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Springer eBooks

The Fundamental Theory: Relativistic Quantum Fields

Art Hobson

Published Jan 1, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-72613-2_5

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•Apr 21, 2017•0 citations
Several recent arguments purport to show that there can be no relativistic, quantum-mechanical theory of localizable particles and, thus, that relativity and quantum mechanics can be reconciled only in the context of quantum field theory. We point out some loopholes in the existing arguments, and we provide two no-go theorems to close these loopholes. However, even with these loopholes closed, it does not yet follow that relativity plus quantum mechanics exclusively requires a field ontology, since relativistic quantum field theory itself might permit an ontology of localizable particles supervenient on the fundamental fields. Thus, we provide another no-go theorem to rule out this possibility. Finally, we allay potential worries about this conclusion by arguing that relativistic quantum field theory can nevertheless explain the possibility of "particle detections," as well as the pragmatic utility of "particle talk."
The existence of ontologically different but empirically indistinguishable versions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of metaphysical underdetermination. I argue that this problem is unlikely to disappear when we turn to the next more fundamental theory, namely relativistic quantum field theory. The problem is merely overshadowed by yet another interpretational controversy, but it persists regardless of the outcome of this latter debate. I further argue that one should not be too optimistic about transferring ontological lessons learned in the context of one physical theory to the context of a more fundamental theory.