Quantum theory of the world order

Shan Gao

Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties. In this paper, I argue that the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics or Everett's theory seems to violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience. In order to be consistent with our experience, the theory assumes psychophysical supervenience in each world, including our world. However, this permits the possibility that under certain unitary time evolution which does not lead to world branching, the wave function of each world changes and correspondingly the mental states of the observers in the world also change, while the wave function of the total worlds does not change, which violates the principle of psychophysical supervenience for all worlds. It seems that one must go beyond Everett's theory such as denying multiplicity in order to avoid the failure of psychophysical supervenience.

David J. Gross, Marc Henneaux A, Alexander Sevrin

Robert B. Griffiths

Shan Gao

Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties. In this paper, I argue that the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics or Everett's theory seems to violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience. In order to be consistent with our experience, the theory assumes psychophysical supervenience in each world, including our world. However, this permits the possibility that under certain unitary time evolution which does not lead to world branching, the wave function of each world changes and correspondingly the mental states of the observers in the world also change, while the wave function of the total worlds does not change, which violates the principle of psychophysical supervenience for all worlds. It seems that one must go beyond Everett's theory such as denying multiplicity in order to avoid the failure of psychophysical supervenience.

David Hodgson

Shiro Ishikawa

It is a matter of course that Kolmogorov’s probability theory is a very useful mathematical tool for the analysis of statistics. However, this fact never means that statistics is based on Kolmogorov’s probability theory, since it is not guaranteed that mathematics and our world are connected. In order that mathematics asserts some statements concerning our world, a certain theory (so called “world view”) mediates between mathematics and our world. Recently we propose measurement theory (i.e., the theory of the quantum mechanical world view), which is characterized as the linguistic turn of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we assert that statistics is based on measurement theory. And, for example, we show, from the pure theoretical point of view (i.e., from the measurement theoretical point of view), that regression analysis can not be justified without Bayes’ theorem. This may imply that even the conventional classification of (Fisher’s) statistics and Bayesian statistics should be reconsidered.