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Ceteris Paribus Laws and the Concept of Capacity in the Philosophy of Science of Nancy Cartwright

Gilberto Aboites, Andrea Rodríguez-Yáñez, Vicente Aboites

Published Jan 26, 2022• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

A brief introduction to Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science is presented along with an analysis of several of her thoughtful and controversial views. Nancy Cartwright came to revolutionize the philosophy of science by presenting original and provocative philosophical positions using specific concepts such as: capacity, ceteris paribus laws, nomological machines, among others. In this article it is shown that some of nature fundamental conservation laws, such as energy, momentum and angular momentum, cannot be ceteris paribus. Also, it is discussed among other quantum mechanical examples, the application of the concept of capacity to Coulomb interactions and Bohr quantum mechanics postulates for the hydrogen atom.

DOI
10.23924/oi.v13i27.512

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A brief introduction to Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science is presented along with an analysis of several of her thoughtful and controversial views. Nancy Cartwright came to revolutionize the philosophy of science by presenting original and provocative philosophical positions using specific concepts such as: capacity, ceteris paribus laws, nomological machines, among others. In this article it is shown that some of nature fundamental conservation laws, such as energy, momentum and angular momentum, cannot be ceteris paribus. Also, it is discussed among other quantum mechanical examples, the application of the concept of capacity to Coulomb interactions and Bohr quantum mechanics postulates for the hydrogen atom.
This paper deals with Nancy Cartwright's views on the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics, as exposed in her book How the Laws of Physics Lie. It will be argued that the fundamental object of Quantum Mechanics is not the transition rate, but the wave function, and that many laws of physics tell undisputable truths. Furthermore the positions she defends about the reduction of the wave packet do not address the fundamental issue, i.e. the duality of a world where quantum and classical objects coexist and interact. I suggest that the main problem with Nancy Cartwright's positions is her difficulty in accepting that the contradiction at the basis of Quantum Mechanics, i.e. the simultaneous corpuscular and wave like nature of quantum objects, is a fact of nature.
The law of nature is a core concept in the philosophy of science, but there are significant differences among science philosophers regarding the necessity and connotation of this concept. The current understanding of the law of nature can be roughly divided into two categories – the regularity approach and the necessity approach. How to understand the status of quantum states is a core issue in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The following analysis focuses on the nomological interpretation of the wave function of quantum mechanics proposed by some scholars of the Bohmian school. To defend this interpretation, supporters have put forward various arguments and carefully distinguished different meanings of “nomology”. This is not only related to the several major approaches to understanding the law of nature that already exist in the philosophy of science but also shows a different perspective from the literature. In particular, these new arguments provide a reference for re-examining the formalism of the quantum histories interpretation.
Philosophical reflections on physics and its theories have been shaping the agenda of general philosophy of science, including issues such as the nature of scientific theories, the meaning of scientific terms, and scientific modeling. But physics is also well worth being considered a special science of its own, whose methods and tools raised specific questions for philosophers of science: this is the approach followed in this chapter, which has as its main thread the role of mathematics in physical theories. It tackles classical issues concerning measurement and determinism and long-standing controversies in the philosophy of statistical mechanics (how may the reversible laws of mechanics account for the irreversible principles of thermodynamics?) and in the philosophy of quantum physics (does quantum mechanics provide us a with a complete description of quantum phenomena?). It also addresses emerging issues in the field, such as computer simulations and their role between theory and observation.
Three more substantive challenges that the quantum Bayesian faces are presented: 1) Can a sensible ontology be found for the approach? 2) Can requisite sense of quantum explanations be made? and 3) Are subjective probabilities in quantum theory really adequate? The first question is answered positively: a suitable ontological picture is provided by making use of components of Nancy Cartwright’s philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the causal powers of objects. The second two questions are shown to be more problematic, however: quantum Bayesianism would rob quantum theory of explanatory power which it nonetheless seems to possess; and trouble arises for subjective probabilities in two ways. First, quantum Bayesianism is committed to an objectionable class of statements – quantum analogues of Moore’s Paradoxes; second, it renders mysterious how the means of enquiry about the world could deliver the intended ends: coping better with the world.
The most important problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics are the problem of measurement and the problem of the 'acausal' EPR correlations. It is commonly thought that these problems call for a new interpretation of the quantum theory. I argue that it is possible to construe both problems rather differently, as resulting from a mistaken understanding of scientific theory-application. It then becomes possible to tackle both problems independently of questions of interpretation, by attending carefully to what constitutes a successful application of a scientific theory, and of the quantum theory in particular. In the first part of the Thesis, I argue against a standard conception of scientific theory-application. This standard conception, which is often presupposed in the philosophical discussions of quantum mechanics, takes the applications of a scientific theory to constitute its domain of empirical adequacy. I argue that, on the contrary, a scientific theory can be applied to phenomena that it does not subsume. I present a case study in the history of superconductivity to illustrate and to motivate this claim. In the second part, I argue that the problem of measurement can be construed as the impossibility of applying the quantum theory to measurement interactions. I then argue that Arthur Fine's proposed solution to the measurement problem implicitly abandons the standard conception of application. Finally I look at quantum correlation phenomena. Bas Van Fraassen has claimed that the EPR correlations fit no causal model. The correctness of this claim depends on what probabilistic constraints a causal model is taken to have to satisfy. I argue, following Nancy Cartwright, that Van Fraassen's constraints on common-cause models are too strong; and I describe a direct-cause model that, I urge, constitutes a successful application of the quantum theory to the EPR correlations.
Abstract The introduction explains the origin and development of the views expressed in these essays. Fruitful interaction with physicists applying quantum theory provided the kernel for the author’s growing interest in contemporary pragmatism, initially as a source of ideas that could solve conceptual problems blocking an understanding of quantum theory. These pragmatist ideas were later applied to more general issues in the philosophy of science and metaphysics. After briefly sketching the pragmatist view of quantum theory defended in the essays, the introduction explains the implications—for the place of quantum theory in science, for metaphysics, and for the philosophy of science and specifically for the issue of scientific realism. New results in the foundations of physics prompted revision of the original view of the objectivity of quantum event outcomes. Some later essays show how elaborating a pragmatist view of the function of truth helped to acknowledge that the outcome of a quantum measurement is a relative fact that remains objective in the sense that matters for science: others take a neo-pragmatist view of causation, explanation, and laws in science. All these later essays illustrate the neo-pragmatist moral that by focusing on the intellectual function of a concept, one can satisfy a demand for understanding that might otherwise provoke a fruitless metaphysical quest.