ABSTRACT In this paper, we introduce a lattice‐based authenticated three‐party key agreement scheme for mobile devices with the aim of achieving both post‐quantum security and efficiency. Our scheme is inspired by the authenticated key exchange protocol developed. We revisit the recently suggested system, which is a communication‐efficient three‐party password‐authenticated key exchange, in which we found that the scheme is not fully correct and also demonstrate that the scheme is not safe from user's anonymity and impersonation assaults. We provide an enhanced scheme that is both effective and resistant to the mentioned assault. We also demonstrate its security in a ROM (Random Oracle Model). A comparison analysis that includes performance, security evaluations, energy consumption, and packet loss rate is also provided, proving the suitability of the suggested design.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we introduce a lattice‐based authenticated three‐party key agreement scheme for mobile devices with the aim of achieving both post‐quantum security and efficiency. Our scheme is inspired by the authenticated key exchange protocol developed. We revisit the recently suggested system, which is a communication‐efficient three‐party password‐authenticated key exchange, in which we found that the scheme is not fully correct and also demonstrate that the scheme is not safe from user's anonymity and impersonation assaults. We provide an enhanced scheme that is both effective and resistant to the mentioned assault. We also demonstrate its security in a ROM (Random Oracle Model). A comparison analysis that includes performance, security evaluations, energy consumption, and packet loss rate is also provided, proving the suitability of the suggested design.
ABSTRACT A three‐party post‐quantum key agreement protocol involves server with two communicating parties securely agreeing on a shared secret key in a way that is resistant to quantum attacks. Once the shared secret key is shared using authenticated key agreement protocol, then user (A), and user (B) can use it for securing communication channel using symmetric‐key encryption AES‐256 algorithm. Although there are few third‐party post‐quantum authenticated and key agreement schemes exist, but the recent studies in this paper illustrates that they are not satisfying properties like unlinkability, anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and signal leakage attacks. Therefore, the proposed protocol ensures anonymity, unlinkablity, perfect forward secrecy, and resistant against signal leakage attacks. The proposed protocol uses different random numbers for each of sessions and ensures freshness of the session key to maintain forward secrecy. In this protocol, the user (A) only communicates with server, and establish an authenticated session key with user (B) which avoids server overheads. The use of ring learning with errors (RLWE) instead of the simpler learning with errors (LWE) is primarily motivated by the need for efficiency, compactness, and scalability in cryptographic applications. A comparative study, including both performance and security assessments, demonstrates that the proposed design is more secure and efficient.
A three-party authenticated key exchange protocol enables two entities to agree on a session key with the help of a dedicated server through an insecure channel. Lattice based cryptography plays a very important role in authentication and key exchanges that protects against the threat of quantum attacks. However, it is not easy to design quantum resistant password based three-party protocol due to the high demand for security requirements and the limited resources nature of mobile devices. In this article, we have proposed a new post quantum three party key exchange based on a variant of lattice assumption, the ring learning errors. The protocol ensures security against impersonation attack, stolen smartcard attack, password guessing attack, and other existing attacks. In authentication phase, the protocol have used lattice based cryptography that plays a very important role in authentication and key exchanges that protects against the threat of quantum attacks. The proposed protocol ensures both securities against quantum attacks and efficiency due to simple algebraic operations that are polynomial addition and multiplications.
A three-party authenticated key exchange protocol enables two entities to agree on a session key with the help of a dedicated server over public channel. Shor’s algorithm is a big threat for existing authenticated key exchange protocols. Lattice based cryptography plays a very important role in designing authentication and key agreement secure against the threat of quantum attacks. However, it is not easy job to design quantum resistant password based three party protocol due to the high demand for security requirements and the limited resources nature of mobile devices. In this article, we have proposed a new post quantum three party key exchange based on ring learning with errors assumption. This protocol is motivated from Islam et al.’s authenticated key exchange protocol. Their protocol is not secure against stolen smartcard attack, password guessing attack, and can’t provide user anonymity. The anonymous communication is a big requirement for practical applications like e-healthcare services/smart vehicular communication. This paper also contains the performance analysis of the proposed protocol along with other relevant protocols.
Once the shared secret key is established, three parties can use it for secure communication using symmetric-key encryption AES (128, 192, 256) algorithms or other cryptographic primitives. Although there are few third-party post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocols exist, but the recent studies in this article show that they are not anonymous or cannot provide forward secrecy. Most of the existing protocols enable adversaries to trace the source of messages. Many of third-party AKA schemes based on conventional public-key cryptosystems are vulnerable to quantum computers. Therefore, this paper contains a forward secure three-party post-quantum authenticated key establishment protocol for mobile devices. The proposed three-party key exchange protocol establishes an authenticated shared key that can be periodically refreshed to maintain forward secrecy. This protocol enables two parties to establish a shared session key even in the presence of quantum adversaries and enables them to communicate confidentially and securely over insecure networks. The protocol is anonymous as both the parties communicate using masked dynamic identities. A contrast study consisting of performance and security assessment is presented, which illustrates the suggested design is more applicable.
ABSTRACT Quantum computing poses a mounting and concrete threat to the cryptographi protocols underpinning mobile communication systems, where both security and computational efficiency are critical constraints. Existing three‐party authenticated key agreement (3PAKA) schemes either rely on classically hard problems broken by Shor's algorithm or, among postquantum proposals, fail to simultaneously achieve user anonymity, unlinkability, and perfect forward secrecy at acceptable cost for resource‐constrained mobile devices. We first conduct a rigorous cryptanalysis of the recent lattice‐based scheme of Singh et al. and uncover four concrete vulnerabilities: an identity recovery vulnerability and scalability failure arising from XOR masking with a static server key, which forces an exhaustive identity search and opens a denial‐of‐service vector; blind acceptance by the responder , as User forwards the initiator's message without verifying the sender's identity; authentication blindness at the initiator , since the response received by User carries no cryptographic proof of User 's identity; and server‐side incomplete verification caused by a missing session parameter , which the server requires but never receives. To remedy these deficiencies, we propose a Three‐Party Post‐Quantum Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement (MAKA) scheme for mobile devices, built on the Ideal‐Lattice Ring Learning With Errors (Ring‐LWE) assumption with parameters and Gaussian width . The proposed four‐message protocol employs biometric‐bound fuzzy extractors, dynamic masked identities , and fresh per‐session Ring‐LWE samples to achieve mutual authentication, user anonymity, unlinkability, and perfect forward secrecy. Security is formally analyzed in the Bellare–Rogaway (BR) model under the Random Oracle Model (ROM), yielding a tight reduction to the Decision‐RLWE assumption. Our message structure yields a total communication cost of bits, representing approximately improvement over Singh et al. It also demonstrates a favourable communicationcost relative to those of Islam and Basu, Rewal et al., Kumar et al., Dabra et al., and Park et al. across both metrics.
The Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol is a useful tool for establishing secure remote communication between users, especially given the prevalence of amplifying a human-memorable password into a strong session key in the age of hand-held devices. Recent advances in quantum computing have stimulated interest in quantum-safe cryptographic schemes. Therefore, we propose QSPAK and QSPPK, two post-quantum and efficient PAKE protocols which are parallel extensions of PAK and PPK, but based on the hardness assumption over module lattices. Specifically, we make a comprehensive trade-off among multiple significant performance indicators such as the post-quantum security, the failure rate, the communication cost and the running time to guide optimal parameter choices. This rigorous instantiation has never been seen in previous PAKE papers. Additionally, utilizing the flexibility of module lattices, we provide three parameter sets (#1, #2, and #3) matching different security scenarios. We implement and benchmark QSPAK and QSPPK against other competitive proposals. The performance results indicate that our QSPAK and QSPPK, besides being more efficient, exhibit the flexibility and security advantages over the latter schemes. Furthermore, we construct a post-quantum password-authenticated TLS 1.3 framework, aimed towards provide a further suggestion for IETF standardization of quantum-safe PAKE.