Abstract Cooperative R&D has become one of the effective ways for enterprises to improve R&D efficiency and break the bottleneck of R&D resources, but cooperation between enterprises often falls into difficulties due to various factors. Given this, we use the quantum game to study the incentive mechanism of forming cooperative R&D strategic alliances between enterprises, first we establish a stag-hunt game model based on cooperative R&D and independent R&D, then expand the classical strategy to the quantum strategy space, and discuss the strategic characteristics of whether to consider state entanglement, and finally conducts case study to verify the effectiveness of the model. The results show that in the non-entangled scenario or non-quantum scenario, it is difficult to achieve the Pareto optimal result that both sides in full cooperation, because the full-effort one need to bear the risk of betrayal by the on-effort one. However, in the context of maximally entangled quantum game, the risk causing by the defector is borne by himself rather than the cooperator, so both parties will adopt a complete cooperative R&D strategy to achieve a win-win situation. Based on these findings, we establish three incentive mechanisms: information sharing, performance evaluation and responsibility constraint, which provides theoretical guidance for the formation and stability of enterprise cooperative R&D strategic alliance. Furthermore, our research can be extended to other fields, such as the issues of multilateral cooperation between major powers.
Abstract Cooperative R&D has become one of the effective ways for enterprises to improve R&D efficiency and break the bottleneck of R&D resources, but cooperation between enterprises often falls into difficulties due to various factors. Given this, we use the quantum game to study the incentive mechanism of forming cooperative R&D strategic alliances between enterprises, first we establish a stag-hunt game model based on cooperative R&D and independent R&D, then expand the classical strategy to the quantum strategy space, and discuss the strategic characteristics of whether to consider state entanglement, and finally conducts case study to verify the effectiveness of the model. The results show that in the non-entangled scenario or non-quantum scenario, it is difficult to achieve the Pareto optimal result that both sides in full cooperation, because the full-effort one need to bear the risk of betrayal by the on-effort one. However, in the context of maximally entangled quantum game, the risk causing by the defector is borne by himself rather than the cooperator, so both parties will adopt a complete cooperative R&D strategy to achieve a win-win situation. Based on these findings, we establish three incentive mechanisms: information sharing, performance evaluation and responsibility constraint, which provides theoretical guidance for the formation and stability of enterprise cooperative R&D strategic alliance. Furthermore, our research can be extended to other fields, such as the issues of multilateral cooperation between major powers.
Cooperation is essential to biological organizations and human society.In this paper, the conditions of dilemmas resolving by quantum strategies in the three games, Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken Game and Stag Hunt, are presented.The rule for the evolution of cooperation in general quantum games, b/c > coth 2 γ, is put forward.The formation of the rule is similar to those of the five rules in the classical game theory summarized by Nowak.b/c is still the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic act, while γ is a measure for the game's entanglement.The rule is the prerequisite for the realization of cooperation in quantum games.
The peer-to-peer transmission is a mainstream in challenged network environments. Yet, the free rider phenomenon in peer-to peer transmissions presses a need for incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions of data transmission. As a result, it is imperative to answer the questions: whether and to what extent an incentive mechanism can invoke such contributions? To answer these questions, we employ an n-player continuous quantum game model to analyze extrinsic incentive mechanisms (promoting cooperative behaviors by offering rewards), and use the quantum prisoner's dilemma model to analyze intrinsic incentive mechanisms (encouraging reciprocal cooperation by exploiting internal bounds). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze incentive mechanisms for peer-to-peer transmissions from a quantum game perspective. Such a perspective is adopted because the extended strategy space in the quantum game broadens the range for searching optimal strategies and the introduction of entanglement makes the proposed analytical frameworks more practical due to the consideration of the peers' relationships in decision-making. Our proposed quantum game-based analytical frameworks are generic because they are compatible with classic game-based schemes. Our analytical results can provide straightforward insights on evaluating the potential of incentive mechanisms and can serve as important references for designing new incentive mechanisms.
By incorporating payoff matrix and population evolution of open systems and proposing density games, pioneering effort has been made to break the following two basic assumptions of evolutionary game theory over the past decades: the payoff from the game determines the reproductive rate of individuals, and the total population size remains constant by a variable called the death rate. On the other hand, most studies on strategic interactions in game theories consider independent individual strategies as the basic unit of analyses. This is in fact not always true in human interaction strategies. It has been unclear that how subjective non-independent species with strategic interactions in open dynamic systems evolve. In this paper, we create the new concept of hybrid quantum games, and propose an open quantum dynamic symbiosis model for exploring the evolution of this type of species under unclosed social settings. We show that the stability conditions of the model with non-independent strategic interactions are influenced by the specific symbiosis states, game payoff matrix and quantum entanglement. The stability conditions of the competition scenario are more stringent than those of the cooperation one. Our system dynamics simulation study demonstrates and verifies the dynamic changes for the population sizes of two different species in the theoretical model, on the basis of the stability conditions of the competition and cooperation scenarios. Our model combines quantum games, game payoff matrix and symbiosis equations organically, and can provide insights into competition, cooperation and symbiosis mechanisms in open systems with subjective non-independent strategies considered.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) services such as mobile P2P transmissions and resource sharing, provide efficient methods to deliver data without the deployment of any central server. Nevertheless, the free-riding phenomenon inherit in such services presses a need for incentive mechanisms to stimulate contributions of data transmissions or sharing. As a result, it is imperative to answer the following questions: whether, and if so to what extent, an incentive mechanism can invoke such contributions? To answerthese questions, we employ an n-player continuous quantum game model to analyze the general extrinsic incentive mechanisms as well as the reputation-based incentive mechanisms, a typical class of extrinsic incentive mechanisms. We focus on studying the extrinsic incentive mechanisms in this paper due to their wide scope of applications stemming from the fact that they promote cooperative behaviors by offering rewards rather than depending on the internal bounds (e.g., social ties) among peers, which may not always exist between any pair of peers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the extrinsic incentive mechanisms for P2P services from a quantum game perspective. Such a perspective is adopted because the extended strategy space in the quantum game broadens the range for searching optimal strategies and the introduction of entanglement makes the proposed analytical frameworks more practical due to the consideration of the peers' relationships imposed by the rewards in extrinsic incentive mechanisms. Our quantum game-based analytical framework is generic because it is compatible with classic game-based schemes. The analytical results can provide a straightforward insight on evaluating the potential of the extrinsic incentive mechanisms and can serve as important references for designing new extrinsic incentive mechanisms.
Game theory is the study of strategic competition used in many branches of science. In general, a game is a match between two or more players and each wants to maximize his or her score. In a game, the player’s score depends on their strategies. The goal is to find the optimized decision, with regard to the payoff, in conformity with the rules of the game. This thesis considers the games with two players who know both their own and their rival’s payoff. However, they do not know the strategy chosen by the opponent.\nIn a classical game, the options of players are referred to as cooperation and defect. Quantum game theory is a generalization of classical game theory. In quantum games a linear combination of two options specify the strategy based on qubit. The quantum domain is characterized by entanglement. The quantum entanglement coefficient (y) varies from 0 to . The game is in the classical regime when y is smaller than a threshold. Quantum entanglement is intrinsically non-local.\nIn an iterated game tournament, 63 different strategies contest with four known strategies. Depending on the result, they are divided to a number of groups. The competition specifies which group of strategies can obtain a higher score.\nOther types of games are discussed in the thesis. They are known as incomplete information games. In these games one player has two payoff matrixes, and the rival does not know which of them is used. We discuss the advantage of using quantum strategy over the classical game, particular in avoiding the dilemma in classical games.
The last two decades have witnessed a rapid development of quantum information processing, a new paradigm which studies the power and limit of "quantum advantages" in various information processing tasks. Problems such as when quantum advantage exists, and if existing, how much it could be, are at a central position of these studies. In a broad class of scenarios, there are, implicitly or explicitly, at least two parties involved, who share a state, and the correlation in this shared state is the key factor to the efficiency under concern. In these scenarios, the shared \emph{entanglement} or \emph{discord} is usually what accounts for quantum advantage. In this paper, we examine a fundamental problem of this nature from the perspective of game theory, a branch of applied mathematics studying selfish behaviors of two or more players. We exhibit a natural zero-sum game, in which the chance for any player to win the game depends only on the ending correlation. We show that in a certain classical equilibrium, a situation in which no player can further increase her payoff by any local classical operation, whoever first uses a quantum computer has a big advantage over its classical opponent. The equilibrium is fair to both players and, as a shared correlation, it does not contain any discord, yet a quantum advantage still exists. This indicates that at least in game theory, the previous notion of discord as a measure of non-classical correlation needs to be reexamined, when there are two players with different objectives.