A cryptographic analysis is presented of a new quantum key distribution protocol using phase-time coding. An upper bound is obtained for the error rate that guarantees secure key distribution. When no counts are detected in the control time slot, the protocol guarantees secure key distribution if the bit error rate in the sifted key does not exceed 50%. This protocol partially discriminates between errors due to system defects (e.g., imbalance of a fiber-optic interferometer) and eavesdropping. In the absence of eavesdropping, the counts detected in the control time slot are not caused by interferometer imbalance, which reduces the requirements for interferometer stability.
A cryptographic analysis is presented of a new quantum key distribution protocol using phase-time coding. An upper bound is obtained for the error rate that guarantees secure key distribution. When no counts are detected in the control time slot, the protocol guarantees secure key distribution if the bit error rate in the sifted key does not exceed 50%. This protocol partially discriminates between errors due to system defects (e.g., imbalance of a fiber-optic interferometer) and eavesdropping. In the absence of eavesdropping, the counts detected in the control time slot are not caused by interferometer imbalance, which reduces the requirements for interferometer stability.
A cryptographic analysis is presented of a new quantum key distribution protocol using phase-time coding. An upper bound is obtained for the error rate that guarantees secure key distribution. It is shown that the maximum tolerable error rate for this protocol depends on the counting rate in the control time slot. When no counts are detected in the control time slot, the protocol guarantees secure key distribution if the bit error rate in the sifted key does not exceed 50%. This protocol partially discriminates between errors due to system defects (e.g., imbalance of a fiber-optic interferometer) and eavesdropping. In the absence of eavesdropping, the counts detected in the control time slot are not caused by interferometer imbalance, which reduces the requirements for interferometer stability.
We propose quantum key distribution protocols based on coherent single-photon optical pulses with duration T and with minimum time-frequency uncertainty. The pulses are sent with possible delays (e.g., 0, T∕2) that are used to code the information (e.g., bit 0, bit 1) and that are shorter than the pulse width. Therefore, the time detection of the photons may result in a ambiguity of the delay evaluation for a potential eavesdropper. The duration of the received pulses is controlled thanks to a contrast measurement using an interferometer. A quantum formalism is given, allowing us to model the transmission of the key and the consequences of a possible eavesdropping. Two protocols are proposed and discussed. The first one involves two states and is limited to channels with losses lower than 50%. The second one involves four states, which prevents the eavesdropper from exploiting the losses of the line. The security of each protocol is evaluated as a function of channel losses, quantum bit error rate, and contrast loss in the case of intercept-resend attacks. It is applied to situations where photocounters dark counts are the main limitation of the system. The resulting maximum propagation distance allowing secure communication is evaluated.
Employing the fundamental laws of quantum physics, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises the unconditionally secure distribution of cryptographic keys. However, in practical realisations, a QKD protocol is only secure, when the quantum bit error rate introduced by an eavesdropper unavoidably exceeds the system error rate. This condition guarantees that an eavesdropper cannot disguise his presence by simply replacing the original transmission line with a less faulty one. Unfortunately, this condition also limits the possible distance between the communicating parties, Alice and Bob, to a few hundred kilometers. To overcome this problem, we design a QKD protocol which allows Alice and Bob to distinguish system errors from eavesdropping errors. If they are able to identify the origin of their errors, they can detect eavesdropping even when the system error rate exceeds the eavesdropping error rate. To achieve this, the proposed protocol employs an alternative encoding of information in two-dimensional photon states. Errors manifest themselves as quantum bit and as index transmission errors with a distinct correlation between them in case of intercept-resend eavesdropping. As a result, Alice and Bob can tolerate lower eavesdropping and higher system error rates without compromising their privacy.
Abstract The analysis of a new two-parametric quantum cryptography protocol is presented. A fundamentally new feature of the protocol is that the detection of the eavesdropper occurs not only by the number of errors on the receiving side, but also by the number of photocounts in the control time slots. The second feature of this protocol is the fact that the protocol allows fiber implementation (Klimov et al 2018 Laser Phys. Lett . 15 075207), which does not use active optical elements (phase modulators and polarization controllers) on the receiving side.
We propose one kind of improved QKD scheme based on time coding and phase coding. The pulse which had been discarded on the BB84 protocol phase coding QKD system is used to realize the time coding protocol, thus the useful bits rate in the present scheme can be doubled. At the same time, the phase coding keys and the time coding keys are obtained, we may combine both as new keys which can enhancethe generated rate and the sensitivity of monitor. At Bob’s side, a Fraday-Michelson is used instead of a traditional M-Z interferometer, which improves the stability of the interference visibility. With the proposed experimental setup, a stable quantum key distribution was performed over 90 km fiber. It is shown in our experiment that the characteristics of our system are as follows: secure, stable and economical.
In so-called private-key cryptographic systems, secure transmission of confi dential information through unprotected channels relies on the exchange of secret keys, known only to the sender, Alice, and the receiver, Bob.Quantum cryptography is based on the properties of quantum mechanics to obtain a provably secure key distribution.Most existing implement ations rely on either the polarization or the phase of very weak pulses of light sent through optical fibers.Recent results by research groups in British Telecom, Los Alamos National Laboratory and at the University of Geneva, have shown that quantum key distribution is possible over distances of tens of kilometers, using only standard telecom cables.However, due to birefringence and the effects of the environment, the polarization at the output of a fiber fluctuates randomly.Therefore, all existing systems need active polarization control.Systems based on phase also require interferometric detection, which necessitates active stabilization of the interferometers.To eliminate these problems, our team, led by Prof. N. Gisin in the Group of Applied Physics at the University of Geneva, is currently developing a new interferometric system implementing phase-encoded quantum key distribution (US patent pending).A schematic of the setup is given in Fig. 1.Its main features are:1) The system is based on time multiplexing, the interfering pulses following exactly the same spatial path, albeit with a small time delay.The interferometer is thus automatically aligned, and needs neither adjustments nor stabilization of the path lengths.2) Use of Faraday mirrors enables all birefringence effects in the fibers to be cancelled out.Therefore, the system does not require any polarization control.With this new system, Alice and Bob could exchange their cryptographic keys through standard telecom systems.They would be provided with a sending kit and