In this work we implemented and evaluated the performance of the most relevant pre-quantum, post-quantum (PQC) and quantum digital signature (Q-DS) algorithms during the key generation, signature generation and signature verification processes. The aim is to help in the selection of possible candidates during the migration process from current cryptographic systems to quantum-resistant ones. As a result, for a security level of 256 bits, RSA is the pre-quantum algorithm that presents the worst performance together with the “small” variant of SPHINCS+ sphincsshake256ssimple in PQC. The Q-DS is the most efficient solution during the signature generation and verification, but its performance is strongly impacted in the key generation process that is carried out through Quantum Key Distribution. The out-performer within the pre-quantum algorithms, for a security level of 256 bits, is the elliptic curve secp521r1 and within PQC solutions the CRYSTALS-Dilithium DSA Dilithium5 stands out.
In this work we implemented and evaluated the performance of the most relevant pre-quantum, post-quantum (PQC) and quantum digital signature (Q-DS) algorithms during the key generation, signature generation and signature verification processes. The aim is to help in the selection of possible candidates during the migration process from current cryptographic systems to quantum-resistant ones. As a result, for a security level of 256 bits, RSA is the pre-quantum algorithm that presents the worst performance together with the “small” variant of SPHINCS+ sphincsshake256ssimple in PQC. The Q-DS is the most efficient solution during the signature generation and verification, but its performance is strongly impacted in the key generation process that is carried out through Quantum Key Distribution. The out-performer within the pre-quantum algorithms, for a security level of 256 bits, is the elliptic curve secp521r1 and within PQC solutions the CRYSTALS-Dilithium DSA Dilithium5 stands out.
ABSTRACT The rapid advancement of quantum computing presents a significant threat to classical cryptographic systems, particularly RSA, whose security is based on the hardness of integer factorization. Shor’s algorithm demonstrates that large RSA keys can be efficiently broken in a quantum environment, raising concerns about the long-term reliability of traditional digital signatures. To address this, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a promising solution, with lattice-based schemes such as CRYSTALS-Dilithium3 gaining attention for their quantum resistance and efficiency. This study presents a comparative security and performance analysis of RSA and CRYSTALS-Dilithium3 digital signatures in the post-quantum era. The evaluation considers signature size, signing and verification speed, tamper detection capability, and resilience against classical and quantum attack models. Results highlight that RSA offers compact signature sizes but fails to provide integrity protection once subjected to simulated quantum attacks, while Dilithium3 ensures robust tamper detection, forward security, and cross-format verification across multiple document types. Despite larger signature sizes, Dilithium3 demonstrates superior verification speed and scalability, making it a viable candidate for post-quantum digital infrastructures. The findings emphasize the need for transitioning from classical to quantum-resistant cryptographic systems to ensure secure digital communication in the emerging quantum age. Keywords: Post-Quantum Cryptography, RSA, CRYSTALS-Dilithium3, Digital Signatures, Quantum Attacks, Tamper Detection, Performance Analysis
Quantum computers are becoming increasingly adept at circumventing numerous cryptographic techniques that are currently employed. This is particularly true for methods that employ public key infrastructure (PKI), such as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) or RSA. The primary objective of this chapter is to elucidate the fundamentals of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in order to ensure the security of digital systems in the coming quantum era. This chapter provides a comprehensive examination of a variety of quantum-resistant encryption methods. These methods are isogeny-based, multivariate, hash, and code. The primary objective of this chapter is to develop and evaluate a limited number of algorithms, including Falcon, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and SPHINCS+, through the utilization of the liboqs tool. The speed review contains information on the creation of key pairs, the verification of signatures, and the signing of files. The trade-offs between security and efficiency are evident when comparing them to the extensively used and well-known RSA method. Based on the data, it is possible to select secure ciphers that are compatible with certain 5G and 6G services.
Quantum computing represents one of the most disruptive technological advancements of the 21st century, with profound implications for modern cryptographic systems. Traditional digital signature algorithms—such as RSA, DSA, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)—derive their security from mathematical problems like integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which are computationally infeasible for classical computers. However, the advent of quantum algorithms, particularly Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, poses a direct threat to these cryptographic assumptions by drastically reducing the time required to solve such problems. This development renders existing Digital Signature infrastructures potentially obsolete once large-scale quantum computers become operational. To counter this threat, researchers have proposed a range of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based signature schemes, which are designed to resist quantum attacks. This paper critically examines the extent of quantum vulnerability in current Digital Signature systems and evaluates the comparative performance, efficiency, and security trade-offs of post-quantum alternatives. The study aims to provide a structured understanding of the ongoing transition toward quantum-resistant digital authentication and to propose a roadmap for secure implementation in future cryptographic environments.
As quantum computing advances, current cryptographic protocols are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly those based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) like RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This paper presents a comprehensive review of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as a solution to protect digital systems in the quantum era. We provide an in-depth analysis of various quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, and multivariate approaches. The review highlights the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization process, highlighting key algorithms, such as CRYSTALS–Kyber, CRYSTALS–Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, and discusses the strengths, vulnerabilities, and implementation challenges of the leading algorithms. In addition, we explore transition strategies for organizations, emphasizing hybrid cryptography to ensure backward compatibility during migration. This study offers key insights into the future of cryptographic standards and the critical steps necessary to prepare for the transition from classical to quantum-resistant systems.
The increasing sophistication of quantum computing presents significant challenges to the long-term security, computational efficiency, and operational resilience of digital banking infrastructures that rely on conventional public-key cryptographic algorithms. Although Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH), and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) remain widely established cryptographic mechanisms, their underlying mathematical assumptions are vulnerable to sufficiently powerful quantum computers. Recent standardization of ModuleLattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), and Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA) creates opportunities for quantum-resistant financial transaction security, although computational overhead, transmission requirements, and deployment scalability remain important engineering considerations.
Quantum computing challenges the mathematical problems anchoring the security of the classical public key algorithms. For quantum-resistant public key algorithms, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has undergone a multi-year standardization process and selected the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public key digital signatures of Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+. Finding common ground to compare these algorithms can be difficult because of their design differences, including the fundamental math problems (lattice-based vs. hash-based). We use a visualization model to show the key/signature size vs. security trade-offs for all PQC algorithms. Our performance analyses compare the algorithms’ computational loads in the execution time. Building on the individual algorithms’ analyses, we analyze the communication costs and implementation overheads when integrated with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and with Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Our results show that the lattice-based algorithms of Dilithium and Falcon induce lower computational overheads than the hash-based algorithms of SPHINCS+. In addition, the lattice-based PQC can outperform the classical algorithm with comparable security strength; for example, Dilithium 2 and Falcon 512 outperform RSA 4096 in the TLS handshake time duration.