way, I address crucial foundational issues in Relational Quantum Mechanics, from cross-perspective communication to the link between relative facts and experiences to empirical adequacy.

DOI
10.1007/s10701-025-00853-2

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Abstract Relational Quantum Mechanics posits that facts about the properties of physical systems are relative to other systems. As recently pointed out by Adlam, this gives rise to the question of the relationship between the facts that obtain relative to complex systems and the facts that obtain relative to their constituents. In this paper, I respond to Adlam’s discussion of what she calls the Combination Problem. My starting point is a maximally permissive default view according to which any collection of systems counts as a new system and composites inherit all facts that obtain relative to their constituents. Subsequently, I advance three main claims: First, that Adlam’s arguments in favour of a more restrictive approach are not compelling. Second, that even if they were, she is wrong to claim that a ‘tamed’ version of RQM with postulated links between perspectives is in a better position to support such a restrictive approach. And third, that the possibly most difficult aspect of the Combination Problem in fact pertains to the combination of quantum states and probabilities. While significant challenges for the permissive solution arise here, I argue that they are likely to arise for any plausible response to the Combination Problem. More tentatively, I propose a strategy to mitigate the difficulty based on the observer-dependence of relative quantum state assignments. Along the way, I address crucial foundational issues in Relational Quantum Mechanics, from cross-perspective communication to the link between relative facts and experiences to empirical adequacy.
Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interesting alternative to the standard responses to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. But it suffers from a distinctive kind of epistemic solipsism: an observer can’t in principle know anything beyond their immediate present experience. This makes RQM self-undermining: it takes away the evidence we have for believing in quantum mechanics in the first place. Recently, Adlam and Rovelli have proposed a solution to this problem in the form of a new postulate they call cross-perspective links. Here I argue that this postulate does indeed solve the skeptical problem, but it also removes those aspects of RQM that make it distinctively relational. Nevertheless, the result of equipping RQM with cross-perspective links is an interesting interpretation in its own right.
This paper examines the metaphysical foundations of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM), with special attention to its compatibility with scientific realism. We argue that RQM faces a dilemma. In its original formulation, RQM secures a sparse ontology of relative quantum events, but lacks the world-building structure needed to explain how these events jointly constitute a single, coherent reality of the kind presupposed by scientific realism. Recent discussions have already emphasized the difficulties that RQM faces concerning intersubjective agreement, communication, and the emergence of stable facts. Our contribution is to diagnose these difficulties as symptoms of a deeper metaphysical problem: RQM provides relative facts, but no clear account of what makes them facts of one world. We then assess the revised formulation proposed by Adlam and Rovelli, centered on the Cross-Perspective Links (CPL) principle. While CPL aims to restore intersubjective agreement by guaranteeing consistency across perspectives, we argue that it does so at a significant cost. It introduces observer-independent facts, persistent information-bearing structures, and global consistency constraints that sit uneasily with the relational spirit of the original interpretation. Thus, RQM either remains thoroughly relational but metaphysically too weak to support robust scientific realism, or it repairs this weakness by compromising its own relational foundations.
This paper examines the explanatory adequacy of formulations of relational quantum mechanics by distinguishing two levels of relationality. Intra-event relationality concerns the specification of a fact that obtains relative to a system in a particular interaction; inter-event relationality concerns the constraints connecting an event to subsequent events, physical records, and a relational history. Using established results from measurement theory, we show that an effect can specify the statistics of the current outcome without uniquely determining the conditional operation or the statistics of subsequent sequences. Likewise, a fixed coupling and ready state do not uniquely determine the structure of retrievable records unless the readout is specified. We accordingly introduce a task-relative criterion of explanatory adequacy: the required structures must be assessed against the particular explanatory role that a formulation assigns to an event, a relational fact, or a link between perspectives. The conclusion is not that RQM must derive instruments, dynamics, or linking rules from relational principles. A formulation that explicitly incorporates these structures can be fully adequate for the task in question. The paper contributes a distinction between intra-event and inter-event adequacy, a unified criterion for the division of explanatory labor, and a task-relative definition of an architectural deficit.
This article uses the existing literature on the panpsychist combination problem as a starting point to think about how to address a structurally similar combination problem in relational quantum mechanics. I note some similarities and differences between the two problems, and I consider various proposed solutions to the panpsychist problem, assessing the prospects for a similar solution in the context of RQM. I argue that overall the prospects for solving RQM's combination problem look better for RQM with cross-perspective links than for orthodox versions of RQM.
We discuss the status of relative facts - the central concept of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) - in the context of the new amendment to RQM called cross-perspective links postulate. The new axiom states that by a proper measurement one learns the value of the relative outcome/fact earlier obtained by another observer-system. We discuss a Wigner-Friend-type scenario in which, without cross-perspective links postulate, relative facts have no predictive or causal power, whereas including cross-perspective links makes them effectively hidden variables, which causally determine outcomes of specific measurements. However, cross-perspective links axiom invalidates the other axiom of RQM, the one which states that in a Wigner-Friend scenario, RQM assigns an entangled state to the Friend and System after the unitary transformation of their interaction, despite the appearance of the relative fact for the Friend. This quantum mechanical state according to RQM properly describes the situation for Wigner. From this we show that RQM with cross-perspective links axiom is an internally inconsistent hidden variable theory and therefore cannot be treated as an interpretation of quantum mechanics in any sense.
Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on the idea that quantum states do not describe an absolute property of a system but rather a relationship between systems. There have recently been some criticisms of RQM pertaining to issues around intersubjectivity. In this article, we show how RQM can address these criticisms by adding a new postulate which requires that all of the information possessed by a certain observer is stored in physical variables of that observer and thus is accessible by measurement to other observers. This makes it possible for observers to reach intersubjective agreement about quantum events that have occurred in the past. We suggest a possible ontology for a version of RQM employing this postulate; this ontology upholds the principle that quantum states are always relational, but it also postulates a set of quantum events that are not strictly relational. We show that the new postulate helps address the preferred basis problem in RQM.