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IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Secure Quantum Communication With the Preservation of Optimal Measurements

Heasin Ko, Spiros Kechrimparis, Young‐Ho Ko, Kap‐Joong Kim, Byung‐Seok Choi, Chahan M. Kropf, Chun Ju Youn, Joonwoo Bae

Published May 8, 2025• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

One of the consequences in the distribution of quantum states over a long distance is that, since resulting quantum states are noisy due to the intervention of an environment, a measurement setting should be re-aligned to optimize detection events, for which additional experimental resources such as quantum tomography of a channel or resulting states is necessary. In this work, we present a protocol for protecting an optimal measurement setup without verifying a channel. A receiver does not have to revise the measurement prepared in a noiseless scenario since it would remain optimal for quantum states resulting from an unknown and noisy channel. The measurement protection protocol realizes a supermap describing transformations over quantum channels and is experimentally feasible as it only applies local unitary transformations before and after the transmission. We present experimental proof-of-principle demonstrations of the measurement protection protocol. We also apply the measurement protection to a prepare-and-measure protocol, the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, and find that preserving an optimal measurement can suppress quantum-bit error rates, allowing the protocol to tolerate an even higher noise during transmission. The BB84 protocol with the measurement protection is experimentally demonstrated with the polarization encoding on photonic qubits.

DOI
10.1109/jsac.2025.3568037

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One of the consequences in the distribution of quantum states over a long distance is that, since resulting quantum states are noisy due to the intervention of an environment, a measurement setting should be re-aligned to optimize detection events, for which additional experimental resources such as quantum tomography of a channel or resulting states is necessary. In this work, we present a protocol for protecting an optimal measurement setup without verifying a channel. A receiver does not have to revise the measurement prepared in a noiseless scenario since it would remain optimal for quantum states resulting from an unknown and noisy channel. The measurement protection protocol realizes a supermap describing transformations over quantum channels and is experimentally feasible as it only applies local unitary transformations before and after the transmission. We present experimental proof-of-principle demonstrations of the measurement protection protocol. We also apply the measurement protection to a prepare-and-measure protocol, the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, and find that preserving an optimal measurement can suppress quantum-bit error rates, allowing the protocol to tolerate an even higher noise during transmission. The BB84 protocol with the measurement protection is experimentally demonstrated with the polarization encoding on photonic qubits.
In the distribution of quantum states over a long distance, not only are quantum states corrupted by interactions with an environment but also a measurement setting should be re-aligned such that detection events can be ensured for the resulting states. In this work, we present measurement-protected quantum key distribution where a measurement is protected against the interactions quantum states experience during the transmission, without the verification of a channel. As a result, a receiver does not have to revise the measurement that has been prepared in a noiseless scenario since it would remain ever optimal. The measurement protection is achieved by applications of local unitary transformations before and after the transmission, that leads to a supermap transforming an arbitrary channel to a depolarization one. An experimental demonstration is presented with the polarization encoding on photonic qubits. It is shown that the security bounds for prepare-and-measure protocols can be improved, for instance, errors up to 20.7% can be tolerated in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol.
In the distribution of quantum states over a long distance, not only are quantum states corrupted by interactions with an environment but also a measurement setting should be re-aligned such that detection events can be ensured for the resulting states. We here present a method of protecting a measurement in quantum key distribution against the interactions quantum states experience during the transmission, without the verification of a channel. As a result, a receiver does not have to revise the measurement that has been prepared in a noiseless scenario since it would remain ever optimal. The measurement protection is achieved by applications of local unitary transformations before and after the transmission, that leads to a supermap transforming an arbitrary channel to a depolarization one. An experimental demonstration is presented with the polarization encoding on photonic qubits. It is shown that the security bounds for prepare-and-measure protocols can be improved.
Quantum state discrimination is a fundamental task in quantum information theory and also an important building block in practical quantum information applications. We here consider optimal state discrimination in a noisy environment in which quantum states may be corrupted due to the intervention of an environment. We show that even if there exists an unwanted interaction with an environment and the channel describing the interaction is not yet identified, a measurement prepared in the beginning for optimal state discrimination can be preserved as an optimal measurement ever after a channel use. This means that in a practical realization of quantum communication, verification of a channel can be circumvented and the cost of quantum tomography is saved. We also show a protocol of preserving an optimal measurement for state discrimination.
An attempt to eavesdrop on a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, in both the two-state B92 [B92 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)] and the four-state BB84 [BB84 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175--179] quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently from other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are covered. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi (rather than Shannon) information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob (rather than all bits). This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.
The security of quantum cryptography is guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem, which implies that an eavesdropper copying transmitted qubits in unknown states causes their disturbance. Nevertheless, in real cryptographic systems some level of disturbance has to be allowed to cover, e.g., transmission losses. An eavesdropper can attack such systems by replacing a noisy channel by a better one and by performing approximate cloning of transmitted qubits which disturb them but below the noise level assumed by legitimate users. We experimentally demonstrate such symmetric individual eavesdropping on the quantum key distribution protocols of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) and the trine-state spherical code of Renes (R04) with two-level probes prepared using a recently developed photonic multifunctional quantum cloner [Lemr et al., Phys. Rev. A 85, 050307(R) (2012)]. We demonstrated that our optimal cloning device with high-success rate makes the eavesdropping possible by hiding it in usual transmission losses. We believe that this experiment can stimulate the quest for other operational applications of quantum cloning.
The ideal Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum-key-distribution protocol is based on the preparation and measurement of qubits in two alternative bases differing by an angle of $\ensuremath{\pi}/2$. Any real implementation of the protocol, though, will inevitably introduce misalignments in the preparation of the states and in the alignment of the measurement bases with respect to this ideal situation. Various security proofs take into account (at least partially) such errors, i.e., show how Alice and Bob can still distill a secure key in the presence of these imperfections. Here, we consider the complementary problem: How can Eve exploit misalignments to obtain more information about the key than would be possible in an ideal implementation? Specifically, we investigate the effects of misalignment errors on the security of the BB84 protocol in the case of individual attacks, where necessary and sufficient conditions for security are known. Though the effects of these errors are small for expected deviations from the perfect situation, our results nevertheless show that Alice and Bob can incorrectly conclude that they have established a secure key if the inevitable experimental errors in the state preparation and in the alignment of the measurements are not taken into account. This gives further weight to the idea that the formulation and security analysis of any quantum cryptography protocol should be based on realistic assumptions about the properties of the apparatus used. Additionally, we note that BB84 seems more robust against alignment imperfections if both the xxx and zzz bases are used to generate the key.