Zero-Sum Information Games: Jamming and Witsenhausen’s Counterexample as a Game

Shabnam Shafiee, Şennur Ulukuş

We investigate the behavior of two users and one jammer in an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with and without fading when they participate in a noncooperative zero-sum game, with the channel's input/output mutual information as the objective function. We assume that the jammer can eavesdrop on the channel and can use the information obtained to perform correlated jamming. We also differentiate between the availability of perfect and noisy information about the user signals at the jammer. Under various assumptions on the channel characteristics, and the extent of information available at the users and the jammer, we show the existence, or otherwise nonexistence of a simultaneously optimal set of strategies for the users and the jammer, and characterize those strategies whenever they exist.

Luca Marinatto, Tullio Weber

Pedro Comesaña, Fernando Pérez‐González, Chaouki Tanios Abdallah

Simon C. Benjamin

Munnujahan Ara, Samah A. M. Ghanem

We investigate optimal power allocation strategies over a OFDM Gaussian wiretap channels where a legitimate transmitter and a legitimate receiver communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper and a jammer-who acts as unfriendly to both the legitimate parties and the eavesdropper. In particular, we formulate a zero-sum power allocation game between the transmitter and the jammer where the payoff function is the secrecy rate. We characterize the optimal power allocation strategies as well as the Nash equilibrium in some asymptotic regimes. We also provide a set of results that cast further insight into the problem.