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Radiophysics and Quantum Electronics

Quantum Hacking on the Technical Implementation of Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Systems

Boris Aleksandrovich Nasedkin, R. Goncharov, P. A. Morozova, I. M. Filipov, Vladimir Chistiakov, E.O. Samsonov, V. I. Egorov

Published Jun 1, 2024• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11141-025-10350-1

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