On the Received View Versus the Alternative View Controversy About Quantum (Non)individuality

Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

Décio Krause

Some philosophers of physics have addressed criticisms of the so-called Received View (RV) of non-individual quantum objects, also called the orthodox view. Dennis Dieks made a very good resume of these criticisms in [1] and Tomasz Bigaj in [2] has a more detailed account. In considering (mainly) these works and with some additional mentions, we hope to dissipate some misunderstandings about the RV and clarify what is happening with such a view. According to Dieks, the RV doesn’t fit the practice of physics since in some situations the physicist assumes that quantum objects can be treated individually, imitating standard objects (individuals) of classical physics. Dieks also proposes an Alternative View (AV), generally called the heterodox view, which would give a view of the fundamental ontology of quantum physics and which would be more by the way physicists usually proceed. In my view, the AV cannot be viewed as the fundamental ontological theory despite being suitable for practical purposes. Furthermore, we think that it does not conflate the RV, but is complementary to it, substituting it when quantum objects are sufficiently apart and can be treated in conformity with the classical way. From our point of view, in the practice of physics, we can adopt AV. Still, the RV is more adequate when we are looking for logical and foundational analyses, at least when the supposed metaphysics comprises non-individuals.

Décio Krause, Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

Christian DE RONDE, Ivan Klarreich

In this work we address the contemporary debate about quantum individuality expressed as an opposition between those who, like Décio Krause, defend the reference of the theory to "non-individual particles", and those like Dennis Dieks, who propose instead to preserve the notion of "classical particle" as commonly applied by contemporary physicists. We will argue that these viewpoints rather than truly opposed share a common methodology which has helped to reinforce the doctrine of classical concepts that was imposed by Bohr and Dirac within the "standard" formulation --which remains the orthodox physical account of the theory of quanta. We will also discuss a recently proposed relativist yet objective relational account of quantum individuality [25] which, going back to Einstein's methodological approach, opens the doors to a completely new, truly realist understanding of quantum individuality.

Nathan Moore

One recent debate in philosophy of physics has centered whether quantum particles are individuals or not. The received view is that particles are not individuals and the standard methodology is to approach the question via the structure of quantum theory. I challenge both the received view and the standard methodology. I contend not only that the structure of quantum theory is not the right place to look for conditions of individuality that quantum particles may or may not satisfy, but also that there is an important role for traditional metaphysics to play. Consequently, my work brings together the philosophy of physics and traditional metaphysics literatures to shed new light on the debate over the individuality of quantum particles. I defend a set of conditions of individuality and argue that quantum particles satisfy these conditions thereby defending the view that particles are individuals in opposition to the received view. I also challenge a second feature of the standard methodology insofar as I challenge the significance of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in terms of which much discussion in the philosophy of physics literature is framed. My work is significant in a number of additional ways as well. My work implies that the dominant explanation for quantum statistics in terms of non-individuality is incorrect and it also undermines the ontic-structural realists metaphysical underdetermination challenge to the scientific realist.

MICHAEL R. GARDNER