The emergence of quantum computing poses significant risks to the security of current cryptographic systems, particularly those reliant on classical algorithms vulnerable to quantum attacks. This systematic literature review adopts the PRISMA model to critically assess the development, methodologies, and security of post-quantum hash-based signature schemes as resilient alternatives. Through a methodical selection process from leading academic databases, we identify and analyze key contributions to the field within the last decade, focusing on the schemes’ security proofs, enhanced performance, and efficiency metrics. Our analysis reveals a diverse landscape of hash-based signature schemes, their evolving security features against quantum threats, and their practical implementations in securing digital communications. The review highlights the importance of advancing these quantum-resistant technologies, discusses the challenges in their adoption, and outlines future directions for research and standardization efforts. The findings aim to provide a comprehensive resource for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers involved in the transition toward secure cryptographic practices in the quantum era.
The emergence of quantum computing poses significant risks to the security of current cryptographic systems, particularly those reliant on classical algorithms vulnerable to quantum attacks. This systematic literature review adopts the PRISMA model to critically assess the development, methodologies, and security of post-quantum hash-based signature schemes as resilient alternatives. Through a methodical selection process from leading academic databases, we identify and analyze key contributions to the field within the last decade, focusing on the schemes’ security proofs, enhanced performance, and efficiency metrics. Our analysis reveals a diverse landscape of hash-based signature schemes, their evolving security features against quantum threats, and their practical implementations in securing digital communications. The review highlights the importance of advancing these quantum-resistant technologies, discusses the challenges in their adoption, and outlines future directions for research and standardization efforts. The findings aim to provide a comprehensive resource for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers involved in the transition toward secure cryptographic practices in the quantum era.
The advance of quantum computing poses significant risks to traditional cryptographic systems, including RSA and ECC, due to algorithms such as Shor's, prompting an urgent need for robust post-quantum cryptography (PQC) solutions. This paper presents a systematic review of PQC algorithms, encompassing lattice-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial, hash-based, and supersingular isogeny-based cryptography. By evaluating recent publications and NIST standardization efforts, we assess these approaches in terms of quantum resistance, computational efficiency, scalability, and implementation challenges. Lattice-based schemes, notably CRYSTALS-Kyber, excel in quantum-secure encryption and performance, whereas codebased systems like McEliece are hindered by large key sizes. Hash-based signatures, such as SPHINCS+, and isogeny-based protocols, including SIDH, provide promising alternatives but require further optimization to reduce computational overhead. Our analysis highlights the potential of hybrid PQC methods and lightweight hardware implementations for securing emerging domains like IoT, blockchain, and financial systems. The review serves as a foundational resource for researchers and practitioners, advocating the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptography to preserve data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in the quantum era.
With the constantly changing world of computers nowadays, the introduction of quantum computing has posed immense threats to the security of old and previous encryption algorithms. Post-Quantum Cryptography or PQC refers to a new generation of algorithms specifically created to resist the intense quantum computer attacks and offer secure and long-lasting protection to digital communications. As the potential of quantum technology becomes increasingly evident, the pursuit of secure, future-proof cryptographic solutions has never been more critical. This systematic review explores different PQC solutions for their strengths, weaknesses, and challenges of implementation. provides a comprehensive analysis of key studies on quantum-resistant algorithms, migration strategies and examines cryptographic security measures to present a complete picture of the latest advancements in quantum-safe cryptography. In this systematic paper, different PQC algorithms such as lattice, hash, code, multivariate and isogeny are reviewed along with their advantages and disadvantages. It also discusses how such findings will affect the security of real world communication, digital signatures, as well as blockchain security. This ensures how important it is to establish standardized PQC protocols for overall data security. This paper concludes with what future research directions and practical considerations relate to the adoption of PQC in critical infrastructures.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is an emerging field that aims to develop cryptographic algorithms resistant to attacks by quantum computers. As quantum computing technology advances, traditional cryptographic methods such as RSA and ECC are becoming increasingly vulnerable. This systematic review provides an in-depth analysis of the current state of PQC, focusing on the most promising algorithms and their potential applications. The review covers lattice-based, code-based, multivariate, and hash-based cryptographic schemes, evaluating their security, efficiency, and practicality. We also discuss the challenges and future directions in PQC, including standardization efforts and integration into existing cryptographic systems. This paper aims to serve as a comprehensive resource for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers interested in the next generation of cybersecurity algorithms
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.
Quantum computers threaten to break asymmetric cryptography protocols almost immediately. To address this, researchers are developing post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which offers greater security but comes with higher costs and greater implementation complexity. The objective of this article is to identify the NEW cryptographic schemes, methods, and algorithms designed to resist quantum attacks. To do so, we first conducted a literature review that included mapped studies, systematic reviews, and surveys published in 2025 and mid-2026. This would help identify gaps and knowledge vacuums. Second, we conducted a systematic review using the PRISMA methodological guidelines for the period between 2020 and mid-2026 to compare the performance of PQC schemes, characterize the main challenges of their implementation, and identify trends. The results show that lattice-based schemes, followed by code-based and hash-based schemes, are the most extensively researched because they balance security, computational efficiency, and readiness for standardization. Furthermore, the most commonly reported performance metrics are key and signature sizes, as well as execution times. Meanwhile, scalability, power consumption, and performance on resource-constrained devices have been explored very little. Our study concludes with the key priorities that are likely to shape the future development of PQC.
The rapid growth of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic systems. That is due in large part to the fact that they represent efficient solutions for some of the most challenging mathematical problems such as integer factoring or finding discrete logarithms. Schemes currently in wide use including RSA, Diffie–Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography are particularly susceptible to being attacked by quantum computers, using algorithms like Shor's Algorithm and Grover's Algorithm. The advent of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) provides a promising potential answer to providing longterm security from adversaries using quantum computing capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive state-of-the-art review of various PQC techniques currently being researched, including lattice-based methods, code-based methods, multivariate methods, hash-based methods, and isogeny-based methods. key challenges that will need to be addressed include computational overhead, large key sizes and implementation complexity. Furthermore the study reviews the current standardization efforts by the National Institute of Standards and Technology related to PQC and discusses some of the very specific practical considerations that need to be considered before widely deploying these techniques. The paper concludes by a complete list of existing research challenges and proposed future work that will assist in the development of efficient and scalable systems that will resist attacks from quantum computers.