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Physics Letters A

Laser damage attack on continuous variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution: Practical security and countermeasure

Xuan Li, Qingquan Peng, Ying Guo

Published Jan 8, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.physleta.2025.130221

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Continuous variable quantum key distribution is a information system that uses quantum physics to share secret keys among legitimate participants, where a variable optical attenuator (VOA) plays a crucial role in managing the intensity of light transmitted between the participants. However, minor changes in light intensity can have an impact on its security. In this paper, we suggest an attack strategy called the laser damage attack targeting the VOA of the continuous variable (CV) measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) system. This attack can damage the VOA, leading to incorrect secret key rate calculations by legitimate participants and enabling an eavesdropper to steal partial secret key information. Numerical simulations show its potential impact on the practical security of the CV-MDI-QKD system.
Continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) can defend all detection-side attacks effectively. Therefore, the source side is the final battlefield for performing quantum hacking attacks. This paper investigates the practical security of a CV-MDI QKD system under a light-injection attack. Here, we first describe two different light-injection attacks, i.e., the induced-photorefractive attack and the strong-power injection attack. Then, we consider three attack cases where Eve only attacks one of the parties or both parties of the CV-MDI QKD system. Based on the analysis of the parameter estimation, we find that the legitimate communication parties will overestimate the secret key rate of the system under the effect of a light-injection attack. This opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully obtain secret key information in a practical CV-MDI QKD system. In particular, compared to the laser-damage attack, the above attacks use a lower power of injected light and have a more serious effect on the security of the system. To eliminate the above effects, we can enhance the practical security of the system by doping the lithium niobate material with various impurities or by using protective devices, such as optical isolators, circulators, optical power limiters, and narrow-band filters. Apart from these, we can also use an intensity monitor or a photodetector to detect the light-injection attack.
Lithium niobate materials, which have the potential to fabricate lasers, modulation devices, and photodetectors, are widely used in quantum information processing due to their exceptional optical and electro-optical properties. However, the photorefractive effect in lithium niobate materials may cause the quantum device to deviate from its ideal operation model, which is an important assumption for the security of quantum key distribution. Here, we demonstrate the practical security of the continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol under the photorefractive effect, where the eavesdropper Eve injects a 488 nm visible light into the source-side variable optical attenuator and excites the photorefractive effect phenomenon in a lithium-niobate-based dual-waveguide. In particular, we derive the photorefractive-effect-induced intensity change of a variable optical attenuator and then the corresponding parameter estimation process, showing the effectiveness of this attack for various irradiation powers and waveguide technologies (including proton-exchanged and annealed-proton-exchanged waveguides). To show its effect on practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems, we present the composable finite-size security of one-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution and continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocols. Numerical results show that this induced-photorefraction attack can break the security even with a low irradiation power, such as 3 [Formula: see text] (or about 0.21 [Formula: see text]). In addition, we find that Eve's optimal attack strategy against continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution is related to the information reconciliation process by comparing three different attack strategies. Finally, we discuss some possible countermeasures to resist induced-photorefraction attacks to enhance the security of the system.