The emergence of quantum computing poses a threat to classical cryptography algorithms, necessitating a shift to quantum secure cryptography. Hybrid protocols combining at least one classical and one quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm are becoming the standard for securing communications. In this work, we present our novel solution for integrating three different cryptographic assumptions (two of them quantumresistant) into hybrid network security protocols, ensuring that three different cryptographic assumptions must be broken before the protocol becomes vulnerable. Our solution allows for a seamless integration of classical and post-quantum (PQ) cryptography, and quantum key distribution (QKD) into existing network security protocols (e.g., TLS, IPsec) without any major modifications to the protocols themselves. This crypto-agility ensures the mitigation of some of the most well known challenges of both PQ cryptography and QKD. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of such triple-hybrid network security protocols, showing non-substantial decrease in performance and almost no added packet overhead compared to state of the art protocols. In exchange, we pave the way towards next generation networks where the potential of new quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes can be leveraged in a dynamic and agile fashion, thus fostering a new era of unbreakable communication systems.
The emergence of quantum computing poses a threat to classical cryptography algorithms, necessitating a shift to quantum secure cryptography. Hybrid protocols combining at least one classical and one quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm are becoming the standard for securing communications. In this work, we present our novel solution for integrating three different cryptographic assumptions (two of them quantumresistant) into hybrid network security protocols, ensuring that three different cryptographic assumptions must be broken before the protocol becomes vulnerable. Our solution allows for a seamless integration of classical and post-quantum (PQ) cryptography, and quantum key distribution (QKD) into existing network security protocols (e.g., TLS, IPsec) without any major modifications to the protocols themselves. This crypto-agility ensures the mitigation of some of the most well known challenges of both PQ cryptography and QKD. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of such triple-hybrid network security protocols, showing non-substantial decrease in performance and almost no added packet overhead compared to state of the art protocols. In exchange, we pave the way towards next generation networks where the potential of new quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes can be leveraged in a dynamic and agile fashion, thus fostering a new era of unbreakable communication systems.
Advances in quantum computing pose a significant threat to the widely used Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The two leading technologies to address this challenge are Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Key Distribution. A promising approach is the hybridization of these technologies - combining their respective strengths while mitigating their limitations - and integrating them with the cryptographic mechanisms used today to enhance crypto-agility and facilitate transitioning to a quantum-safe infrastructure. However, changing current network protocols to quantum-safe alternatives is not just a matter of security: their efficiency and scalability must also be demonstrated within real-world telecommunications infrastructures to ensure their practical adoption. In this work, we present the first long-running test with detailed measurements of a suite of hybrid quantum-safe protocols that integrate classical cryptography, PQC, and QKD within a production environment (MadQCI). Using standardized protocols and interfaces and employing Transport Layer Security (TLS) as the base protocol for real-world comparison, this study demonstrates the efficiency and scalability of the proposed solution in deployed heterogeneous networks. These results mark a significant step towards the widespread adoption of quantum-safe hybrid protocols and contribute to clarifying the path toward their future standardization in next-generation telecommunications networks.
Hybrid authenticated key exchange combines cryptography key material from different sources (classical, quantum and post-quantum cryptography) to build protocols that are resilient to catastrophic failures, technology advances and future cryptanalytic attacks. In this work, we propose and implement a triple-hybrid version of the transport layer security network protocol TLS 1.3, combining classical and post-quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution. We evaluate the performance of this triple-hybrid TLS in an experimental network scenario and our analysis shows that the quantum-resistant feature comes at an increased communication cost of approximately 68 % over the total time of the composite handshakes. In exchange, our solution is an enhancement to the TLS 1.3 protocol by adding quantum-resistant cryptography schemes.
Abstract Advances in quantum computing pose a significant threat to the widely used Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The two leading technologies to address this challenge are Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Key Distribution. A promising approach is the hybridization of these technologies - combining their respective strengths while mitigating their limitations - and integrating them with the cryptographic mechanisms used today to enhance crypto-agility and facilitate transitioning to a quantum-safe infrastructure. However, changing current network protocols to quantum-safe alternatives is not just a matter of security: their efficiency and scalability must also be demonstrated within real-world telecommunications infrastructures to ensure their practical adoption. In this work, we present the first long-running test with detailed measurements of a suite of hybrid quantum-safe protocols that integrate classical cryptography, PQC, and QKD within a production environment (MadQCI). Using standardized protocols and interfaces and employing Transport Layer Security (TLS) as the base protocol for real-world comparison, this study demonstrates the efficiency and scalability of the proposed solution in deployed heterogeneous networks. These results mark a significant step towards the widespread adoption of quantum-safe hybrid protocols and contribute to clarifying the path toward their future standardization in next-generation telecommunications networks.
The emergence of large-scale quantum computers poses a significant threat to current cryptographic protocols, particularly Transport Layer Security (TLS), which relies on RSA and elliptic curve cryptography vulnerable to Shor's algorithm. This paper presents a hybrid framework for quantum-resistant TLS handshakes that integrates post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum key distribution (QKD) and classical cryptography to provide comprehensive protection against both classical and quantum attacks. The approach employs three QKD protocols; BB84, E91, and Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD) alongside NIST-standardized PQC algorithms as well as alternative candidates such as HQC and BIKE. A key innovation is the QKD key management module, which addresses performance bottlenecks through periodic key generation and secure reuse within predefined retention periods, significantly reducing QKD overhead in TLS handshakes. The experimental implementation using the quantum network simulator evaluated 144 distinct cryptographic protocol combinations. Results demonstrate that ML-KEM combined with ML-DSA provides optimal PQC performance, while QKD protocol selection is distance-dependent: BB84 for short-range and MDI-QKD for long-distance communication. The framework includes various attack mitigation mechanisms and ensure security as long as at least one cryptographic method remains uncompromised. Consistent with current global quantum network usage, the proposed TLS approach is designed primarily for MAN and WAN environments rather than the Internet, providing a balanced solution that combines theoretical security guarantees with computational efficiency.
The rapid development of quantum computing presents a significant challenge to existing cryptographic systems, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography, which rely on the complexity of mathematical problems for security. Shor’s algorithm, which can efficiently solve these problems, emphasizes the need for cryptographic solutions that are resistant to quantum threats. This study aims to investigate the potential of Quantum Cryptography, with a specific focus on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), to strengthen network security in response to emerging quantum computing risks. Despite the theoretical potential of QKD, there remains a gap in its practical application, particularly in terms of scalability, high implementation costs, and sensitivity to environmental factors, which have hindered its widespread adoption. The novelty of this research lies in the comprehensive approach it takes, combining theoretical analysis of QKD protocols, simulations using Qiskit, and comparisons with traditional cryptographic methods. This provides a more robust understanding of QKD effectiveness in different network scenarios. The study reveals that the BB84 protocol consistently outperforms the E91 protocol in terms of key generation efficiency and noise resilience. However, despite its unmatched security capabilities, QKD faces challenges such as scalability and implementation costs. To overcome these challenges and achieve widespread adoption, integrating QKD with post quantum cryptography and developing hybrid approaches are essential. Quantum Cryptography, particularly QKD, holds the potential to become a cornerstone for securing critical infrastructure, ensuring communication security in the quantum era.
The reliance on asymmetric public key cryptography (PKC) and symmetric encryption for cyber-security in current telecommunication networks is threatened by the emergence of powerful quantum computing technology. This is due to the ability of quantum computers to efficiently solve problems such as factorization or discrete logarithms, which are the basis for classical PKC schemes. Thus, the assumption that communications networks are secure no longer holds true. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are the first cyber-security technologies that allow communications to resist the attacks of a quantum computer. To achieve quantum-resistant communications, the aforementioned technologies need to be incorporated into a network security protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). In this paper, we describe and implement two novel, hybrid solutions in which QKD and PQC are combined inside TLS for achieving quantum-resistant authenticated key exchange: Concatenation and Exclusively-OR (XOR). We present the results, in terms of complexity and security enhancement, of integrating state-of-the-art QKD and PQC technologies into a practical, industry-ready TLS implementation. Our findings demonstrate that the adoption of a PQC-only approach enhances the TLS handshake performance by approximately 9 % compared to classical methods. Furthermore, our hybrid PQC-QKD quantum-resistant TLS comes at a performance cost of approximately 117 % during the key establishment process. In return, we substantially augment the security of the handshake, paving the road for the development of future-proof quantum-resistant communication systems based on QKD and PQC.