The advent of quantum computers makes asymmetric cryptographic algorithms insecure and vulnerable. A promising solution to ensure the continued security attributes of confidentiality, integrity, and availability is the use of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. The adoption of quantum-safe algorithms takes place at a vastly different pace in different industries. In some industries, adoption processes are slow due to the required adaptation of regulations and standards. At the same time, long-lived products with non-PQC algorithms are more likely to become insecure during their lifetime. Vehicles are a prime example of long-lived products where the adoption of PQC proceeds slowly. When quantum computers are able to break relevant key lengths of asymmetric cryptography and, thus, render current vehicle systems insecure, vehicles that are developed and produced today will most likely remain in use. In this work, we provide a structured and comprehensive overview of the current migration state of PQC algorithms in the automotive area. We address use cases involving asymmetric cryptography in the automotive context that face the challenge of adapting PQC, such as internal vehicle networks, manufacturer-specific communication, and vehicle-to-everything communication. In addition, we review the standards concerning vehicle security and their relevance to PQC. Finally, we identify and discuss open research challenges regarding the adoption of PQC in the automotive domain and further steps towards quantum-safe vehicles.
The advent of quantum computers makes asymmetric cryptographic algorithms insecure and vulnerable. A promising solution to ensure the continued security attributes of confidentiality, integrity, and availability is the use of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. The adoption of quantum-safe algorithms takes place at a vastly different pace in different industries. In some industries, adoption processes are slow due to the required adaptation of regulations and standards. At the same time, long-lived products with non-PQC algorithms are more likely to become insecure during their lifetime. Vehicles are a prime example of long-lived products where the adoption of PQC proceeds slowly. When quantum computers are able to break relevant key lengths of asymmetric cryptography and, thus, render current vehicle systems insecure, vehicles that are developed and produced today will most likely remain in use. In this work, we provide a structured and comprehensive overview of the current migration state of PQC algorithms in the automotive area. We address use cases involving asymmetric cryptography in the automotive context that face the challenge of adapting PQC, such as internal vehicle networks, manufacturer-specific communication, and vehicle-to-everything communication. In addition, we review the standards concerning vehicle security and their relevance to PQC. Finally, we identify and discuss open research challenges regarding the adoption of PQC in the automotive domain and further steps towards quantum-safe vehicles.
Cryptographic algorithms are an essential measure to ensure confidentiality and integrity of internet communication. The development of quantum computers (QCs) and their potential to utilize Shor’s Law, is increasingly recognized as a threat to asymmetric cryptography. In response, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is gaining prominence as a notable field of research aiming to standardize quantum resistant algorithms before the operational usage of QCs. This paper is addressed to people with preliminary knowledge in the field of cryptography and QC. Based on a literature review, the authors provide an overview of challenges faced by the research community and elaborate the advancements in addressing post-quantum threats. A migration strategy from classical cryptosystems to PQC systems is in development, but obstacles such as time constraints and improper implementation complicate the process. Full implementation could take a decade or more. Until then, our paper aims to create awareness for potential challenges when transitioning towards PQC. As categorization scheme for these potential obstacles, we refer to a well- established model in cybersecurity – the McCumber Cube. Conclusions embrace preparing for risks of improper implementation and deriving a multi-step migration. Special attention is expected to be needed for data migration of existing data sets. As a request for future research in PQC, the authors identified the process of implementing post-cryptography standards, e.g., from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and an assessment of the perceived readiness of industry to adapt.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly developing field that addresses the potential threat quantum computers pose to the security of current cryptographic algorithms. With the rapid advancement of quantum computing technologies, it has become imperative to identify and standardize new cryptographic techniques that can withstand attacks from quantum computers. This paper explores the motivation behind PQC and provides an overview of the experimental research conducted in the field. It highlights the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks and emphasizes the need for transitioning to quantum-resistant alternatives. The experiments conducted in the PQC domain encompass the evaluation and analysis of candidate algorithms submitted to the NIST PQC competition. These experiments involve comprehensive security assessments, performance evaluations, and code audits to ensure the suitability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in real-world scenarios. This paper provides guidelines for organizations and practitioners adopting PQC. It discusses considerations for selecting and implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including security levels, algorithmic characteristics, performance tradeoffs, and integration challenges. It also outlines the importance of a smooth transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic systems and highlights the need for standardization efforts to ensure interoperability and compatibility.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.
The development of large quantum computers will have dire consequences for cryptography. Most of the symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Grover’s search algorithm gives a square root time boost for the searching of the key in symmetric schemes like AES and 3DES. The security of asymmetric algorithms like RSA, Diffie Hellman, and ECC is based on the mathematical hardness of prime factorization and discrete logarithms. The best classical algorithms available take exponential time. Shor’s factoring algorithm can solve the problems in polynomial time. Major breakthroughs in quantum computing will render all the present-day widely used asymmetric cryptosystems insecure. This paper analyzes the vulnerability of the classical cryptosystems in the context of quantum computers, discusses various post-quantum cryptosystem families, discusses the status of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process, provides a performance comparison of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms on different platforms, and finally provides a couple of future research directions in this field.
The threats are existential to the traditional cryptosystems of public keys, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), due to the rapid progress in quantum computing. Such algorithms as the Shor and Grover algorithms prove that as soon as large scale quantum computers are achieved, these classical cryptographic protocols will not provide any privacy and integrity to online communication. This has created an emergency to find post-quantum cryptography (PQC), or quantum-safe cryptography, which will resist attacks by both classical and quantum attackers. The paper is a review of the latest research and development in post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and their implementation in current security systems. We organize quantum-safe methods into significant organizations such as lattice-based, hash-based, multivariate polynomial-based and code-based encrypted communications. Each type has been evaluated critically based on computational efficiency, key sizes, speed of encryption/decryption and security proofs. The survey also examines the current standardization activities happening in the world and especially the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC competition, which lists candidate algorithms that have advanced to standard adoption. Besides this, the paper addresses hybrid cryptographic designs that use both classical and post-quantum bases in ensuring a seamless migration in the transition phase. Internet security protocols like TLS, VPNs and blockchain consensus as applications of PQC are examined in detail. Lastly, we pinpoint open research issues, which include creating lightweight PQC to support resource-constrained IoT devices, balancing performance and strong security assurances, and interoperability between the new PQC algorithms and existing infrastructures. Through detailed survey we inform the future of researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on the preparation of the post-quantum era of secure digital communications.
This paper surveys the practical transition from conventional to post-quantum/quantum-safe cryptography (PQC) across contemporary infrastructures. Large-scale quantum computers impact cryptographic primitives differently: conventional asymmetric encryption/signatures will become insecure, while symmetric ciphers largely remain viable and hash functions face only modest weakening. Therefore, adaptations to existing as well as future systems are needed. Depending on the application area, “harvest-now, decrypt-later” may either be a real threat or not, so urgent action is required only in those areas, where once security has been broken it cannot be reconstructed, while others may have more time to adapt (e.g. where data has a very short lifetime anyway). The paper discusses a long list of potentially affected systems, and what special challenges implementing postquantum cryptography poses for them, and where upgrading needs to be prioritized. A problem identified as remaining unsolved is “grandfathering”: what to do with devices that simply cannot be updated, e.g. because the cryptography is integrated into their hardware.