Summary Satellite communication is becoming an increasingly important component of the communication process, as all forms of communication are sent over open networks. As a result, there is an increase in the number of security concerns, and several protocols have been established with this consideration in mind. Recently, Dharminder et al. proposed a post‐quantum secure authentication protocol for satellite communication. The protocol is an improved version of Kumar and Garg's protocol. The authors claimed that the protocol resists the vulnerability of Kumar and Garg's protocol and provides post‐quantum security for satellite communication. Despite their claims, we have found that the protocol is vulnerable to a key mismatch attack and an offline dictionary attack. Further, we have improved Dharminder et al.'s proposed protocol that resists the key mismatch attack and offline dictionary attack and have provided the condition for the correctness of the improved protocol. Our formal security proof and implementation results demonstrate that the improved protocol is secure against quantum attacks.
Summary Satellite communication is becoming an increasingly important component of the communication process, as all forms of communication are sent over open networks. As a result, there is an increase in the number of security concerns, and several protocols have been established with this consideration in mind. Recently, Dharminder et al. proposed a post‐quantum secure authentication protocol for satellite communication. The protocol is an improved version of Kumar and Garg's protocol. The authors claimed that the protocol resists the vulnerability of Kumar and Garg's protocol and provides post‐quantum security for satellite communication. Despite their claims, we have found that the protocol is vulnerable to a key mismatch attack and an offline dictionary attack. Further, we have improved Dharminder et al.'s proposed protocol that resists the key mismatch attack and offline dictionary attack and have provided the condition for the correctness of the improved protocol. Our formal security proof and implementation results demonstrate that the improved protocol is secure against quantum attacks.
Summary Satellite's communication system is used to communicate under significant distance and circumstances where the other communication systems are not comfortable. Since all the data are exchanged over a public channel, so the security of the data is an essential component for the communicating parties. Both key exchange and authentication are two cryptographic tools to establish a secure communication between two parties. Currently, various kinds of authentication protocols are available to establish a secure network, but all of them depend on number–theoretical (discrete logarithm problem/factorization assumption) hard assumptions. Due to Shor's and Grover's computing algorithm number theoretic assumptions are breakable by quantum computers. Although Kumar and Garg have proposed a quantum attack‐resistant protocol for satellite communication, it cannot resist stolen smart card attack. We have analyzed that how Kumar and Garg is vulnerable to the stolen smart card attack using differential power analysis attack described in He et al and Chen and Chen. We have also analyzed the modified version of signal leakage attack and sometimes called improved signal leakage attack on Kumar and Garg's protocol. We have tried to construct a secure and efficient authentication protocol for satellites communication that is secure against quantum computing. This is more efficient as it requires only three messages of exchange. This paper includes security proof and performance of the proposed authentication and key agreement protocol.
Summary The rapid development of satellite communications has brought great convenience to people's lives, as well as huge security challenges. In order to guarantee the security of users, a large number of authentication protocols have been proposed. Recently, Xu et al. proposed an improved mutual authentication protocol based on perfect forward secrecy for satellite communications. In this paper, we will point out that Xu et al.'s protocol cannot resist the offline password guessing attack and the replay attack and fails to provide user untraceability. To overcome these weaknesses, we propose a robust three‐factor‐based authentication protocol for satellite communication systems and analyze its correctness using Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic. In addition, the descriptive security analysis shows that our protocol is safe and robust against various attacks. By comparing with other related protocols, we find that our protocol has better performance.
Abstract Mobile communication is very important for an individual users, enterprisers, industries, businesses, and organizations. Since the nodes communicate through a public channel, security, and privacy become essential component for mobile communication. Both key exchange and authentication are two important security attributes to establish secure communication between two parties. In the past few years, various post‐quantum secure authentication protocols have been designed, but we have found that either some of the protocols are vulnerable to stolen smart card attack, invalid login, or signal leakage attack. In this article, we have discussed how the protocol Dharminder et al (Dharminder D, Chandran KP. J Ambient Intell Humaniz Comput. 2020; 11:4089‐4100.) is vulnerable to modified version of signal leakage attack, and sometimes called improved signal leakage attack. We have also suggested a remedy over the current existing protocol suffering from signal leakage attacks. The proposed protocol is secure against quantum attacks. We have proved the security of the proposed protocol under ring learning with errors assumption. The proposed authentication and key agreement needs only two messages exchange. We have also found the proposed is efficient in terms of computation with respect to relevant protocols.
Summary The mobile satellite communication (MSC) system is a vital communication method in which mobile users and network control centers connect via satellites. Since the satellite's communication is wireless, communication security is a critical factor to ensure accountable communication. Key exchange and authentication (KEA) mechanism is widely used to achieve data security for data transmitted in an insecure or open channel. Different authentication systems are suggested in the last many years to establish safe communication, whereas most existing security protocols are based on factorization or discrete logarithm. However, these systems are no longer reliable by Shor's algorithm as any discrete logarithm and factorization can be resolved in polynomial time on quantum computers. Thus, developing a quantum secure KEA protocol for MSC systems is necessary. In this direction, recently a ring learning with an error‐based KEA technique is proposed to ensure a quantum‐safe environment. This scheme is quantum‐safe and satisfies desirable security attributes but has low efficiency in computation and communication. Moreover, establishing a secure session requires six communications among involved entities. As a result, replay attack detection at an early stage is not possible for the central authority (server), which could delay the server response, and the adversary gets the advantage of drawing a denial of service scenario for authorized entities. We propose a lattice‐based KEA protocol for the MSC system to improve computation, communication efficiency, and early‐stage replay attack detection. The security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented in the random oracle model. Calculation of performance is also presented to observe advantages in computation and communication overhead.
Summary The mobile satellite communication (MSC) system represents a crucial means of communication, facilitating connections between mobile users and network control centres through satellites. Given the wireless nature of satellite communication, ensuring communication security is paramount for maintaining accountability. Key exchange and authentication (KEA) mechanisms are commonly employed to secure data transmitted over insecure or open channels. Developing a lattice‐based KEA protocol for MSC systems is imperative to achieve both quantum security and efficient communication. In this direction, Yadav et al. devised ring learning with an error‐based KEA technique to ensure a quantum‐safe environment. Their scheme is quantum‐safe and satisfies desirable security attributes but has low efficiency in computation. Moreover, we have identified that their scheme is susceptible to denial of service attack and session key established at user and NCC ends is different. To overcome the flaws of Yadav et al., we propose a lattice‐based KEA protocol for the MSC system to improve computation efficiency, and get resistance against key mismatch attack. The security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented in the random oracle model. Comparative study is also presented to observe advantages in computation efficiency.
Summary Satellite communication is one of the essential communication mechanisms that can be used for significant distance and under circumstances where the other communication mechanisms cannot work. Therefore, the security of this communication method is highly needed. Because in this era where information plays an important role, information security becomes the first priority for everyone. When we talk about information security, the key exchange and authentication are two key factors of information security. Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman1 proposed the first key exchange protocol. In the last two or three decades, various authentication schemes have been proposed to create a secure network that mainly depends on classical number–theoretical hard assumptions (factorization or discrete logarithm), but due to the Shor's2 algorithm, above‐mentioned scheme is no longer secure because any discrete logarithm or factorization problems can be solved by Shor's algorithm in polynomial time if the quantum computer becomes the reality soon. As far as our knowledge goes, there is no authentication protocol for satellite communication, which is secure against quantum computer attacks. Therefore, in this paper, we first proposed authentication protocol for satellite communication based on ring learning with error which is secure against quantum attacks.