Sensing for Secure Communication in ISAC: Protocol Design and Beamforming Optimization

Abstract

The channel state information (CSI) of malicious users in the field of physical layer security is usually difficult to obtain due to the users’ passive listening. However, as sensing is integrating into the cellular network, it becomes feasible to acquire the CSI of passive eavesdroppers. Motivated by this, we propose a novel sensing-aided secure communication (SASC) scheme in this paper, which is implemented by a two-stage transmission protocol including beam sensing of the eavesdropper’s CSI and secure communication to the legitimate user against the eavesdropper. In the first stage, the base station (BS) needs to decide the number of sensing beams$L$, and we derive the closed-form Cramer-Rao bound (CRB) to establish the relationship between the estimated angle range for the eavesdropper’s location and$L$, where a larger$L$for beam sensing returns a tighter CRB to locate the eavesdropper. In the second stage, the BS designs the beamforming vector to transmit confidential data to the legitimate user and avoid leakage to the eavesdropper in the estimated range. As sensing affects the subsequent secure communication, we decouple the non-convex two-stage joint optimization problem into two subproblems and solve it by backward induction. In particular, in the secrecy beamforming subproblem given$L$, we investigate the worst-case information leakage by constructing a convex hull to approximate the angle range from sensing. Then we develop a semi-closed-form solution of robust secrecy beamforming vector, and use it for the other subproblem to decide initial$L$. To achieve this goal, we also obtain a semi-closed-form solution of$L$by considering all potential estimated results in the worst case. Finally, we present simulation results to show the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed SASC scheme as compared to various benchmarks.