Quantum cryptanalysis methods are used to crack the majority of symmetric key ciphers. With this knowledge, cryptologists should be able to create post-quantum symmetric ciphers by incorporating these new quantum cryptanalysis techniques into their toolkit. Secure communication is crucial for applications related to the Internet of Things (IoT) to avoid cyberattacks. Cryptographic hash functions can be used to protect data integrity. The development of large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers is the most significant challenge. Recent techniques to attack symmetric key schemes can be achieved by using the Pre-image attack method, Simon’s algorithm, or by combining Simon’s and Grover’s algorithms. In this study, we explored some of the most recent methods for quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric key ciphers. Firstly, we discussed the design of quantum cryptanalysis methods, along with the advantages over classical procedures. In this paper, we illustrate the implementation of the NIST-standard lightweight hash function PHOTON-Beetle on a Quantum Computer (using IBM Qiskit), which is mostly used in IoT devices. Efficient quantum implementation of PHOTON-Beetle is proposed in this paper. This paper calculates the quantum cost of PHOTON-Beetle for every layer and compares it with [1].
Quantum cryptanalysis methods are used to crack the majority of symmetric key ciphers. With this knowledge, cryptologists should be able to create post-quantum symmetric ciphers by incorporating these new quantum cryptanalysis techniques into their toolkit. Secure communication is crucial for applications related to the Internet of Things (IoT) to avoid cyberattacks. Cryptographic hash functions can be used to protect data integrity. The development of large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers is the most significant challenge. Recent techniques to attack symmetric key schemes can be achieved by using the Pre-image attack method, Simon’s algorithm, or by combining Simon’s and Grover’s algorithms. In this study, we explored some of the most recent methods for quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric key ciphers. Firstly, we discussed the design of quantum cryptanalysis methods, along with the advantages over classical procedures. In this paper, we illustrate the implementation of the NIST-standard lightweight hash function PHOTON-Beetle on a Quantum Computer (using IBM Qiskit), which is mostly used in IoT devices. Efficient quantum implementation of PHOTON-Beetle is proposed in this paper. This paper calculates the quantum cost of PHOTON-Beetle for every layer and compares it with [1].
The Internet of Things (IoT) now underpins critical systems like healthcare monitors, smart home, smart grids, automotive V2V & V2X networks, and industrial controls but it still relies on classical cryptography, whose security assumptions are vulnerable to quantum computers. A large quantum computer could run Shor’s algorithm to break RSA/ECC and use Grover’s algorithm to accelerate brute-forcing of symmetric keys, undermining the confidentiality and authentication of data in these IoT applications. Researchers have proposed quantum cryptographic solutions. Quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum random number generators (QRNGs) exploit quantum mechanics to detect eavesdropping and deliver provably secure key material. For example, chip-scale QRNGs can be embedded in IoT sensors to generate true random keys, boosting resistance to brute-force attacks. These quantum techniques provide information-theoretic secrecy, for instance, QKD-generated keys have been used to authenticate smart-grid SCADA. However, most IoT devices are resource-constrained, making direct deployment of conventional QKD hardware challenging. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) complements quantum methods by providing algorithms such as lattice-based, hash-based that resist quantum attacks on existing hardware. Standardized PQC can be deployed via software updates on legacy IoT nodes, enabling scalable and quantum-safe security within current constraints. Researchers are exploring lightweight PQC for connected cars and e-health sensors. Hybrid approaches combining QKD/QRNG with PQC offer a layered defense. Since QKD protocols are regarded as ‘future-proof’ and PQC standards mature, their combined use will be essential for robust, quantum-safe IoT security. Miniaturizing quantum components such as integrated QKD/QRNG modules and optimizing lightweight PQC schemes for low-power IoT devices are future research directions to secure IoT networks.
With the development of quantum technology, quantum computing has an increasingly significant impact on cryptanalysis. Several quantum algorithms, such as Simon’s algorithm, Grover’s algorithm, the Bernstein–Vazirani algorithm, Shor’s algorithm, and the Grover-meets-Simon algorithm, have been proposed successively. However, almost all cryptanalysis is based on the quantum chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) model. This paper focuses on a powerful cryptanalytic model, quantum related-key attack (qRKA), and proposes a strategy of qRKAs against symmetric ciphers using Simon’s algorithm. We construct a periodic function to efficiently recover the secret key of symmetric ciphers if the attacked symmetric ciphers satisfy Simon’s promise, and present the complexity analysis on specific symmetric ciphers. Then, we apply qRKA to the Even–Mansour cipher and SoEM construction, recover their secret keys, and show their complexity comparison in the distinct attack models. This work is of great significance for the qRKA cryptanalysis of existing provably secure cryptographic schemes and the design of future quantum secure cryptographic schemes.
The rapid advancements in quantum technologies have introduced significant threats to the security of conventional cryptographic systems. In particular, the evaluation of quantum resource requirements—measured in terms of circuit depth and qubit count—has become essential for analyzing the resilience of widely used schemes such as AES and RSA, as well as cryptographic hash functions like SHA-2. At the same time, the widespread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) applications has increased the exposure to cybersecurity risks, which are further exacerbated by the emerging capabilities of quantum adversaries. To address these challenges, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched a competition to standardize lightweight hash functions and defined five quantum security levels to assess their robustness. In this work, we conduct a resource analysis of the NIST Lightweight Hash Function finalists against the Grover search algorithm, providing detailed insights into their quantum resistance. The findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the security strength of lightweight hash functions in the post-quantum era.
Abstract With the emergence of quantum computing, traditional cryptographic algorithms face the threat of being compromised, necessitating the development of quantum-resistant alternatives. The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm presents unique security challenges due to its vast scale and resource-constrained devices. This research aims to address these challenges by proposing a novel quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm QuantIoT specifically designed for securing IoT devices. The research begins by evaluating the vulnerabilities of existing cryptographic algorithms against quantum attacks and identifying the need for post-quantum solutions in the IoT context. Various families of post quantum cryptographic algorithms, including lattice based and hash based schemes, are examined to assess their suitability for securing IoT devices. Based on the analysis, a novel quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm tailored for IoT devices is proposed. The algorithm takes into account the limited computational capabilities, power constraints, and communication requirements of IoT devices while offering strong defence against both conventional and quantum threats. The proposed algorithm is evaluated through simulations and practical experiments on a representative IoT platform. Performance metrics, including computation time, memory usage, and communication overhead, are measured and compared against traditional cryptographic algorithms. The results show that the suggested quantum-resistant technique for protecting IoT devices is workable and effective. This research contributes to the growing body of knowledge on post-quantum cryptography and provides valuable insights for the design and implementation of secure IoT systems in the face of quantum threats.
The rapid proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has revolutionized digital communication, yet it simultaneously poses unprecedented security challenges due to constrained device capabilities and increasing cyber threats. Conventional cryptographic techniques, while currently effective, are vulnerable to emerging quantum computing technologies that threaten to render classical encryption obsolete. This paper explores the integration of quantum-safe cryptographic techniques within IoT networks to ensure long-term confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. It examines post-quantum cryptographic primitives, including lattice-based, hash-based, multivariate, and code-based schemes, and evaluates their suitability for resource-constrained IoT environments. The study focuses on lightweight implementation strategies, balancing computational efficiency with robust security requirements. Simulation analyses demonstrate that properly optimized quantum safe protocols can provide resilient encryption, key exchange, and digital signature functionalities without overwhelming device resources. Furthermore, the integration of these techniques with IoT communication standards and secure network protocols ensures end-to-end protection across heterogeneous networks. Challenges such as latency, energy consumption, and scalability are addressed, highlighting the necessity of tailored cryptographic solutions for diverse IoT applications. The findings confirm that quantum safe cryptography is essential for future-proofing IoT networks, offering sustainable security measures that remain resilient against both classical and quantum adversaries, thereby supporting the continued expansion of secure and intelligent interconnected systems.
Quantum algorithms can break factoring and discrete logarithm based cryptography and weaken symmetric cryptography and hash functions. In order to estimate the real-world impact of these attacks, apart from tracking the development of fault-tolerant quantum computers it is important to have an estimate of the resources needed to implement these quantum attacks. For attacking symmetric cryptography and hash functions, generic quantum attacks are substantially less powerful than they are for today's public-key cryptography. So security will degrade gradually as quantum computing resources increase. At present, there is a substantial resource overhead due to the cost of fault-tolerant quantum error correction. We provide estimates of this overhead using state-of-the-art methods in quantum fault-tolerance. We use state-of-the-art optimized circuits, though further improvements in their implementation would also reduce the resources needed to implement these attacks. To bound the potential impact of further circuit optimizations we provide cost estimates assuming trivial-cost implementations of these functions. These figures indicate the effective bit-strength of the various symmetric schemes and hash functions based on what we know today (and with various assumptions on the quantum hardware), and frame the various potential improvements that should continue to be tracked. As an example, we also look at the implications for Bitcoin's proof-of-work system. For many of the currently used asymmetric (public-key) cryptographic schemes based on RSA and elliptic curve discrete logarithms, we again provide cost estimates based on the latest advances in cryptanalysis, circuit compilation and quantum fault-tolerance theory. These allow, for example, a direct comparison of the quantum vulnerability of RSA and elliptic curve cryptography for a fixed classical bit strength.