Information-Theoretic Foundations for Post-Quantum Secure Multi-Party Computation
PAULO SÉRGIO DE ANDRADE
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security of current cryptographic systems, including those underpinning secure multi-party computation (MPC). While considerable research has focused on developing post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives, their integration into MPC protocols often inherits the computational security assumptions characteristic of classical cryptography. This paper explores the information-theoretic foundations for designing and analyzing post-quantum secure MPC protocols, aiming to achieve security guarantees that are independent of computational hardness assumptions and resilient against adversaries with unbounded computational power, including quantum adversaries. We delve into how information-theoretic primitives, such as secret sharing and oblivious transfer, can be adapted or combined with post-quantum techniques to construct MPC protocols with enhanced security. The work reviews existing paradigms, identifies challenges in achieving robust post-quantum information-theoretic security, and proposes conceptual frameworks for constructing such protocols. We examine the trade-offs between information-theoretic security, efficiency, and the practical implementation of post-quantum MPC, offering a theoretical perspective on how to achieve strong, long-term security in a quantum era. Our findings suggest that a hybrid approach, leveraging the strengths of both information theory and carefully selected post-quantum primitives, is crucial for building resilient MPC solutions.
•Nov 24, 2025•0 citations