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IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics

Post Quantum-Resistant Blind Signature Scheme for Consumer Internet of Things Security

Mohammed E. Seno, Janjhyam Venkata Naga Ramesh, Aadam Quraishi, Azzah A. AlGhamdi, KDV Prasad, Divya Nimma, Yelisela Rajesh, Uguloy Berdieva, Mukesh Soni

Published May 1, 2025• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

To overcome the issue of traditional blind signature schemes being vulnerable to quantum computing attacks during interactions over the consumer electronic Internet of Things (CIoT), a new blind signature scheme called CDBS has been developed. The post quantum digital signature technique CRYSTALS-Dilithium, which was standardized by NIST, serves as the foundation for the quantum-resistant blind signature scheme, CDBS, presented in this study. This system is appropriate for a variety of internet application scenarios, including e-ticketing, anonymous payments, and privacy protection, because it integrates the idea of blind signatures, which is not included in typical digital signature schemes. This scheme is designed to resist quantum computing attacks and is based on the post-quantum digital signature algorithm CRYSTALS-Dilithium, which NIST has selected. The whole technique utilizes the Fiat-Shamir signature structure, which consists of five stages: key creation, blinding, signing, unblinding, and verification. The security of the proposed scheme is dependent on the resolution of the Module Learning with Errors (MLWE) problem and the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. Additionally, the scheme must satisfy the criteria of correctness, blindness, and unforgeability. According to the test results, the CRYSTALS-Dilithium scheme requires an average of 401.89 μ s for a single round of verification and signing. The CDBS technique takes an average of 657.65 ls for one round of signing and verification since the blinding and unblinding modules are added on top of the original algorithm, increasing the algorithm’s complexity. The software testing results indicate that the average time required to complete a single full blind signature and verification operation is 657.65 microseconds. The suggested system offers a framework for expanding the CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature algorithm.

DOI
10.1109/tce.2025.3570340

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To overcome the issue of traditional blind signature schemes being vulnerable to quantum computing attacks during interactions over the consumer electronic Internet of Things (CIoT), a new blind signature scheme called CDBS has been developed. The post quantum digital signature technique CRYSTALS-Dilithium, which was standardized by NIST, serves as the foundation for the quantum-resistant blind signature scheme, CDBS, presented in this study. This system is appropriate for a variety of internet application scenarios, including e-ticketing, anonymous payments, and privacy protection, because it integrates the idea of blind signatures, which is not included in typical digital signature schemes. This scheme is designed to resist quantum computing attacks and is based on the post-quantum digital signature algorithm CRYSTALS-Dilithium, which NIST has selected. The whole technique utilizes the Fiat-Shamir signature structure, which consists of five stages: key creation, blinding, signing, unblinding, and verification. The security of the proposed scheme is dependent on the resolution of the Module Learning with Errors (MLWE) problem and the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. Additionally, the scheme must satisfy the criteria of correctness, blindness, and unforgeability. According to the test results, the CRYSTALS-Dilithium scheme requires an average of 401.89 μ s for a single round of verification and signing. The CDBS technique takes an average of 657.65 ls for one round of signing and verification since the blinding and unblinding modules are added on top of the original algorithm, increasing the algorithm’s complexity. The software testing results indicate that the average time required to complete a single full blind signature and verification operation is 657.65 microseconds. The suggested system offers a framework for expanding the CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature algorithm.
Abstract Traditional threshold signature schemes, which are based on number-theoretic problems, are vulnerable to attacks in quantum computing environments. Moreover, these schemes incur high communication and computational costs among nodes, which pose significant challenges for meeting the stringent requirements of interactive security and real-time performance in power grid load regulation systems. To address these challenges, this paper introduces a post-quantum threshold signature scheme based on CRYSTALS-Dilithium (CDTS) specifically designed for power grid load regulation systems. Constructed within the Fiat-Shamir framework and integrating a CRYSTALS-Dilithium-based threshold signature, this scheme effectively ensures the system’s fault tolerance and security in the face of quantum computing threats. In terms of efficiency, the CDTS scheme significantly reduces computational overheads through the introduction of rejection sampling techniques and the optimization of the number-theoretic transform algorithm. To further enhance the scheme’s adaptability to the dynamic nature of power grid load regulation, an innovative dynamic threshold adjustment mechanism is proposed. This mechanism monitors load changes in real-time within a ΔT\Delta TΔT Δ T time window, allowing for flexible adjustments to the threshold parameters. Security analysis confirms that the proposed scheme satisfies the security requirements of power grid load regulation systems, making it a robust solution for ensuring secure and efficient load regulation in the quantum era. We conducted rigorous experimental comparisons under the same security level (NIST Level 3) and system scale ( th=5,n=10th=5, n=10th=5,n=10 t h = 5 , n = 10 ), the sizes of the public key (1.32 KB), private key (2.01 KB), and signature (2.45 KB) of the CDTS scheme are almost identical to those of the original Dilithium scheme. This data demonstrates that the threshold construction we proposed is nearly lossless in terms of storage efficiency, significantly outperforming the exponential overhead growth typically brought by traditional scheme. Through rigorous software testing and verification, we evaluated the performance of the CDTS scheme by randomly generating a 59-byte message and iteratively executing the signing process 10,000 times. The results indicate that the CDTS scheme achieves a complete signature and verification process in an average of 506.73 microseconds. This efficiency makes the CDTS scheme highly feasible for practical applications, particularly in environments requiring rapid and secure transaction processing.
Proxy signatures enable the secure delegation of signing authority, which is particularly useful in resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) environments. However, most existing schemes rely on classical hardness assumptions and therefore cannot resist quantum attacks. To address the challenge, we propose a post-quantum proxy signature scheme based on Dilithium for IoT scenarios. We first propose an asynchronous remote key generation (ARKG) scheme based on CRYSTALS-Kyber, enabling the delegator and proxy signer to generate proxy keys of Dilithium without real-time interaction. We further integrate ARKG with the Dilithium signature scheme to construct a proxy signature scheme called DPS while ensuring the unlinkability of proxy signatures. Additionally, our proposed DPS achieves post-quantum security and provides unforgeability, distinguishability, verifiability, and undeniability with formal proofs. Experimental performance evaluation shows that our scheme yields significant efficiency gains over existing quantum-safe proxy signature solutions, with 10× speedup for both the delegation and proxy signing phases, as well as a 2.4× improvement in the verification phase.
The Edge-enabled Industrial Internet of Things (Edge-IIoT) has emerged as a fundamental architecture for intelligent manufacturing by enabling low-latency data collection, processing, and communication among distributed industrial devices. However, the open and distributed nature of Edge-IIoT introduces significant challenges to secure data authentication and privacy preservation. Meanwhile, conventional public key infrastructure incurs considerable certificate management overhead and is not well suited for future industrial environments in the presence of quantum computing. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a lattice-based certificateless blind signature scheme for secure and privacy-preserving authentication in Edge-IIoT. The proposed scheme integrates the Dilithium signature algorithm with certificateless public key cryptography and blind signature techniques to simultaneously provide anonymous authentication, data integrity, conditional identity revocation, and post-quantum security while eliminating the certificate management overhead associated with traditional public key infrastructures. Furthermore, the proposed construction improves existing lattice-based certificateless blind signature schemes by addressing identified security weaknesses and strengthening resistance against forgery attacks, while effectively avoiding the key escrow problem inherent in identity-based cryptography. The correctness, blindness, and unforgeability of the proposed scheme are formally proved in the random oracle model based on the hardness of the Module Short Integer Solution (MSIS) problem. In addition, theoretical performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme incurs acceptable computational, communication, and storage overhead while providing comprehensive security properties, including certificateless operation, identity anonymity, no key escrow, conditional revocation, and post-quantum security. Overall, the proposed scheme achieves an effective balance between security, privacy preservation, and efficiency, which exhibits favorable theoretical security-efficiency trade-offs for secure industrial data authentication in resource-constrained Edge-IIoT environments. Practical implementation is left for future investigation.
Since its birth by Chaum, blind signatures have become one of the fundamental components in the so-called e-cash or e-voting. The scheme ensures a message to be blinded before being signed. Among all lattice-based signatures submitted to NIST post-quantum cryptographic standardization, Dilithium is a very promising candidate. The scheme has some advantages such as simple to implement securely, conservative with parameters and minimal in total size of public key and signature. In this paper, we propose a blind signature scheme based on the framework of Dilithium in order to take advantages of Dilithium. The proposed scheme is blind and one-more unforgeable secure in the random oracle model under the hardness of the module Learning with Errors problem MLWE and the module short integer solution problem MSIS.
With the advancement in quantum computing technology, the number theory-based hard problems underlying traditional searchable encryption algorithms are now vulnerable to efficient quantum attacks. To address this challenge, this paper proposes Dilithium-PAEKS (Dilithium-Public Authenticated Encryption with Keyword Search), a searchable encryption scheme based on the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm CRYSTALS-Dilithium. By transforming the verification relationship of digital signatures into a matching relationship between trapdoors and ciphertexts, the scheme not only meets the functional requirements of searchable encryption but also demonstrates quantum resistance. The implementation enhances algorithm efficiency through keyword-based signatures and dynamic matching testing mechanisms. The security of the scheme is defined by the MLWE and MSIS hard problems, with proofs of keyword ciphertext indistinguishability and trapdoor indistinguishability under the random oracle model. Additionally, the scheme provides strong resistance against both outside and insider keyword guessing attacks through sender–receiver binding mechanisms and trapdoor indistinguishability properties. Experimental results show that, compared to the post-quantum schemes CP-Absel and LB-FSSE, the proposed scheme demonstrates superior overall computational efficiency while maintaining stronger quantum resistance than the traditional scheme SM9-PAEKS.
The development of quantum computers is a threat to current cryptographic algorithms, such as the RSA algorithm. Due to this, the development of post quantum cryptography is a topic of research. One digital signature algorithm that is proposed as a quantum proof solution is the Dilithium digital signature system. Dilithium is based on a learning with errors problem (LWE) in which the value of generated signatures includes an error term. The security of Dilithium is based on previous re- search on topics such as the Module LWE problem, the Fiat Shamir transformation with aborts and the Module Short integer solution problem (MSIS ). The reference implementation includes optimization in the signature generation process. By using the number theoretic transform the multiplication of the ring elements is point-wise or in other words in linear time. This thesis presents the mathematical foundations on which the systems security is based on. In addition, the security of digital signatures, identification schemes and the LWE problem are discussed. In the final chapter these topics are brought together to present the Dilithium scheme.