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Lecture notes in computer science

General Adversary Structures in Byzantine Agreement and Multi-party Computation with Active and Omission Corruption

Konstantinos Brazitikos, Vassilis Zikas

Published Dec 2, 2024• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-78023-3_7

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