Recent advancements in reactor designs could offer new revolutionary capabilities, including remote monitoring, increased flexibility, and reduced operation and maintenance costs. Embracing new digital technologies would allow for operational concepts such as semiautonomous or near-autonomous control, and two-way communications for real-time integration with the upcoming smart electric grid. However, such continuous data transmission from and toward a reactor site could potentially introduce new challenges and vulnerabilities, necessitating the prioritization of cybersecurity.Conventional information technology–based encryption schemes, which rely mostly on computational complexity, have been shown to be vulnerable to cyberattacks. With the advent of quantum computing, practically any asymmetric encryption could be potentially compromised. For example, it has been shown that a RSA-2048 bit key could be broken in 8 h.To address this challenge, we explore the feasibility of quantum key distribution (QKD) to secure communications. QKD is a physical layer security scheme relying on the laws of quantum mechanics instead of mathematical complexity. QKD promises not only unconditional security but also detection of potential intrusion, as it allows the communication parties to become aware of eavesdropping. To test the proposed hypothesis, a novel simulation tool (NuQKD) was developed to allow for real-time simulation of the BB84 QKD protocol between two remote terminals. A reference scenario is proposed, generic enough to cover various internal and external communication links to a reactor site. Using NuQKD, the internal and external data links were modeled, and receiver operating characteristic curves were calculated for various QKD configurations.A performance analysis was conducted, demonstrating that QKD can provide adequate secret key rates with low false alarms and has the potential of addressing the nuclear industry’s high standards of confidentiality for distance lengths up to 75 km of fiberoptics. Using a conservative estimation, QKD can provide up to 21.5 kbps of secret key rate for a distance of 1 km and 14.4 kbps at 10 km. The target secret key rates for the corresponding links were estimated at 16 kbps and 80 bps, respectively, based on the analysis of real data from a PUR-1 fully digital reactor. Consequently, QKD is shown to be compatible with existing and future point-to-point reactor communication architectures. These results motivate further study of quantum communications for nuclear reactors.
Recent advancements in reactor designs could offer new revolutionary capabilities, including remote monitoring, increased flexibility, and reduced operation and maintenance costs. Embracing new digital technologies would allow for operational concepts such as semiautonomous or near-autonomous control, and two-way communications for real-time integration with the upcoming smart electric grid. However, such continuous data transmission from and toward a reactor site could potentially introduce new challenges and vulnerabilities, necessitating the prioritization of cybersecurity.Conventional information technology–based encryption schemes, which rely mostly on computational complexity, have been shown to be vulnerable to cyberattacks. With the advent of quantum computing, practically any asymmetric encryption could be potentially compromised. For example, it has been shown that a RSA-2048 bit key could be broken in 8 h.To address this challenge, we explore the feasibility of quantum key distribution (QKD) to secure communications. QKD is a physical layer security scheme relying on the laws of quantum mechanics instead of mathematical complexity. QKD promises not only unconditional security but also detection of potential intrusion, as it allows the communication parties to become aware of eavesdropping. To test the proposed hypothesis, a novel simulation tool (NuQKD) was developed to allow for real-time simulation of the BB84 QKD protocol between two remote terminals. A reference scenario is proposed, generic enough to cover various internal and external communication links to a reactor site. Using NuQKD, the internal and external data links were modeled, and receiver operating characteristic curves were calculated for various QKD configurations.A performance analysis was conducted, demonstrating that QKD can provide adequate secret key rates with low false alarms and has the potential of addressing the nuclear industry’s high standards of confidentiality for distance lengths up to 75 km of fiberoptics. Using a conservative estimation, QKD can provide up to 21.5 kbps of secret key rate for a distance of 1 km and 14.4 kbps at 10 km. The target secret key rates for the corresponding links were estimated at 16 kbps and 80 bps, respectively, based on the analysis of real data from a PUR-1 fully digital reactor. Consequently, QKD is shown to be compatible with existing and future point-to-point reactor communication architectures. These results motivate further study of quantum communications for nuclear reactors.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), a cryptographic method grounded in the laws of quantum mechanics rather than computational hardness, promises provably secure communications. Its integration into critical infrastructure offers a pathway to secure resilient operation of next-generation control systems, from power-intensive data centers to remotely operated microreactors located in energy-deprived remote communities. While QKD has been demonstrated in laboratory and network settings, its use in safety-critical control systems remains unexplored where requirements on latency, key availability, and operational stability pose unique challenges. Here, we introduce a QKD-secured data acquisition and control framework for embedding quantum cybersecurity directly into safety-critical cyber-physical systems and report the first end-to-end experimental demonstration in a nuclear reactor. The framework establishes the conditions necessary to achieve secure, low-latency, real-time operation in safety-critical environments. Using a phase-encoding decoy-state BB84 system deployed on Purdue's 10 kWth fully digital research reactor (PUR-1) we validate the model and achieve real-time encryption and decryption of 2,000 reactor signals. Experiments demonstrated a stable secret-key rate of 320 kbps with a quantum bit error rate of 3.8% at 54 km, and maximum optical-fiber distances of 82 km with One-Time Pad (OTP) encryption and 140 km with AES-256. We further evaluated compliance with latency and key availability conditions using three cryptographic schemes (OTP, AES-256, ASCON), finding that all variants supported real-time operation at typical data reporting rates. Our results establish a universal framework for quantum-cybersecurity in safety-critical systems, demonstrating that quantum communication technologies can enable secure, low-latency, real-time operation of nuclear reactors and other critical infrastructure.
Industrial control systems would increasingly depend on remote operation, online monitoring, and potentially autonomous control. This creates new requirements for secure, low-latency communications, and introduces new operational constraints on secret key availability, communication autonomy, and resilience under normal and abnormal conditions. We present a time-dependent quantitative model for embedding quantum-secure communications in an industrial control system and demonstrate its implementation on Purdue’s fully-digital 10-kWth research reactor (PUR-1). Using a phase-encoding decoy-state-BB84 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system we propose and evaluate three communication autonomy metrics: dynamic key pool size, lead time, and post-failure uptime. We establish quantitative relationships linking physical-layer QKD performance metrics, such as secret key rate (SKR) and quantum bit-error-rate (QBER), to industrial control-level communication demands defined by sampling rate, data precision, and reporting frequency. We show that for the most demanding configuration, 20 Hz sampling at 120 km, QKD coupled with AES-256 encryption required a minimum of 24 min lead time, while distances below 95 km required less than 10 min, regardless of the number of signals. These results establish experimentally verified bounds for integrating quantum cybersecurity within real-time control architectures and provide a foundation for designing quantum-resilient communication frameworks for next-generation reactors and other safety-critical industrial systems.
As digital communication continues to expand across critical infrastructures, ensuring data security has become more challenging in the face of advancing computational capabilities, especially with the anticipated rise of quantum computers. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) presents a revolutionary approach to secure communications by leveraging the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, such as superposition and entanglement, to enable the secure exchange of cryptographic keys. Unlike classical encryption methods that rely on computational complexity, QKD ensures unconditional security, as any attempt to intercept the key disturbs the quantum state, revealing the presence of eavesdroppers. This paper explores the current developments in QKD protocols, including BB84 and E91, as well as practical challenges in implementation, such as distance limitations and hardware requirements. Furthermore, it discusses recent advancements in satellite-based QKD, integrated photonics, and quantum networks, highlighting their potential to reshape the landscape of secure global communication. The integration of QKD into future communication infrastructure is positioned to be a cornerstone of post-quantum cryptography, making it a vital technology in the era of quantum computing.
As digital communication continues to scale globally, cybersecurity vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Classical encryption methods—based on mathematical complexity—face obsolescence with the advancement of quantum computing, which can break widely used cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC through algorithms like Shor’s. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) represents a paradigm shift by leveraging the laws of quantum mechanics, particularly photon entanglement and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, to establish secure communication channels. Unlike classical cryptography, which relies on computational security, QKD guarantees information-theoretic security, making interception detectable and ineffective. This research paper evaluates entanglement-based protocols, including E91, BBM92, and emerging satellite-assisted QKD networks. The study includes a comparative performance analysis between classical cryptographic techniques and QKD across speed, security breach probability, latency, and scalability. A real-world case study of China’s Micius Quantum Satellite Network is used to illustrate practical deployment. Findings show that QKD reduces key interception vulnerability to near zero, while classical systems remain susceptible to brute-force and eavesdropping attacks. Data demonstrate that entanglement-based QKD outperforms other quantum protocols in long distance secure communication and offers a scalable foundation for the future quantum internet.
Abstract The evolution of quantum computers is considered a serious threat to public‐key cryptosystems (e.g. RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, etc.). This is indeed a big concern for security of the Internet and other data communication and storage systems. The reason is that public‐key schemes are the basis in the generation of shared symmetric keys that are used to perform data encryption/decryption in communication and data transfer protocols. One possible approach to address this issue is to use Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) (instead of public‐key schemes) for the ultra‐secure generation of symmetric keys. QKD is a physical layer technology that allows two parties (equipped with optical communication interfaces) to generate secure random keys over a quantum channel that is immune to eavesdropping threats. The keys are then used by symmetric encryption schemes (e.g. AES) to encrypt data over classical channels. This allows us to have data encryption/decryption without needing a public‐key scheme. However, due to its inherent characteristics, the implementation of QKD has mostly been considered in particular contexts only (e.g. backhaul networks, point‐to‐point connections, optical networks, etc.). This indeed limits the utility of QKD technology to only some particular applications while it has the potential to be used in a wide range of used cases. Motivated by this (increasing the usability of QKD technology), in this study, the authors propose a model that enables SDN‐based networks to utilise QKD technology and provide QKD security service (i.e., random key generation service) to network applications and security protocols in a practical and efficient way. In the proposed approach, secret keys are generated based on the distribution of quantum entanglement between QKD nodes deployed in the network. The significant characteristic of our proposed model is that it does not rely on quantum repeaters to operate. This also improves the efficiency of the employed QKD mechanisms in terms of the key generation rate.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a potential defense against future quantum attacks that can break traditional encryption algorithms, such as RSA and ECC. The current work is based on the development of the BB84 protocol with the features of utilizing quantum mechanics and eavesdropping detection through signal disturbance. A simulation of the BB84 protocol was built using polarization encoding over a 10 km single-mode optical fiber using OptiSystem software. The system consists of standard telecom equipment, such as a continuous wave laser at a frequency of 193.1 THz, polarization controllers, and single-photon detectors. Both secure and insecure cases were simulated, where an attacker (Eve) had used an intercept-resend attack. The outcome showed significant Bit Error Rate (BER) and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) increases during attacks, thus proving the protocol's vulnerability to interference. In addition, a special intrusion detection system based on BER was used to identify such anomalies in real-time. The simulation illustrates the feasibility of using QKD in today's optical networks to secure communications.