Abstract Physical unclonable function (PUF) has emerged as a unique physical'fingerprint' that is inherently difficult to replicate. It shows tremendous application value in various hardware security areas such as identity authentication, chip anticounterfeiting, communication encryption, blockchain, etc. However, with the rapid development of 3D nanoprinting, classical PUFs constructed with disordered micro‐nanostructures face tremendous threats from physical cloning attacks. Herein, this study proposes and demonstrates the utilization of room‐temperature single‐photon emitters derived from atomic defects in randomly distributed pyramidal aluminum nitride (AlN) nanocrystals as a novel quantum PUF to resist physical cloning attacks. The fabrication of this quantum PUF on silicon (Si) wafers enables seamless integration with silicon photonic integrated circuits. The multidimensional fingerprint features of the single‐photon emitters are highly sensitive to the lattice parameters of the uneven AlN nanocrystals. Furthermore, each single photon emitter can work as a quantum random number generator to ensure the fundamental unpredictability of PUFs. The subatomic precision requirement coupled with unpredictable quantum emission behavior makes it practically impossible to attack the proposed quantum PUF, providing a promising solution for information security in the post‐quantum era.
Abstract Physical unclonable function (PUF) has emerged as a unique physical'fingerprint' that is inherently difficult to replicate. It shows tremendous application value in various hardware security areas such as identity authentication, chip anticounterfeiting, communication encryption, blockchain, etc. However, with the rapid development of 3D nanoprinting, classical PUFs constructed with disordered micro‐nanostructures face tremendous threats from physical cloning attacks. Herein, this study proposes and demonstrates the utilization of room‐temperature single‐photon emitters derived from atomic defects in randomly distributed pyramidal aluminum nitride (AlN) nanocrystals as a novel quantum PUF to resist physical cloning attacks. The fabrication of this quantum PUF on silicon (Si) wafers enables seamless integration with silicon photonic integrated circuits. The multidimensional fingerprint features of the single‐photon emitters are highly sensitive to the lattice parameters of the uneven AlN nanocrystals. Furthermore, each single photon emitter can work as a quantum random number generator to ensure the fundamental unpredictability of PUFs. The subatomic precision requirement coupled with unpredictable quantum emission behavior makes it practically impossible to attack the proposed quantum PUF, providing a promising solution for information security in the post‐quantum era.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are hardware security primitives whose inherent physical complexity can be exploited for secure authentication and cryptographic key generation. Silicon photonic devices, owing to their suitability for quantum and artificial intelligence applications alongside standard CMOS fabrication processes, constitute a highly promising substrate for integrated multifunctional PUFs. Despite the advanced security guarantees offered by quantum cryptographic protocols and the central role of silicon photonics in quantum technologies, quantum readout strategies based on single-photon states for photonic PUFs remain largely unexplored. In this work, we experimentally demonstrate a silicon nitride (SiN) programmable photonic Mach Zehnder interferometer mesh that implements a unitary transformation and operates as a PUF, whose secret physical signature arises from uncontrollable waveguide variations during fabrication. Using experimentally derived parameters from the SiN integrated mesh, we further introduce and numerically evaluate a quantum readout protocol that combines single-photon states with PUFs. Maximally mixed quantum states are employed to conceal the underlying unitary transformation from passive eavesdropping. Security against adversaries possessing devices fabricated under similar conditions is assessed, with authentication performance quantified through Monte Carlo analysis of the false acceptance and false rejection rates as a function of the number of detected events and corrected errors. The results indicate exceptional performance with equal error rates as low as 10 to the minus 14, highlighting the potential of quantum secure PUFs for high security authentication applications.
The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) has significantly raised concerns over secure identification and authentication of IoT devices. While physical unclonable function (PUF)-based anticounterfeiting cryptography shows promise, implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) system with resource-constrained PUF device remains a significant challenge. Here, we demonstrate a multidimensional-encoded optical PUF fabricated with multi-color quantum dots (mQDs), resilient to machine learning attacks, for use in anticounterfeiting MFA. Randomly distributed mQDs in a periodic nanostructure fabricated via nanoimprint lithography generate spatially chaotic, unpredictable multiple security keys when ultraviolet (UV) light is only illuminated. Photoluminescence measurements revealed irregular mQD emission, where disordered distribution-induced Förster resonant energy transfer produces unpredictable color patterns. Our PUF-induced multiple keys were validated through advanced PUF metrics like uniformity, uniqueness, correlation factor, entropy, and even resilience to machine learning attack. We further demonstrate efficient implementation of a cryptography protocol with MFA system for IoT applications using mQDs-based optical PUFs. Material systems with physical unclonable functions (PUF) are needed for secure authentication. Here, a multidimensional-encoded optical PUF fabricated with multi-color quantum dots is demonstrated, for multi-factor authentication.
The increasing security threat is a serious challenge to the internet of things (IoT). Hardware‐based security primitive is an essential and powerful way to protect IoT devices from various attacks. But most of the current security hardwares are based on macrophysical features, which are usually produced by reproducible deterministic processes and can be copied by counterfeiters. Herein, a physical unclonable function (PUF) with high robustness based on the intrinsic random micro‐/nanostructures of the electronic packages is proposed thereby demonstrating a low‐cost and label‐free hardware security solution for IoT. Using the unique surface micropattern and the spatially coded laser scattering, the proposed PUFs can be used as anticounterfeiting labels, authentication tokens and cryptographic key generators. With the help of the proposed PUFs, the safety protection is still effective even when the attacker is able to get access to the database because the secret keys are inherently hidden in the complex microscopic stochastic physical features of the PUFs but not the database. The proposed package‐enabled PUFs provide a promising and practical physical protection solution for IoT security.
Abstract A physical unclonable function (PUF) device leverages manufacturing randomness to generate a unique fingerprint for secure authentication, encryption, and counterfeit prevention. Optical PUFs (OPUFs) have gained prominence due to their strong security, light‐based challenge‐response mechanisms, and potential for quantum‐secure encryption. These devices have promising applications for hardware security, authentication, cryptographic key generation, and anti‐counterfeiting measures across multiple industries. This review enlightens the diverse material platforms used for OPUFs, ranging from fiber optics and liquid crystals to advanced semiconductor nanocrystals and plasmonic metasurfaces, each offering distinct optical characteristics that impact security strength. While no single material system dominates the field, hybrid and multi‐model approaches integrating low‐dimensional materials are being explored to enhance reliability and scalability. Finally, the challenges and future perspectives are outlined, including adaptive OPUFs architectures, utilizing artificial intelligence (AI) for challenge‐response generation, and their integration into quantum communication networks, highlighting how next‐generation semiconductor materials can further advance OPUFs technologies.
The hallmark of the information age is the ease with which information is stored, accessed, and shared throughout the globe. This is enabled, in large part, by the simplicity of duplicating digital information without error. Unfortunately, an ever-growing consequence is the global threat to security and privacy enabled by our digital reliance. Specifically, modern secure communications and authentication suffer from formidable threats arising from the potential for copying of secret keys stored in digital media. With relatively little transfer of information, an attacker can impersonate a legitimate user, publish malicious software that is automatically accepted as safe by millions of computers, or eavesdrop on countless digital exchanges. To address this vulnerability, a new class of cryptographic devices known as physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are being developed. PUFs are modern realizations of an ancient concept, the physical key, and offer an attractive alternative for digital key storage. A user derives a digital key from the PUF’s physical behavior, which is sensitive to physical idiosyncrasies that are beyond fabrication tolerances. Thus, unlike conventional physical keys, a PUF cannot be duplicated and only the holder can extract the digital key. However, emerging machine learning (ML) methods are remarkably adept at learning behavior via training, and if such algorithms can learn to emulate a PUF, then the security is compromised. Unfortunately, such attacks are highly successful against conventional electronic PUFs. Here, we investigate ML attacks against a nonlinear silicon photonic PUF, a novel design that leverages nonlinear optical interactions in chaotic silicon microcavities. First, we investigate these devices’ resistance to cloning during fabrication and demonstrate their use as a source of large volumes of cryptographic key material. Next, we demonstrate that silicon photonic PUFs exhibit resistance to state-of-the-art ML attacks due to their nonlinearity and finally validate this resistance in an encryption scenario.
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a device with unique behaviour that is hard to clone hence providing a secure fingerprint. A variety of PUF structures and PUF-based applications have been explored theoretically as well as being implemented in practical settings. Recently, the inherent unclonability of quantum states has been exploited to derive the quantum analogue of PUF as well as new proposals for the implementation of PUF. We present the first comprehensive study of quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs) with quantum cryptographic tools. We formally define qPUFs, encapsulating all requirements of classical PUFs as well as introducing a new testability feature inherent to the quantum setting only. We use a quantum game-based framework to define different levels of security for qPUFs: quantum exponential unforgeability, quantum existential unforgeability and quantum selective unforgeability. We introduce a new quantum attack technique based on the universal quantum emulator algorithm of Marvin and Lloyd to prove no qPUF can provide quantum existential unforgeability. On the other hand, we prove that a large family of qPUFs (called unitary PUFs) can provide quantum selective unforgeability which is the desired level of security for most PUF-based applications.