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Withdrawn: Advancements in Quantum Computing and AI May Impact PQC Migration Timelines

Robert Campbell, Whitfield Diffie, Charles R. Robinson

Published Feb 22, 2024• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This preprint was withdrawn due to unresolved authorship disputes.
DOI
10.20944/preprints202402.1299.v1

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The advancement of quantum computing forces organizations to reconsider cryptographic foundations of digital trust. Scaled quantum computers may threaten public-key cryptography used for communication, authentication, data exchange, and transaction processing. Migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is more than an algorithm upgrade. Organizations must locate quantum-vulnerable cryptography across ecosystems and develop migration plans. Yet, PQC readiness is limited. A Trusted Computing Group (2025) survey of 1,500 cybersecurity professionals found 91% reported no formal PQC roadmap, while 81% said current cryptographic libraries and hardware security modules were not migration-ready. IS research is examining PQC migration, including banking-focused work highlighting variation in strategies, resources, and timelines (Brettschneider & Mendling, 2025). We build on prior work by focusing on FinTech ecosystem readiness, especially digital payments. Atlanta’s “Transaction Alley” illustrates why this context matters, as roughly 70% of global financial transactions pass through companies headquartered in metro Atlanta (Georgia Department of Economic Development, n.d.) amounting to 300 billion transactions worth $49 Billion generated by 10 public FinTechs alone (Fintech Atlanta, n.d.). Digital payments rely on cryptographic trust across merchants, gateways, processors, wallets, APIs, and cloud services. Since many FinTech firms use payment infrastructure they do not fully own, PQC migration is a challenge in coordinating ecosystems and digital trust governance. This research investigates how FinTech organizations govern PQC readiness across interdependent digital payment ecosystems. We ask how firms identify cryptographic dependencies, assess vendor preparedness, coordinate migration across partners, and preserve trust in high-volume transaction environments. Through exploratory interviews, we aim to develop a FinTech PQC readiness framework that explains how firms move from awareness to dependency discovery, vendor assurance, migration coordination, and trust preservation. The study extends IS research by explaining readiness-building when security infrastructure is invisible, distributed, transaction-critical, and externally dependent. This research will also help leaders structure governance, vendor assessments, and migration roadmaps for quantum-era resilience in digital payments.
Scholarship and enterprise practice have historically treated quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI) as distinct domains of cybersecurity risk, each with its own timeline, mechanisms, and mitigation literature. This article argues that the separation is no longer analytically or operationally tenable. As of 2026, the two technologies have entered a phase of mutual acceleration in which AI compresses the timeline toward a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) while serving as the principal mechanism through which organizations can detect, inventory, and defend against quantum-era threats. The article develops this thesis across five analytical movements: the accelerated offensive timeline, in which machine-learning techniques contribute to advances in error correction and algorithm optimization that have driven estimated qubit requirements for breaking RSA-2048 from roughly twenty million toward one million, a reduction attributable to converging algorithmic, hardware, and AI-assisted advances rather than to any single cause; the harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat, which converts a prospective future risk into a present data-exposure problem made more urgent by the state-directed investment postures of well-resourced adversaries; the bidirectional defensive opportunity, in which quantum machine learning (QML), a research-stage methodology whose results are exploratory and conditional on task, dataset, and evaluation environment, and AI-driven cryptographic discovery offer a realistic path to enterprise-scale post-quantum migration; the 2026 regulatory inflection, in which finalized NIST standards and binding compliance deadlines have transformed migration from a research question into an execution problem; and the global investment and geopolitical competition dimension, in which divergent national quantum programs, military-civil fusion architectures, indigenous cryptographic standards, and supply chain concentration risks expand the scope of the migration challenge beyond the compliance-deadline framing that domestic regulatory guidance alone provides. Drawing on recent empirical results in QML-based intrusion detection, documented advances in AI-assisted quantum error correction, the current standards landscape, and comparative analysis of U.S., Chinese, and European quantum investment postures, the article concludes with a five-part strategic framework for security leaders and identifies directions for further research. The central claim is that the defining cybersecurity challenge of the coming decade resides in the interaction of quantum computing and AI, and in the geopolitical competition shaping both, rather than in either technology considered in isolation.