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International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP)

A Secret Key Spreading Protocol for Extending ETSI Quantum Key Distribution

Thomas Prévost, Bruno Martin, Olivier Alibart

Published Jan 1, 2025• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper presents an information theoretic secure secret key transfer protocol by Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in the case of multi-hops quantum links between the two correspondents. We aim to transmit a secret between two parties using existing quantum infrastructure in the case where half of the intermediate routers are evil. We recursively divide the secret into Shamir’s shares, which are transmitted through different routes. This protocol has been successfully verified with ProVerif, which grants the secrecy of the transmitted key. We also propose an on-the-fly route discovery algorithm, in case the network is too large for each node to know all possible routes, and provide a formal verification of this algorithm using Maude.

DOI
10.5220/0013077100003899

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This paper presents an information theoretic secure secret key transfer protocol by Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in the case of multi-hops quantum links between the two correspondents. We aim to transmit a secret between two parties using existing quantum infrastructure in the case where half of the intermediate routers are evil. We recursively divide the secret into Shamir’s shares, which are transmitted through different routes. This protocol has been successfully verified with ProVerif, which grants the secrecy of the transmitted key. We also propose an on-the-fly route discovery algorithm, in case the network is too large for each node to know all possible routes, and provide a formal verification of this algorithm using Maude.
This work presents quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs) to safeguard security in large networks, efficiency is improved as the proposed protocols contain the fewest number of communication rounds and two parties can share and use a long-term secret Key. Quantum cryptography is basically based on a trusted channel in communication between two parties compared to classical channel. Recently, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has become more secure transmission method used to transmit secret key between two legitimate parties. This paper discusses the implementation of (QKD) protocol with the existence of an eavesdropper. The implementation simulates the communication of two parties who wish to share a secret key with the existing of eavesdropper. The existing of eavesdropper is simulated with two kinds of attacks, which is used as parameter to measure the length of final key agreed by both authenticated parties at the end of the communication.
We show the security of multi-user key establishment on a single line of quantum communication. More precisely, we consider a quantum communication architecture where the qubit generation and measurement happen at the two ends of the line, whilst intermediate parties are limited to single-qubit unitary transforms. This network topology has been previously introduced to implement quantum-assisted secret-sharing protocols for classical data, as well as the key establishment, and secure computing. This architecture has numerous advantages. The intermediate nodes are only using simplified hardware, which makes them easier to implement. Moreover, key establishment between arbitrary pairs of parties in the network does not require key routing through intermediate nodes. This is in contrast with quantum key distribution (QKD) networks for which non-adjacent nodes need intermediate ones to route keys, thereby revealing these keys to intermediate parties and consuming previously established ones to secure the routing process. Our main result is to show the security of key establishment on quantum line networks. We show the security using the framework of abstract cryptography. This immediately makes the security composable, showing that the keys can be used for encryption or other tasks.
We show the security of multi-user key establishment on a single line of quantum communication. More precisely, we consider a quantum communication architecture where the qubit generation and measurement happen at the two ends of the line, whilst intermediate parties are limited to single-qubit unitary transforms. This network topology has been previously introduced to implement quantum-assisted secret-sharing protocols for classical data, as well as the key establishment, and secure computing. This architecture has numerous advantages. The intermediate nodes are only using simplified hardware, which makes them easier to implement. Moreover, key establishment between arbitrary pairs of parties in the network does not require key routing through intermediate nodes. This is in contrast with quantum key distribution (QKD) networks for which non-adjacent nodes need intermediate ones to route keys, thereby revealing these keys to intermediate parties and consuming previously established ones to secure the routing process. Our main result is to show the security of key establishment on quantum line networks. We show the security using the framework of abstract cryptography. This immediately makes the security composable, showing that the keys can be used for encryption or other tasks.
Secure communication in large-scale quantum key distribution (QKD) networks relies on the key management layer to establish a key between any two nodes in the network. For non-adjacent nodes key forwarding is applied and secure keys are one-time pad encrypted with key material obtained from individual QKD links on a hop-by-hop basis from the initiator to the receiver. Notably, in a distributed setting, this requires that the nodes along the path be fully trusted, since they are given plaintext access to the secret during re-encryption.In this work, we propose a security model for the key forwarding process that provides confidentiality of the key with respect to all nodes that are not on the selected path from initiator to receiver. The model also captures the authenticity of the forwarded key in a sense that the key at the receiver is the same as the one sent by the initiator. Furthermore, in case the authenticity check fails, the receiver can identify the link that violated the authenticity guarantees by accident or on purpose. Finally, we provide a protocol for secure authentic key forwarding based on unconditionally hiding commitment schemes and unforgeable signature schemes that achieves confidentiality of the transmitted keys in an information theoretic sense of security whereas authenticity requires computationally secure primitives.
Abstract Secure key distribution is crucial for maintaining communication confidentiality in networks with multiple communicating partners. Asymmetric key algorithms are vulnerable to quantum attacks because of the computational advantage offered by quantum computers, whereas symmetric key algorithms with sufficiently large keys remain comparatively more resistant. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has emerged as a promising quantum-secure key distribution technique based on the principles of quantum physics. However, practical QKD networks often rely on relay nodes to extend communication distance, and malicious relay nodes can compromise quantum keys during the relaying process. This study proposes a secure key relaying approach based on Shamir's Secret Sharing to mitigate this vulnerability. The proposed method uses a probabilistic behavioural model to assess relay nodes according to their curiosity and collaboration tendencies. By splitting a quantum key into multiple shares and routing them through paths with minimum compromise risk, the approach reduces exposure to malicious or colluding relay nodes. The proposed algorithm assigns risk to network paths by evaluating node-level curiosity and collaboration potential, determines the appropriate number of shares, and selects secure routing paths to minimise key compromise. The study further analyses the parameters influencing the ideal number of shares for a given network, thereby offering a resilient mechanism for quantum-safe communication in QKD networks with malicious relay nodes.
We present and experimentally show a novel protocol for distributing secret information between two and only two parties in a N-party single-qubit Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) system. We demonstrate this new algorithm with N = 3 active parties over ~6km of telecom. fiber. Our experimental device is based on the Clavis2 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system built by ID Quantique but is generalizable to any implementation. We show that any two out of the N parties can build secret keys based on partial information from each other and with collaboration from the remaining N − 2 parties. This algorithm allows for the creation of two-party secret keys were standard QSS does not and significantly reduces the number of resources needed to implement QKD on a highly connected network such as the electrical grid.