Abstract The authenticated key agreement (AKA) method used in the Internet of Things (IoT) provides identity authentication and agreed symmetric keys to encrypt large amounts of communication messages for devices and servers. With the development of the quantum computing techniques and corresponding algroithms, classical authenticated key agreement methods based on public key, such as RSA and ECC become vulnerable. Many scholars have proposed lattice-based authenticated key agreement schemes to achieve post-quantum security and address this issue. However, these scheme's security models (such as BR, CK, and ROR) only can capture limited types of adversary attacks and require many communication rounds. To this end, we propose a lower communication rounds lattice-based anonymous authenticated key agreement (LA-AKA) protocol under the seCK model, which can capture a wider range of adversary attacks. The LA-AKA scheme utilizes an identity-based public key system for key agreement, and this system avoids complex resource consumption caused by certificate verification. During the identity authentication and key agreement phase, the communication entities do not need to transmit static public keys; they only need to engage in two communication rounds to generate the session key. Furthermore, the LA-AKA scheme can resist signal leakage attacks caused by key reuse in the ring learning with errors (RLWE) security assumption. The LA-AKA scheme provides higher security, as security analysis proves. The performance evaluation shows that as the number of devices and servers in the system increases, the computational advantage of the LA-AKA scheme in the broadcast channel becomes more significant.
Abstract The authenticated key agreement (AKA) method used in the Internet of Things (IoT) provides identity authentication and agreed symmetric keys to encrypt large amounts of communication messages for devices and servers. With the development of the quantum computing techniques and corresponding algroithms, classical authenticated key agreement methods based on public key, such as RSA and ECC become vulnerable. Many scholars have proposed lattice-based authenticated key agreement schemes to achieve post-quantum security and address this issue. However, these scheme's security models (such as BR, CK, and ROR) only can capture limited types of adversary attacks and require many communication rounds. To this end, we propose a lower communication rounds lattice-based anonymous authenticated key agreement (LA-AKA) protocol under the seCK model, which can capture a wider range of adversary attacks. The LA-AKA scheme utilizes an identity-based public key system for key agreement, and this system avoids complex resource consumption caused by certificate verification. During the identity authentication and key agreement phase, the communication entities do not need to transmit static public keys; they only need to engage in two communication rounds to generate the session key. Furthermore, the LA-AKA scheme can resist signal leakage attacks caused by key reuse in the ring learning with errors (RLWE) security assumption. The LA-AKA scheme provides higher security, as security analysis proves. The performance evaluation shows that as the number of devices and servers in the system increases, the computational advantage of the LA-AKA scheme in the broadcast channel becomes more significant.
In recent years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has gained immense popularity in various aspects of work, learning, and daily life. Within the IoT realm, there is a growing concern regarding communication security issues between users and servers. However, addressing the communication security between servers is equally imperative, which has not received as much attention. To this end, we propose a certificateless anonymous authenticated key agreement (AKA) algorithm based on learning with errors (LWEs) and inhomogeneous small integer solution (ISIS) security assumptions. Our scheme provides strong resistance to quantum attacks and protects the privacy of communication servers. It also has constant communication costs and lower computational requirements than existing lattice-based anonymous AKA algorithms on the broadcast channel. Additionally, the proposed scheme eliminates the resource consumption of managing complex certificates and addresses the security risks associated with key escrow in the key generation center (KGC). Through security and performance analysis, we demonstrate that our approach can enhance the security of IoT-based healthcare systems while significantly improving communication efficiency. Our proposed scheme provides a promising solution to security issues related to server communication in IoT systems.
Abstract The increasing interconnectedness of devices via the Internet of Things (IoT) highlights the growing importance of addressing IoT security issues. Authenticated Key Agreement (AKA) protocols ensure secure communication between IoT devices, users, and central servers. Preserving anonymity in AKA protocols is especially crucial given privacy issues and user preferences. The emergence of Shor's algorithm in 1994 and recent advancements in quantum computing have posed a threat to the security of classical AKA schemes relying on integer factorization, discrete logarithm, and other number theory problems. Consequently, researchers have turned their attention to developing quantum-resistant AKA schemes. In this context, Rana and Mishra introduced a lattice-based key agreement protocol under ring-LWE problem for IoT-enabled smart devices. However, a thorough security assessment uncovered vulnerabilities in their protocol, specifically susceptibility to replay and Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks. Furthermore, their approach reveals potential weaknesses in user impersonation if the user's identity is compromised.
With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), maintaining data confidentiality and protecting user privacy have become increasingly challenging. End devices in the IoT are often deployed in unattended environments and connected to open networks, making them vulnerable to physical tampering and other security attacks. Different authentication key agreement (AKA) schemes have been used in practice; several of them do not cover the necessary security features or are incompatible with resource-constrained end devices. Their security proofs have been performed under the Random-Oracle model. We present an AKA protocol for end devices and servers. The proposal leverages the ECC-based key exchange mechanism and one-way hash function-based message authentication method to achieve mutual authentication, user anonymity, and forward security. A formal security proof of the proposed scheme is performed under the standard model and the eCK model with the elliptic curve encryption computational assumptions, and formal verification is performed with ProVerif. According to the performance comparison, it is revealed that the proposed scheme offers user anonymity, perfect forward security, and mutual authentication, and resists typical attacks such as ephemeral secret leakage attacks, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and key compromise impersonation attacks. Moreover, the proposed scheme has the lowest computational and communication overhead compared to existing schemes.
IoT-based applications require effective anonymous authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols to secure data and protect user privacy due to open communication channels and sensitive data. While AKA protocols for these applications have been extensively studied, achieving anonymity remains a challenge. AKA schemes using one-time pseudonyms face resynchronization issues after desynchronization attacks, and the high computational overhead of bilinear pairing and public key encryption limits its applicability. Existing schemes also lack essential security features, causing issues such as vulnerability to ephemeral secret leakage attacks and key compromise impersonation. To address these issues, we propose two novel AKA schemes, PUAKA and RCAKA, designed for different IoT traffic patterns. PUAKA improves end device anonymity in the periodic update pattern by updating one-time pseudonyms with authenticated session keys. RCAKA, for the remote control pattern, ensures anonymity while reducing communication and computation costs using shared signatures and temporary random numbers. A key contribution of RCAKA is its ability to resynchronize end devices with incomplete data in the periodic update pattern, supporting continued authentication. Both protocols' security is proven under the Real-or-Random model. The performance comparison results show that the proposed protocols exceed existing solutions in security features and communication costs while reducing computational overhead by 32% to 50%.
Rapid advancement in Internet of Things(IoT) changes the way people work and live deliberately. Medical IoT (MIoT) is a highly significant application in the world of IoT, allowing the user to communicate with smart medical devices with the help of a hospital gateway node. To establish a private communication channel, a three-party authenticated key agreement (AKA) technique using public-key cryptography is used. Currently, the AKA algorithms used in MIoT are based on classical cryptography such as ElGamal, RSA, ECC, etc. All of these techniques have become obsolete in the post-quantum environment as the Shor algorithm can solve these techniques on quantum computers. To overcome the problem stated above, a scheme called Lattice based Three party authenticated key agreement scheme in Medical IoT is proposed to accomplish security and efficiency in a post-quantum environment. Formal and informal security analysis is given to authenticate the protocol’s security. Also, the security analysis is conducted formally with the help of the Random Oracle Model (ROM) and ProVerif tool. The suggested scheme is compared to existing schemes in terms of security features, computing costs, and communication costs to evaluate the system’s performance. It validates that the suggested scheme exceeds the existing schemes.
Due to the openness of communication channels and the sensitivity of the data being collected and transmitted, securing data access and communication in IoT systems requires robust ECC-based authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols. However, designing an AKA protocol for IoT presents significant challenges, as most IoT sensors are deployed in resource-constrained, unattended environments with limited computational power, connectivity, and storage. To achieve anonymous authentication, existing solutions typically rely on shared temporary public keys to mask device IDs or validate sender certificates, which increases the computational overhead. Furthermore, these protocols often fail to address crucial security concerns, such as nonresistance to ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attacks and a lack of perfect forward security. To mitigate the computational burden, we propose a dynamic authenticated credentials (DACs) synchronization framework for anonymous authentication. Then, we introduce an ECC-based AKA scheme that employs DACs in place of temporary public keys or sender credentials, enabling efficient and secure anonymous authentication. The security of the proposed protocol was rigorously verified under the Real-or-Oracle model and validated using ProVerif. Performance comparisons demonstrate that our scheme offered significant improvements in security, with an over 37% reduction in communication cost and computational overhead.