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Journal of Lightwave Technology

High-Speed Quantum Key Distribution Using Dead-Time Compensated Detector Arrays

Shuangfeng Jiang, Majid Safari

Published Feb 7, 2024• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

There has been growing research interest in quantum technology in general and in quantum key distribution (QKD) in particular. However, the key generation rate of QKD systems is still limited by the quantum channel losses as well as the practical limitations of the quantum sources and detectors. Here, we focus on one of these limitations, namely, the quantum detector's dead time effect, which happens after each photon detection, limiting the maximum quantum bit transmission rate and consequently the key generation rate of QKD systems. Qubit transmission at the sub-dead-time regime (i.e., faster than the reciprocal of dead time) can introduce different security loopholes. In this paper, we propose the use of a detector array instead of a single detector to measure the quantum state of individual photons in discrete variable QKD systems, showing that it can significantly alleviate the limitations induced by detectors' dead time. A dead-time compensated BB84 scheme is introduced, allowing qubit transmission at the sub-dead-time regime. An$M-$dimensional Markov chain model is used to describe the impact of dead time on the operation of the proposed BB84 system, employing detector arrays of size$M$. Consequently, novel analytical expressions can be derived for the sifted bit rate (SBR) and secrecy key rate (SKR) of the proposed QKD system, showing excellent match with the Monte Carlo simulation results. A remarkable gain is observed for the BB84 system employing detector arrays, showing a potential$M$-fold improvement of SBR at high qubit transmission rates.

DOI
10.1109/jlt.2024.3363145

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Recent advances in quantum key distribution (QKD) have given rise to systems that operate at transmission periods significantly shorter than the dead times of their component single-photon detectors. As systems continue to increase in transmission rate, security concerns associated with detector dead times can limit the production rate of sifted bits. We present a model of high-speed QKD in this limit that identifies an optimum transmission rate for a system with given link loss and detector response characteristics.
Recently, there has been growing research interest in quantum technology in general and particularly in quantum key distribution (QKD) that enables two legitimate parties to share a secret key without leaking information to third parties. Practical implementation of QKD has shown limited key rates due to the practical limits of quantum sources and detectors. For example, after each detection event, practical single-photon detectors such as single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) undergo a period of inactivity called dead time, which limits the highest photon transmission rate achievable for QKD systems as photon transmission at sub-dead-time regime can generate security loopholes. In this paper, we analyze the performance of a sifting scheme that allows for high-speed operation at sub-dead-time regime both theoretically and numerically. We consider an FSO QKD system, where the effect of background noise can be significant and derive the expressions of sifting probability and sifted bit rate considering both dead time and background noise effects. We present a comprehensive performance analysis of the QKD system in terms of quantum bit error rate (QBER) and secrecy key rate (SKR) and show that operation at sub-dead-time regime can significantly improve the achievable SKR for FSO systems with certain path loss and background noise levels.
In light of the growing widely utilized single-photon avalanche detectors, dead time is inevitable due to the presence of afterpulse. Dead time is a critical factor that influences the count rate and the secret key rate (SKR) of quantum key distribution (QKD). It is particularly significant in time-bin-encoding systems, while prior models fail to accurately estimate the gains. Of note, it introduces correlations between early bins and late bins, hence bits with strong correlation and security risks. Here, we put forward a realistic model that precisely characterizes the response of detectors for time-bin-encoding systems. Our model not only improves the accuracy of gain predictions, showing an excellent match with the Monte Carlo simulation results, but also provides theoretical support for data processing, helping to mitigate security risks. Finally, leveraging our model, we can get a much higher SKR than prior models and further enhance the performance of practical QKD systems by adjusting the detector parameters. Our simulation results demonstrate that our model is essential for the application and deployment of QKD systems in practice.
The security of a high speed quantum key distribution system with finite detector dead time τ is analyzed. When the transmission rate becomes higher than the maximum count rate of the individual detectors (1/τ), security issues affect the algorithm for sifting bits. Analytical calculations and numerical simulations of the Bennett-Brassard BB84 protocol are performed. We study Rogers et al.'s protocol (introduced in "Detector dead-time effects and paralyzability in high-speed quantum key distribution," New J. Phys. 9 (2007) 319) in the presence of an active eavesdropper Eve who has the power to perform an intercept-resend attack. It is shown that Rogers et al.'s protocol is no longer secure. More specifically, Eve can induce a basis-dependent detection efficiency at the receiver's end. Modified key sifting schemes that are secure in the presence of dead time and an active eavesdropper are then introduced. We analyze and compare these secure sifting schemes for this active Eve scenario, and calculate and simulate their key generation rate. It is shown that the maximum key generation rate is 1/(2τ) for passive basis selection, and 1/τ for active basis selection. The security analysis for finite detector dead time is also extended to the decoy state BB84 protocol.
The security of a high speed quantum key distribution system with finite detector dead time τ\tauτ is analyzed. When the transmission rate becomes higher than the maximum count rate of the individual detectors (1/τ1/\tau1/τ), security issues affect the scheme for sifting bits. Analytical calculations and numerical simulations of the Bennett-Brassard BB84 protocol are performed. We study Rogers et al.'s scheme (further information is available in [D. J. Rogers, J. C. Bienfang, A. Nakassis, H. Xu, and C. W. Clark, New J. Phys.~{\bf 9}, 319 (2007)]) in the presence of an active eavesdropper Eve who has the power to perform an intercept-resend attack. It is shown that Rogers et al.'s scheme is no longer guaranteed to be secure. More specifically, Eve can induce a basis-dependent detection efficiency at the receiver's end. Modified key sifting schemes that are basis-independent and thus secure in the presence of dead time and an active eavesdropper are then introduced. We analyze and compare these secure sifting schemes for this active Eve scenario, and calculate and simulate their key generation rate. It is shown that the maximum key generation rate is 1/(2τ)1/(2\tau)1/(2τ) for passive basis selection, and 1/τ1/\tau1/τ for active basis selection. The security analysis for finite detector dead time is also extended to the decoy state BB84 protocol for one particular secure sifting scheme.