The fifth generation of mobile networks (5G) is among the critical infrastructures whose security and privacy requirements are paramount. Compared to previous generations, 5G leverages a service-based architecture where many Network Functions (NF), i.e., the set of microservices on which is based the architecture, need secure communication means. NFs can communicate using HTTP2, and despite not being required by the standard, they can use Transport Layer Protocol (TLS) to ensure data integrity and authentication across the network. However, with the expected arrival of quantum computers in the near future, traditional cryptographic algorithms are under significant threat. With the recent run for post-quantum standardization, the NIST selected possible candidate algorithms. However, no study evaluates whether such algorithms would be applicable in the 5G core without significant performance degradation. In this paper, we perform the first assessment of the feasibility of using post-quantum secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) for the 5G core network. To this aim, we implemented and compared the performances of five algorithms among those selected during the NIST standardization process. We adapted those algorithms to implement them in a standalone 5G core implemented via Open5GS, and tested their performance when performing user registration. Our results show that the KY-BER768 achieves comparable performance to TLS in terms of UE registration time and CPU utilization, thus being a candidate solution to improve the security posture of the 5G core.
The fifth generation of mobile networks (5G) is among the critical infrastructures whose security and privacy requirements are paramount. Compared to previous generations, 5G leverages a service-based architecture where many Network Functions (NF), i.e., the set of microservices on which is based the architecture, need secure communication means. NFs can communicate using HTTP2, and despite not being required by the standard, they can use Transport Layer Protocol (TLS) to ensure data integrity and authentication across the network. However, with the expected arrival of quantum computers in the near future, traditional cryptographic algorithms are under significant threat. With the recent run for post-quantum standardization, the NIST selected possible candidate algorithms. However, no study evaluates whether such algorithms would be applicable in the 5G core without significant performance degradation. In this paper, we perform the first assessment of the feasibility of using post-quantum secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) for the 5G core network. To this aim, we implemented and compared the performances of five algorithms among those selected during the NIST standardization process. We adapted those algorithms to implement them in a standalone 5G core implemented via Open5GS, and tested their performance when performing user registration. Our results show that the KY-BER768 achieves comparable performance to TLS in terms of UE registration time and CPU utilization, thus being a candidate solution to improve the security posture of the 5G core.
The advent of quantum computing threatens the security of classical public-key cryptographic systems, prompting the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). While PQC has been analyzed in theory, its performance in practical wireless communication environments remains underexplored. This paper presents a detailed implementation and performance evaluation of NIST-selected PQC algorithms in user equipment (UE) to UE communications over 5G networks. Using a full 5G emulation stack (Open5GS and UERANSIM) and PQC-enabled TLS 1.3 via BoringSSL and liboqs, we examine key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signature schemes across realistic network conditions. We evaluate performance based on handshake latency, CPU and memory usage, bandwidth, and retransmission rates, under varying cryptographic configurations and client loads. Our findings show that ML-KEM with ML-DSA offers the best efficiency for latency-sensitive applications, while SPHINCS+ and HQC combinations incur higher computational and transmission overheads, making them unsuitable for security-critical but time-sensitive 5G scenarios.
Significant performance improvements in bandwidth and latency make 5G a suitable candidate for a wide range of applications, particularly those requiring real-time communication, such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and autonomous vehicles. However, today’s security, including modern cryptographic systems, is prone to different attacks caused by the high computational power of quantum computing, highlighting the need for integrating quantum-resistant security measures. To accommodate attacks targeted at 5G networks, there are efforts to move towards TLS-based security, which is the widely accepted standard across networks. However, integrating post-quantum algorithms must also be considered in such a transition. Thus, this paper is the first to perform the integration of Post-quantum TLS (PQ-TLS) protocols into 5G networks and offer a realistic performance evaluation. Our approach focuses on integrating PQ-TLS into the 5G control plane (CP) without requiring a major overhaul, thus ensuring communications’ interoperability even with legacy components of 5G, which may not support TLS. Specifically, we have updated the registration and authentication protocols for both core network functions and user equipment (UE) by implementing a TLS tunneling approach through virtualization. We then evaluate the performance and feasibility of PQ-TLS in enhancing the security of 5G communications on an actual testbed. Our results demonstrate that while PQ algorithms introduce some overhead, they remain viable for 5G applications, particularly for protocols that can run on the core network.
The Service-Based Architecture (SBA) of the fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks introduced great advancements in flexibility, efficiency, and performance of modern networks, thanks to the distribution and softwarization of core network entities called Network Functions (NFs). Due to the distributed nature of 5G systems, these NFs are usually located in different sites to provide better Quality of Service (QoS) or specific services, which poses a great challenge regarding security. However, even though the 3GPP standard identifies security requirements by leveraging Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication and OAuth2.0 authorization, current experimental and commercial deployments often disregard these aspects for the sake of simplicity and performance. In fact, even though data and communication protection is crucial, the implementation of security protocols and mechanisms complicates the deployments and may reduce the efficiency of 5G systems. This paper presents a novel solution that implements TLS for authentication and encryption leveraging entanglement-based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), ensuring that all the communications between NFs in the 5G core network are secured by QKD keys, and are therefore quantum-safe. Additionally, this paper presents a QKD key repository using the Network Repository Function (NRF), which stores and relays TLS session keys to authenticated consumer NFs to access producer NFs in a fast but quantum-safe process. The solution was validated in a real hardware environment, and obtained results demonstrate that the proposed solution enhances the security of the SBA communications in an efficient way, reducing an 85% the service request time compared to the traditional TLS-based procedure, as well as 29.96% fewer bytes transmitted throughout the process.
Fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks support services such as smart healthcare, connected vehicles, smart homes, and the Internet of Things. Because these services exchange important personal and operational data, secure user authentication is essential. The standard 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol helps verify users and establish communication keys, but research has identified concerns including user traceability, attacks by a malicious serving network, and limited protection against future quantum-computing threats. This paper explains these issues in simple terms and reviews two approaches discussed in the selected research article: a hybrid method combining Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), and a fully post-quantum method based on KEM. The source study reports that both approaches aim to improve authentication security, while the hybrid option uses fewer computational resources. This paper is a literature-based explanation of the published study; it does not claim a new protocol or independent experimental results
5th Generation (5G) cellular networks have been adopted around the world since the rollout began around 2019. It brought with it many innovations and new services, such as Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra Reliable and Low Latency Communications (URLLC), and Massive Internet of Things (mIoT). 5G also introduced a more scalable approach to network operations using fully software-based Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) in Core Networks (CN) rather than the prior hardware-based approach. However, while this shift towards a fully software-based system design provides numerous significant benefits, such as increased interoperability, scalability, and cost-effectiveness, it also brought with it an increased cybersecurity risk. Security is crucial to maintaining trust between vendors, operators, and consumers. Cyberattacks are rapidly increasing in number and sophistication, and we are seeing a shift towards zero-trust approaches. This means that even communications between VNFs inside a 5G core have to be scrutinized and hardened against attacks, especially with the advent of quantum computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), over the past 10 years, has led efforts to standardize Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to protect against quantum attacks. This paper covers a custom implementation of the open-source free5GC CN, to expand its HTTPS capabilities for VNFs by introducing PQC Key Encapsulation Methods (KEM) for TLS v1.3. This paper provides the details of this integration with a focus on the latency of different PQC KEMs in initial handshakes between VNFs, on packet size, and the implications on a 5G environment. This work also conducts a security comparison between the PQC-equipped free5GC and other open-source 5G CNs. The presented results indicate a negligible increase in UE connection setup duration and a small increase in connection setup data requirements, strongly indicating that PQC KEM’s benefits far outweigh any downsides when integrated into 5G and 6G core services.
Quantum computing is reshaping the security landscape of modern telecommunications. The cryptographic foundations that secure todays 5G systems, including RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman (DH), are all susceptible to attacks enabled by Shors algorithm. Protecting 5G networks against future quantum adversaries has therefore become an urgent engineering and research priority. In this paper we introduce QORE, a quantum-secure 5G and Beyond 5G (B5G) Core framework that provides a clear pathway for transitioning both the 5G Core Network Functions and User Equipment (UE) to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The framework uses the NIST-standardized lattice-based algorithms Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) and applies them across the 5G Service-Based Architecture (SBA). A Hybrid PQC (HPQC) configuration is also proposed, combining classical and quantum-safe primitives to maintain interoperability during migration. Experimental validation shows that ML-KEM achieves quantum security with minor performance overhead, meeting the low-latency and high-throughput requirements of carrier-grade 5G systems. The proposed roadmap aligns with ongoing 3GPP SA3 and SA5 study activities on the security and management of post-quantum networks as well as with NIST PQC standardization efforts, providing practical guidance for mitigating quantum-era risks while safeguarding long-term confidentiality and integrity of network data.