A physical theory consists of the mathematical formalism and an interpretation, which contains the definition of symbols, measurement assignments, concepts and principles, and an ontology. We present a scheme to classify these different levels of a physical theory and apply it to Newtonian Mechanics and the interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. We show that this classification scheme is embedded in the methodology of philosophy of science. With this scheme, different interpretations of Quantum Mechanics can be compared concerning the formalism and the used conceptions, and it serves as a guidance to identify ontological entities and reality conceptions in the different interpretations. Inspired by the commitments on the ontological level, we propose two heuristics concerning ontological statements.
Abstract Harrigan and Spekkens (Found Phys 40:125–157, 2010) provided a categorization of quantum ontological models classifying them as
ψ ψ -ontic or
ψ ψ -epistemic if the quantum state
ψ ψ describes respectively either a physical reality or mere observers’ knowledge. Moreover, they claimed that Einstein—who was a supporter of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics—endorsed an epistemic view of
ψ. ψ. In this essay we critically assess such a classification and some of its consequences by proposing a twofold argumentation. Firstly, we show that Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization implicitly assumes that a complete description of a quantum system (its ontic state,
λ λ ) only concernssingle,individualsystems instantiatingabsolute,intrinsicproperties. Secondly, we argue that such assumptions conflict with some current interpretations of quantum mechanics, which employ different ontic states as a complete description of quantum systems. In particular, we will show that, since in the statistical interpretation ontic states describe ensembles rather than individuals, such a view cannot be considered
ψ ψ -epistemic. As a consequence, the authors misinterpreted Einstein’s view concerning the nature of the quantum state. Next, we will focus onrelational quantum mechanicsandperspectival quantum mechanics, which in virtue of their relational and perspectival metaphysics employ ontic states
λ λ dealing with relational properties. We conclude that Harrigan and Spekkens’ categorization is too narrow and entails an inadequate classification of the mentioned interpretations of quantum theory. Hence, any satisfactory classification of quantum ontological models ought to take into account the variations of
λ λ across different interpretations of quantum mechanics.
It is demonstrated that the reason for the diversity of interpretations of quantum mechanics is that they are not connected by continuity relations with classical physics, and also the reason is the impossibility of operationalist definition of the vector of state. The problem lies in the incompatibility of the philosophical foundations of interpretations, which results in the difficulty of building a unified picture of the world. To solve the problem, we identify general philosophical foundation of interpretations of quantum mechanics and built their classification. We also show that in more general theories, the part of which is quantum mechanics, it is possible to integrate (reconcile) the philosophical foundations of interpretations.