Authentication of the information is an important objective in distributed environments. In these environments when the multi-device authentication is required, a significant role is played by proxy-multi signature in diminishing the communication and computation overload. In this paper, we propose the first quantum-resistant proxy-multi signature scheme based on multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC). The security of this scheme depends on the hardness of multivariate quadratic problem. The proposed scheme enjoys the fulfilment of all the required security properties.
Authentication of the information is an important objective in distributed environments. In these environments when the multi-device authentication is required, a significant role is played by proxy-multi signature in diminishing the communication and computation overload. In this paper, we propose the first quantum-resistant proxy-multi signature scheme based on multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC). The security of this scheme depends on the hardness of multivariate quadratic problem. The proposed scheme enjoys the fulfilment of all the required security properties.
The threshold proxy signcryption can implement signature and encryption simultaneously in one logical step, and can be used to realize the decentralized protection of the group signature key, so it is an efficient technology for network security. Currently, most of the existing threshold proxy signcryption schemes are designed based on the traditional public key cryptosystems, and their security mainly depends on the difficulty of the large integer decomposition and the discrete logarithm. However, the traditional public key cryptosystems cannot resist the quantum computer attack, which makes the existing threshold proxy signcryption schemes based on traditional public key cryptosystems insecure against quantum attacks. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a threshold proxy signcryption scheme based on Multivariate Public Key Cryptosystem (MPKC) which is one of the quantum attack-resistent public key algorithms. Under the premise of satisfying the threshold signcryption requirements of the threshold proxy, our scheme can not only realize the flexible participation of the proxy signcrypters but also resist the quantum computing attack. Finally, based on the assumption of Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and Isomorphism Polynomial (IP) problem, the proof of the confidentiality and the unforgeability of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model is given.
The existing certificateless signcryption schemes were designed mainly based on the traditional public key cryptography, in which the security relies on the hard problems, such as factor decomposition and discrete logarithm. However, these problems will be easily solved by the quantum computing. So the existing certificateless signcryption schemes are vulnerable to the quantum attack. Multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC), which can resist the quantum attack, is one of the alternative solutions to guarantee the security of communications in the post-quantum age. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a new construction of the certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme (CLMSC) based on MPKC. The new scheme inherits the security of MPKC, which can withstand the quantum attack. Multivariate quadratic polynomial operations, which have lower computation complexity than bilinear pairing operations, are employed in signcrypting a message for a certain number of receivers in our scheme. Security analysis shows that our scheme is a secure MPKC-based scheme. We proved its security under the hardness of the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and its unforgeability under the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) assumption in the random oracle model. The analysis results show that our scheme also has the security properties of non-repudiation, perfect forward secrecy, perfect backward secrecy and public verifiability. Compared with the existing schemes in terms of computation complexity and ciphertext length, our scheme is more efficient, which makes it suitable for terminals with low computation capacity like smart cards.
Proxy signature is a very useful technique which allows the original signer to delegate the signing capability to a proxy signer to perform the signing operation. It finds wide applications especially in the distributed environment where the entities such as the wireless sensors are short of computational power and needed to be convinced to the authenticity of the server. Due to less proxy signature schemes in the post-quantum cryptography aspect, in this article, we investigate the proxy signature in the post-quantum setting so that it can resist against the potential attacks from the quantum adversaries. A general multivariate public key cryptographic proxy scheme based on a multivariate public key cryptographic signature scheme is proposed, and a heuristic security proof is given for our general construction. We show that the construction can reach Existential Unforgeability under an Adaptive Chosen Message Attack with Proxy Key Exposure assuming that the underlying signature is Existential Unforgeability under an Adaptive Chosen Message Attack. We then use our general scheme to construct practical proxy signature schemes for three well-known and promising multivariate public key cryptographic signature schemes. We implement our schemes and compare with several previous constructions to show our efficiency advantage, which further indicates the potential application prospect in the distributed network environment.
Much of the assumed safety and security of classical cryptographic building blocks depends on the hardness of number-theoretical problems. However, Shor's algorithm proves that conventional cryptographic systems are no longer secure under quantum systems. As a response to this challenge, researchers started to develop a new cryptographic method known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is based on hard computational problem that can resist the quantum threats. The multivariate public-key cryptography (MPKC) is one such candidate. The theoretical security of MPKC comes from the intractability of the MQ problem, which is believed to be NP-hard. Herein, we analyze the security of MQDSS signature scheme proposed by Chen et al. We investigate the proof of security of MQDSS, assuming that the malicious party can access to the quantum resources. We demonstrate that in its current state, MQDSS has quite a few insecurities in the quantum setting. In response to the proposed threats, we pitch possible modifications to MQDSS. We emphasize that our proposed security threats do not restrict themselves to MQDSS, and can be extended to other MPKC and PQC based cryptographic primitives.
Those existing proxy signature schemes are mainly based on the assumed hardness of Big Integer Factoring problem and Discrete Logarithm problem. So they can't resist quantum attacks. This proxy signature scheme is based on the assumed hardness of some lattice problem, which can resist quantum attack. The key pair of proxy signer was generated using basis delegation technology. Combined with GPV basic signature scheme, the proxy signature scheme was constructed. This scheme is satisfied with all the security property of proxy signature schemes. Based on this scheme, variant lattice-based proxy signature schemes will be designed, such as blind proxy signature, multi-grade proxy signature, and identity-based proxy signature etc.
With the development of science and technology and the appearance of various special conditions that cause signers to be unable to sign, proxy signature is gradually becoming a hot spot in cryptography research. This paper combines proxy signature, quantum teleportation, and multi-party verification and proposes a multi-party verifiable quantum proxy signature scheme based on quantum teleportation. This scheme has the following characteristics: The authentication method based on the Hash function can effectively solve the problem of identity identification among members; in order for the proxy signer to be able to verify the correctness of the proxy authorization, a form of proxy signature authorization that concatenates the identity information of the original signer is used. The security analysis shows that our scheme is unforgeable and undeniable and can resist intercept-resend attacks and cheating attacks.