The progression of quantum computing is considered a potential threat to traditional cryptography system, highlighting the significance of post-quantum security in cryptographic systems. Regarding symmetric key encryption, the Grover algorithm can approximately halve the search complexity. Despite the absence of fully operational quantum computers at present, the necessity of assessing the security of symmetric key encryption against quantum computing continues to grow.In this paper, we implement the ARIA block cipher in a quantum circuit and compare it with previous research. Our implementation of the ARIA quantum circuit achieves over 92.5% improvement in full depth and over 98.7% improvement in Toffoli depth compared to the implementation proposed in Chauhan et al. Compared to Yang et al.’s implementation, our implementation is improved the full depth by 36.7% and the number of qubits by 8%. Additionally, we analyze the complexity of Grover’s search attack and compare it with NIST criteria. We confirm that ARIA achieves quantum security level 1, 3, and 5 (ARIA-128, 192, and 256, respectively).
Quantum Amplitude Estimation promises to accelerate Monte Carlo integration by replacing the classical
ε∝N−1/2 sampling law with the Heisenberg-limited
ε∝N−1 scaling, but whether any part of that advantage survives on present-day hardware is an empirical question. We report a systematic experimental benchmark of a Maximum-Likelihood Amplitude Estimation QMC pipeline on IonQ trapped-ion processors, comprising 60 hardware trials on IonQ Forte-1 across five settings(5 & 9 qubits, 100-200 shots per depth, linear & exponential amplification schedules, ~113 device-hours), together with 100 trials on IonQ Aria-1 & Forte-1 noise models at 5, 9 & 19 qubits. The pipeline combines controlled-
Ry rotational state preparation, Grover-based amplitude amplification and maximum-likelihood inference and is benchmarked against
bmax−1∫0bmaxsin2xdx with
bmax=π/5 ,given results emerge. First, the noiseless limit it attains
ε∝N−0.88, close to the Heisenberg-scaling reference, reducing the error 54-74x over a 133x increase in oracle calls. Second, scaling does not survive on hardware. Every noisy backend saturates at an error floor of (2-5)x 10^{-2}, with fitted exponents of 0.04-0.15 on Forte-1 linear schedules and
α≤0 on the vendor noise models: beyond the optimal shallow depth, however, deeper amplification provides no sustained accuracy gain and instead returns to the noise floor. Forte-1 hardware also outperformed IonQ's own Aria-1 noise model at every depth
m≥2, indicating that vendor noise models are bad predictors of MLAE accuracy. The practical implication for UQ is that on current devices the useful operating point is a shallow, schedule-tuned amplification depth chosen so that the deepest circuit lands near p~1/2 not the deepest schedule the coherence budget allows.