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Quantum Information Processing

Comment on “quantum identity authentication with single photon”

Davide Li Calsi, Paul R. Kohl

Published Oct 19, 2024• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract A few years ago Hong et al. (Quantum Inf Process 16:236, 2017) proposed a quantum identity authentication protocol using single photons and executable on currently available quantum hardware. Zawadzki later published two attacks on this protocol, and suggested a mitigation in the same work. In this comment we point out an additional vulnerability that causes the prover Alice to leak a percentage of her secret key at every authentication attempt. The latter is due to a problematic policy in the generation and management of decoy states. We conclude by showing a simple mitigation that addresses the issue.

DOI
10.1007/s11128-024-04564-x

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Abstract A few years ago Hong et al. (Quantum Inf Process 16:236, 2017) proposed a quantum identity authentication protocol using single photons and executable on currently available quantum hardware. Zawadzki later published two attacks on this protocol, and suggested a mitigation in the same work. In this comment we point out an additional vulnerability that causes the prover Alice to leak a percentage of her secret key at every authentication attempt. The latter is due to a problematic policy in the generation and management of decoy states. We conclude by showing a simple mitigation that addresses the issue.
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).
An interesting protocol for quantum identity authentication on a basis of the classic shared secret has been presented recently (Hong et al. in Quantum Inf Process 16(10): 236, 2017 ). It requires few resources and it is technologically feasible. Its seminal analysis focuses on average eavesdropper’s information gain per single protocol run—a parameter suitable for estimation of the security margin applicable to the protocols aiming at provision of confidentiality. However, the security requirements of the authentication process are very stringent—no single bit of the secret can be revealed, otherwise the eavesdropper can collect subsequent bits of the secret in successive protocol runs. The failure of the seminal version to meet this requirement is demonstrated. The sequential processing of qubits and the static nature of the compared data is the rationale behind the improvement. The introduced changes make that partial information gained in some authentication attempt gives the eavesdroppers no advantage in breaking the next ones. They are forced to consider each authentication transaction as a separate puzzle that can be solved according to all-or-nothing paradigm. The improvement retains conceptual simplicity and technological feasibility of the seminal version of the protocol.
Identification schemes are interactive cryptographic protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of their identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decides whether or not it comes from the intended prover. Given the growing interest in quantum computation, it is indeed desirable to have explicit designs for achieving user identification through quantum resources. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki. We discuss the applicability of the theoretical impossibility results from Lo, Colbeck and Buhrman et al. and formally prove that the protocol must necessarily be insecure. Moreover, to better illustrate our insecurity claim, we present an attack on Zawadzki's protocol and show that by using a simple strategy an adversary may indeed obtain relevant information on the shared identification secret. Specifically, through the use of the principal of conclusive exclusion on quantum measurements, our attack geometrically reduces the key space resulting in the claimed logarithmic security being reduced effectively by a factor of two after only three verification attempts.
We analyze the security of a quantum secure direct communication protocol equipped with authentication. We first propose a specifc attack on the protocol by which, an adversary can break the secret already shared between Alice and Bob, when he (adversary) runs the protocol few times. The attack shows that there is a gap in authentication procedure of the protocol, and by doing so the adversary can obtain the key without remaining any trace. We then give the modification of the protocol and analyze the security of it, and show how the modified protocol can close the gap.
This study proposes a two-party quantum identity authentication protocol that does not require the participation of a third party. The protocol can verify the user’s identity without exposing the authentication key information, and it can be implemented with a single-photon state, which does not involve entanglement, enabling it to be combined with existing technologies. The shared key is protected by the protocol and hidden during communication, and the security of the authentication scheme is analyzed and verified under general attack. Further analysis results indicate that this protocol is secure and efficient.