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Asia Communications and Photonics Conference

Quantum Hacking Against 256QAM Modulated Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution using Amplitude-Boosting Attack

Mingze Wu, Yiming Bian, Junhui Li, Song Yu, Yichen Zhang

Published Nov 2, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We report the amplitude-boosting attack against 256QAM continuous-variable quantum key distribution system, which could lead to an inflated estimation of secret key rate by communication parties, thereby compromising the security of practical system.
DOI
10.1109/acp/ipoc63121.2024.10810093

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