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Fundamental theories of physics

The Changing Bell View of Beables: A Forgotten Story

Federico Laudisa

Published Jan 1, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-45434-9_29

Related papers

The Evolution of the Bell Notion of Beable: From Bohr to Primitive Ontology

Federico Laudisa

Abstract John S. Bell introduced the notion of beable, as opposed to the standard notion of observable, in order to emphasize the need for an unambiguous formulation of quantum mechanics. In the paper I show that Bell formulated in fact two different theories of beables. The first is somehow reminiscent of the Bohr views on quantum mechanics but, at the same time, is curiously adopted by Bell as a critical tool against the Copenhagen interpretation, whereas the second, more mature formulation was among the sources of inspiration of the so-called Primitive Ontology (PO) approach to quantum mechanics, an approach inspired to scientific realism. In the first part of the paper it is argued that, contrary to the Bell wishes, the first formulation of the theory fails to be an effective recipe for addressing the ambiguity underlying the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whereas it is only the second formulation that successfully paves the way to the PO approach. In the second part, I consider how the distinction between the two formulations of the Bell theory of beables fares vis-a-vis the complex relationship between the theory of beables and the details of the PO approach.

arXiv:2305.16194•Journal for General Philosophy of Science•Jun 25, 2024•1 citation

My Interaction with John Bell

Bernard d’Espagnat

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Wigner’s friend and Bell’s beables

Jeffrey Barrett

A field-theoretic version of the Wigner’s (1961) friend story illustrates how the quantum measurement problem arises for field theory. Considering spacelike separate measurements of entangled fields shows the sense in which relativistic constraints make the measurement problem particularly difficult to resolve in the context of a relativistic quantum field theory. We will consider proposals by Wigner (1961), Bloch (1967), Helwig & Kraus (1970), and Bell (1984) for resolving the measurement problem for quantum field theory and conclude by considering the possibility of giving up rich dynamical explanation in the context of a many-maps theory.

Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência•Jun 21, 2018•0 citations

On Four Decades of Interaction with John Bell

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Einstein vs Bell? Bell's Inequality Refuted, Bell's Error Corrected.

Gordon Watson

Bell's inequality is widely regarded as a profound proof that nature is nonlocal, not Einstein-local. Against this, and supporting Einstein, we refute Bell's inequality and correct his error. We thus advance the principle of true-local-realism (TLR); the union of true-locality (no beables move superluminally, after Einstein) and true-realism (some beables change interactively, after Bohr). Importantly, for STEM teachers: we believe our commonsense results require no knowledge of quantum mechanics. Let us see.

•Sep 1, 2019•0 citations
Abstract John S. Bell introduced the notion of beable, as opposed to the standard notion of observable, in order to emphasize the need for an unambiguous formulation of quantum mechanics. In the paper I show that Bell formulated in fact two different theories of beables. The first is somehow reminiscent of the Bohr views on quantum mechanics but, at the same time, is curiously adopted by Bell as a critical tool against the Copenhagen interpretation, whereas the second, more mature formulation was among the sources of inspiration of the so-called Primitive Ontology (PO) approach to quantum mechanics, an approach inspired to scientific realism. In the first part of the paper it is argued that, contrary to the Bell wishes, the first formulation of the theory fails to be an effective recipe for addressing the ambiguity underlying the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whereas it is only the second formulation that successfully paves the way to the PO approach. In the second part, I consider how the distinction between the two formulations of the Bell theory of beables fares vis-a-vis the complex relationship between the theory of beables and the details of the PO approach.
A field-theoretic version of the Wigner’s (1961) friend story illustrates how the quantum measurement problem arises for field theory. Considering spacelike separate measurements of entangled fields shows the sense in which relativistic constraints make the measurement problem particularly difficult to resolve in the context of a relativistic quantum field theory. We will consider proposals by Wigner (1961), Bloch (1967), Helwig & Kraus (1970), and Bell (1984) for resolving the measurement problem for quantum field theory and conclude by considering the possibility of giving up rich dynamical explanation in the context of a many-maps theory.
Bell's inequality is widely regarded as a profound proof that nature is nonlocal, not Einstein-local. Against this, and supporting Einstein, we refute Bell's inequality and correct his error. We thus advance the principle of true-local-realism (TLR); the union of true-locality (no beables move superluminally, after Einstein) and true-realism (some beables change interactively, after Bohr). Importantly, for STEM teachers: we believe our commonsense results require no knowledge of quantum mechanics. Let us see.