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An Examination of Two Competing Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics with a Critique of the Kochen-Specker Theorem

Eliza Miller

Published Jan 28, 2024• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

There is ongoing discourse in philosophical and physics literature about whether the probabilistic essence of quantum mechanics indicates that deterministic interpretations of nature must be false. In 1967 two mathematicians, Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker, developed a mathematical theorem to the effect that particles do not have well-defined property values at a given time. A logical consequence of this is that there can be no well-defined hidden variables responsible for the outcomes of mysterious quantum behaviors. The theorem is thus fatal to the many deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics that assume hidden variables, including pilot wave mechanics, a quantum theory developed by Louis de Broglie and David Bohm a few decades prior to the formulation of the Kochen-Specker Theorem. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the legitimacy of the logical basis of Kochen’s and Specker’s argument considering its severe implications. It is concluded that Kochen and Specker do not provide sufficient evidence that deterministic theories must fail, due to their misinterpretation of the axioms on which hidden variable theories rely. This paper also finds that pilot wave mechanics is mathematically successful while remaining consistent with the deterministic understanding of broader physics and deserving of more serious consideration as a quantum theory. Above all it is emphasized that the nonsensicality of absolute randomness and indeterminism should be acknowledged, and theorems purporting to prove their existence should be critically examined, for such a discovery would undermine the legitimacy of logic itself.

DOI
10.55894/dv2.23

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There is ongoing discourse in philosophical and physics literature about whether the probabilistic essence of quantum mechanics indicates that deterministic interpretations of nature must be false. In 1967 two mathematicians, Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker, developed a mathematical theorem to the effect that particles do not have well-defined property values at a given time. A logical consequence of this is that there can be no well-defined hidden variables responsible for the outcomes of mysterious quantum behaviors. The theorem is thus fatal to the many deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics that assume hidden variables, including pilot wave mechanics, a quantum theory developed by Louis de Broglie and David Bohm a few decades prior to the formulation of the Kochen-Specker Theorem. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate the legitimacy of the logical basis of Kochen’s and Specker’s argument considering its severe implications. It is concluded that Kochen and Specker do not provide sufficient evidence that deterministic theories must fail, due to their misinterpretation of the axioms on which hidden variable theories rely. This paper also finds that pilot wave mechanics is mathematically successful while remaining consistent with the deterministic understanding of broader physics and deserving of more serious consideration as a quantum theory. Above all it is emphasized that the nonsensicality of absolute randomness and indeterminism should be acknowledged, and theorems purporting to prove their existence should be critically examined, for such a discovery would undermine the legitimacy of logic itself.
One of the statements one would hear pretty early in any quantum mechanics course is that for quantum particles there are properties which do not have definite values. For example, if we measure |+〉 in standard basis, the best we can do to describe the outcome is to say, that with probability 1/2 we will get 0 and with probability 1/2 we will get 1. Yet one could wonder, is this really the way things are or is it just because our description of this quantum particle is incomplete, but in fact there are some hidden variables inside every quantum system that contain enough information to tell the outcome of measurement (see Fig. 1). However, many people disdain the idea of hidden variables, so there has been rather long history of theorems that forbid theories involving hidden variables. Usually if one wants to prove some no hidden variables theorem he has to assume something about the hidden variables theories he is going to forbid. One of such assumptions is non-contextuality, which means that the outcome we get after measuring with an observable is the same regardless of what other observables we choose to measure at the same time. The first theorem forbidding hidden variables theories is due to von Neumann in 1932. Then for a third of a century everyone cited von Neumann’s work carelessly, till Bell in 1966 indicated that there was an unreasonable assumption in von Neumann’s proof and urged for further examination of the problem (see [6] and [1] for more historical details). Bell also constructed a hidden variables model for one qubit that could assign the outcome of any observable in a way consistent with quantum mechanics. He also proved two theorems that forbid non-contextual hidden variables theories using counterexamples with larger quantum systems. Yet surprisingly he himself thought that hidden variables do exists and considered these theorems only as characterizations of the hidden variables theory we should look for. In this essay we will discuss several versions of one of the two Bell’s theorems. The theorem we will consider was also independently proven by Kochen and Specker in 1967 (see [5]), hence it is called Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. For shortness and in order not to mix this theorem with another Bell’s theorem from now on we will refer to it as Kochen-Specker theorem. We will be interested in proving several versions of this theorem and the following lemma will turn out to be of great use:
One of the most fundamental theoretical results in quantum mechanics, the theorem of Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker (1967), is investigated from a rather mathematical and philosophical than physical viewpoint (i.e. unlike as usual). The absence of hidden variables is interpreted philosophically and ontomathematically: as the identity of the mathematical model by the separable complex Hilbert space (equivalent to the qubit Hilbert space) and physical reality. It implies the completeness of just that model to physical reality including in the sense of its cognitive finality. In other words, "hidden variables" are also interpreted as any mismatch between model and reality implied by the theorem not to be. That property of the qubit Hilbert space unique among all other mathematical theories (i.e., all first-order logics) is deduced as a corollary from the theorem as well. The approach at issue to the theorem implies its inherent contextuality to be deduced also in an "apophatic" or holistic version stating that omitting even a single "axis" of Hilbert space or a single value of probability density break its contextuality thus being inconsistent to the theorem. The concept of "fundamental randomness" is newly introduced as originating from the absence of hidden variables in any probability (density or not) distribution, the characteristic function of which is interpreted to be a (qubit) wave function. Then, the Kochen-Specker theorem implies no deviation from that "fundamental randomness" exists once its preconditions have been satisfied. The deviations at issue are seen to be any excluded degrees of freedom in a variable describing whatever. Just this statement is interpreted to be the theorem's "apophatic interpretation". A powerful method for proving statements in Hilbert arithmetic's number theory is offered as a conjecture to be reasoned and proved in a forthcoming paper.
In this work we begin with a critical review of the concept of observable in a generical physical theory; relying on C*-algebras formalism and on Gelfand-Naimark theorem we justify the link between observables and operators in an Hilbert space. We discuss particularly observables of quantum mechanics, introducing some mathematical results that characterizes them. We introduce the problem of hidden variables and the hypothesis of non-contextuality, than we give a proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem in dimension greater or equal to 3 using partial algebras formalism; we also show a constructive example of an hidden variable theory in dimension 2. Finally we discuss Meyer’s and Kent’s objections relying on finite precision of physical measurements and we present colorations of S² ∩ Q³ and of dense subsets of the projectors of C^n and l²(C) that respect Kochen-Specker rules.
The text is a continuation of the article of the same name published in the previous issue of Philosophical Alternatives. The philosophical interpretations of the Kochen- Specker theorem (1967) are considered. Einstein's principle regarding the,consubstantiality of inertia and gravity" (1918) allows of a parallel between descriptions of a physical micro-entity in relation to the macro-apparatus on the one hand, and of physical macro-entities in relation to the astronomical mega-entities on the other. The Bohmian interpretation ( 1952) of quantum mechanics proposes that all quantum systems be interpreted as dissipative ones and that the theorem be thus derstood. The conclusion is that the continual representation, by force or (gravitational) field between parts interacting by means of it, of a system is equivalent to their mutual entanglement if representation is discrete. Gravity (force field) and entanglement are two different, correspondingly continual and discrete, images of a single common essence. General relativity can be interpreted as a superluminal generalization of special relativity. The postulate exists of an alleged obligatory difference between a model and reality in science and philosophy. It can also be deduced by interpreting a corollary of the heorem. On the other hand, quantum mechanics, on the basis of this theorem and of V on Neumann's (1932), introduces the option that a model be entirely identified as the modeled reality and, therefore, that absolutely reality be recognized: this is a non-standard hypothesis in the epistemology of science. Thus, the true reality begins to be understood mathematically, i.e. in a Pythagorean manner, for its identification with its mathematical model. A few linked problems are highlighted: the role of the axiom of choice forcorrectly interpreting the theorem; whether the theorem can be considered an axiom; whether the theorem can be considered equivalent to the negation of the axiom.
The alternative pilot-wave theory of quantum phenomena—associated especially with Louis de Broglie, David Bohm, and John Bell—reproduces the statistical predictions of ordinary quantum mechanics but without recourse to special ad hoc axioms pertaining to measurement. That (and how) it does so is relatively straightforward to understand in the case of position measurements and, more generally, measurements, whose outcome is ultimately registered by the position of a pointer. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary among physicists, the theory can also account successfully for phenomena involving spin. The main goal of this paper is to explain how the pilot-wave theory's account of spin works. Along the way, we provide illuminating comparisons between the orthodox and pilot-wave accounts of spin and address some puzzles about how the pilot-wave theory relates to the important theorems of Kochen and Specker and Bell.