In this article, we present a view that the interpretation of quantum mechanics lacks unanimous approval among physicists. To show its inadequacy, we describe the well-known measurement problem and discuss two solutions: an orthodox solution and hidden variables. We provide a brief overview of Bohmian mechanics. We then derive the continuity equation for quantum mechanics and show that a realist interpretation of the quantum probability current ->j leads to the guiding equation for Bohmian mechanics.
In this article, we present a view that the interpretation of quantum mechanics lacks unanimous approval among physicists. To show its inadequacy, we describe the well-known measurement problem and discuss two solutions: an orthodox solution and hidden variables. We provide a brief overview of Bohmian mechanics. We then derive the continuity equation for quantum mechanics and show that a realist interpretation of the quantum probability current ->j leads to the guiding equation for Bohmian mechanics.
In this article I defend that an underlying framework exists among those interpretations of quantum mechanics which crucially consider the measurement problem as a central obstacle. I characterise that framework as the Received View on the realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particular, I analyse the extent to which two of the most relevant attempts at quantum mechanics, namely, many worlds interpretations and Bohmian mechanics, belong within the Received View. However, I claim that scientific realism in itself does not entail commitment to such a view, and I propose to consider a form of realism that dissolves the measurement problem. It is simply a stripped down version of realism. I derive the methodological questions in this form of realism, speculating that within it a novel realist interpretation of quantum mechanics could be conceived.
Since its inception Bohmian mechanics has been generally regarded as a hidden-variable theory aimed at providing an objective description of quantum phenomena. To date, this rather narrow conception of Bohm’s proposal has caused it more rejection than acceptance. Now, after 65 years of Bohmian mechanics, should still be such an interpretational aspect the prevailing appraisal? Why not favoring a more pragmatic view, as a legitimate picture of quantum mechanics, on equal footing in all respects with any other more conventional quantum picture? These questions are used here to introduce a discussion on an alternative way to deal with Bohmian mechanics at present, enhancing its aspect as an efficient and useful picture or formulation to tackle, explore, describe and explain quantum phenomena where phase and correlation ( entanglement ) are key elements. This discussion is presented through two complementary blocks. The first block is aimed at briefly revisiting the historical context that gave rise to the appearance of Bohmian mechanics, and how this approach or analogous ones have been used in different physical contexts. This discussion is used to emphasize a more pragmatic view to the detriment of the more conventional hidden-variable (ontological) approach that has been a leitmotif within the quantum foundations. The second block focuses on some particular formal aspects of Bohmian mechanics supporting the view presented here, with special emphasis on the physical meaning of the local phase field and the associated velocity field encoded within the wave function. As an illustration, a simple model of Young’s two-slit experiment is considered. The simplicity of this model allows to understand in an easy manner how the information conveyed by the Bohmian formulation relates to other more conventional concepts in quantum mechanics. This sort of pedagogical application is also aimed at showing the potential interest to introduce Bohmian mechanics in undergraduate quantum mechanics courses as a working tool rather than merely an alternative interpretation.
Since its inception, Bohmian mechanics has been surrounded by a halo of controversy. Originally proposed to bypass the limitations imposed by von Neumann's theorem on the impossibility of hidden-variable models in quantum mechanics, it faced strong opposition from the outset. Over time, however, its use in tackling specific problems across various branches of physics has led to a gradual shift in attitude, turning the early resistance into a more moderate acceptance. A plausible explanation for this change may be that, since the late 1990s and early 2000s, Bohmian mechanics has been taking on a more operational and practical role. The original hidden-variable idea has gradually faded from its framework, giving way to a more pragmatic approach that treats it as a suitable analytical and computational tool. This discussion explores how and why such a shift in perspective has occurred and, therefore, answers questions such as whether Bohmian mechanics should be considered once and for all a legitimate quantum representation (i.e., worth being taught in elementary quantum mechanics courses) or, by extension, whether these ideas can be transferred to and benefit other fields. Here, the Schrödinger equation and several specific numerical examples are re-examined in the light of a less restrictive view than the standard one usually adopted in quantum mechanics.
This paper deals with the development of, and the current discussion about, the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The following topics are discussed: 1. The Copenhagen Interpretation, 2. Formal Problems of Quantum Mechanics, 3. Process of Measurement and the Equation of Motion, 4. Macroscopic Level of Description, 5. Search for Hidden Variables, 6. The Notion of “Reality” and Epistemology of Quantum Mechanics, 7. Quantum Mechanics and the Explanation of Life. The Bohr-Einstein dialogue on the validity of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality lasted over two decades. Since the early nineteen fifties, Wiper has provided much of the point and counterpoint of the continuing discussion on the interpretation and epistemology of quantum mechanics. We have explored Wiper's views in some detail against the background of historical development and current debate.
The field of interpretation of quantum mechanics emerged in an attempt to solve the measurement problem. This turned on the perception that Niels Bohr avoided addressing the measurement problem by taking an instrumentalist view of quantum mechanics. I argue that this view is mistaken and Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics is realist. Moreover, Bohr's interpretation, which is different from textbook quantum mechanics (which is due more to Von Neumann and Paul Dirac), succeeds in solving the measurement problem. While the claim that Bohr dissolves the measurement problem within the limits of the epistemological framework he assumes has been made by a few authors, rarely has the case been made that Bohr's project unambiguously and completely overcomes the measurement problem. I make the strong case that Bohr eliminated the measurement problem altogether. For this, I put forward two new postulates through which to make sense of Bohr's interpretation. The article thus seeks to single out Bohr's interpretation from the various views that go together under the umbrella of orthodox quantum mechanics, and which have been traditionally considered susceptible to the measurement problem. It shows that Bohr's interpretation should be classified along with those like hidden variable theories, collapse models, modal interpretations etc., which offer a solution to the measurement problem and are committed to a realist ontology.
Bohmian mechanics (BM) is a popular interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) in which particles have real positions. The velocity of a point x in configuration space is defined as the standard probability current j ( x ) divided by the probability density P ( x ). However, this 'standard' j is in fact only one of infinitely many that transform correctly and satisfy . In this paper, I show that a particular j is singled out if one requires that j be determined experimentally as a weak value , using a technique that would make sense to a physicist with no knowledge of QM. This 'naively observable' j seems the most natural way to define j operationally. Moreover, I show that this operationally defined j equals the standard j , so, assuming , one obtains the dynamics of BM. It follows that the possible Bohmian paths are naively observable from a large enough ensemble. Furthermore, this justification for the Bohmian law of motion singles out x as the hidden variable, because (for example) the analogously defined momentum current is in general incompatible with the evolution of the momentum distribution. Finally I discuss how, in this setting, the usual quantum probabilities can be motivated from a Bayesian standpoint, via the principle of indifference.