Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

CRC Press eBooks

On the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

F.J. Duarte

Published Jan 15, 2024• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The Einstein Podolsky and Rosen argument labeling quantum mechanics as an ‘incomplete theory’ is revisited, and it is shown that one of its premises is incompatible with the physics of measurement uncertainties. Bell’s criticism toward quantum mechanics is discussed in detail and contrasted with the opinion of well-known practitioners of quantum mechanics such as Born, Dirac, Feynman, Lamb, and Ward. A discussion on hidden variable theories is given, and it is indicated that these theories have features that make them non-quantum mechanical. The argument is made that the so-called ‘quantum measurement problem’ is not a practical problem but a conceptual problem of those who believe in the ‘collapse of the wave function.’ In turn, it is explained that the ‘collapse of the wave function’ is completely unnecessary from a quantum interference and quantum entanglement perspective. The chapter continues to explain the physical bases of quantum entanglements and concludes advocating for a pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics devoid of philosophical prejudices. Instead, a philosophical approach based on the very indeterminism of quantum mechanics is proposed.

DOI
10.1201/9781003398707-23

Related papers

A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)

Hilary Putnam

‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’ (Putnam [1965]) explained why the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a philosophical problem in detail, but with only the necessary minimum of technicalities, in the hope of making the difficulties intelligible to as wide an audience as possible. When I wrote it, I had not seen Bell ([1964]), nor (of course) had I seen Ghirardi et al. ([1986]). And I did not discuss the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation. For all these reasons, I have decided to make a similar attempt forty years later, taking account of additional interpretations and of our knowledge concerning non-locality. (The Quantum Logical interpretation proposed in Putnam [1968] is not considered in the present paper, however, because Putnam [1994b] concluded that it was unworkable.) Rather than advocate a particular interpretation, this paper classifies the possible kinds of interpretation, subject only to the constraints of a very broadly construed scientific realism. Section 7 does, however, argue that two sorts of interpretation—ones according to which a ‘collapse’ is brought about by the measurement (e.g. the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation), and the Many Worlds interpretation or interpretations—should be ruled out. The concluding section suggests some possible morals of a cosmological character. 1. Background 2. Scientific realism is the premise of my discussion 3. What ‘quantum mechanics’ says—and some problems 4. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics 5. The problem of Einstein's bed 6. Classification of the possible kinds of interpretation 7. Which interpretations I think we can rule out 8. The ‘moral’ of this discussion

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 10, 2005•95 citations

The Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Abstract The book starts with a description of classical mechanics then discusses the quantum phenomena that require us to give up our commonsense classical intuitions. We consider the physical and conceptual arguments that led to the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics and how the standard theory explains quantum phenomena. This includes a discussion of how the theory’s two dynamical laws work with the standard interpretation of states to explain determinate measurement records, quantum statistics, interference effects, entanglement, decoherence, and quantum nonlocality. A careful understanding of how the standard theory works ultimately leads to the quantum measurement problem. We consider how the measurement problem threatens the logical consistency of the standard theory then turn to a discussion of the main proposals for resolving it. This includes collapse formulations of quantum mechanics like Wigner’s extension of the standard theory and the GRW approach and no-collapse formulations like pure wave mechanics, the various many-worlds theories, and Bohmian mechanics. In discussing alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we pay particular attention to the explanatory role played by each theory’s empirical ontology and associated metaphysical commitments and the conceptual trade-offs between theoretical options.

•Dec 26, 2019•57 citations

The Nonexisting ‘Measurement Problem’

F. J. Duarte

The indeterminacy and stochasticity of quantum mechanics have nurtured an illustrious gathering of critics including Einstein, Schrödinger, Bell, and Penrose. This has been good for quantum mechanics since it has become the most ruggedized and most battle hardened branch of physics. The one criticism that is often alluded to, now days, is ‘the measurement problem.’ First of all, from a pragmatic perspective it can be categorically stated that there is no measurement problem. Quantum mechanics exquisitely agrees with experimental measurements. Secondly, the so called ‘measurement problem’ is often related, by supporters of this concept, to the alleged ‘collapse of the wave function’ which is an unobserved phenomenon. In this chapter, several aspects of this experimentally nonexisting problem are discussed in order to inform the reader on the measurement reality of quantum mechanics.

CRC Press eBooks•Apr 10, 2026•0 citations

Real and/or Local

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Abstract Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) argued that quantum mechanics was incomplete. We consider their argument and the physical and philosophical intuitions that motivated it. Among their intuitions was a commitment to real physical properties and to local properties and interactions. For his part, Einstein’s commitment to locality was closely related to how he understood special relativity. We show why the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics is flatly incompatible with special relativity. Following Bell, we then see why no physical theory that satisfies EPR’s commonsense and philosophical intuitions can be empirically adequate over quantum phenomena.

•Dec 26, 2019•0 citations

Quantum entanglement and ‘the measurement problem’

F.J. Duarte

The physics of quantum entanglement measurements and N-slit quantum interference measurements is described entirely based on quantum indeterminism without the need to invoke a ‘collapse of the wave function’ thus neutralizing concerns about ‘the measurement problem.’ It is emphasized that the physics of quantum entanglement is decoupled from Bell’s theorem. This stochastic, and pragmatic, approach also makes redundant post-Bell-superdeterminism arguments.

•Jul 22, 2024•0 citations

On quantum mechanics self-consistency: EPR incompleteness claims require no extraneous concepts beyond the theory's plain formalism for refutation

D. F. Orsini, L. R. N. Oliveira, M. G. E. da Luz

From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.

quant-pharXiv:2608.10006•Aug 11, 2026•0 citations
The Einstein Podolsky and Rosen argument labeling quantum mechanics as an ‘incomplete theory’ is revisited, and it is shown that one of its premises is incompatible with the physics of measurement uncertainties. Bell’s criticism toward quantum mechanics is discussed in detail and contrasted with the opinion of well-known practitioners of quantum mechanics such as Born, Dirac, Feynman, Lamb, and Ward. A discussion on hidden variable theories is given, and it is indicated that these theories have features that make them non-quantum mechanical. The argument is made that the so-called ‘quantum measurement problem’ is not a practical problem but a conceptual problem of those who believe in the ‘collapse of the wave function.’ In turn, it is explained that the ‘collapse of the wave function’ is completely unnecessary from a quantum interference and quantum entanglement perspective. The chapter continues to explain the physical bases of quantum entanglements and concludes advocating for a pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics devoid of philosophical prejudices. Instead, a philosophical approach based on the very indeterminism of quantum mechanics is proposed.
‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’ (Putnam [1965]) explained why the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a philosophical problem in detail, but with only the necessary minimum of technicalities, in the hope of making the difficulties intelligible to as wide an audience as possible. When I wrote it, I had not seen Bell ([1964]), nor (of course) had I seen Ghirardi et al. ([1986]). And I did not discuss the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation. For all these reasons, I have decided to make a similar attempt forty years later, taking account of additional interpretations and of our knowledge concerning non-locality. (The Quantum Logical interpretation proposed in Putnam [1968] is not considered in the present paper, however, because Putnam [1994b] concluded that it was unworkable.) Rather than advocate a particular interpretation, this paper classifies the possible kinds of interpretation, subject only to the constraints of a very broadly construed scientific realism. Section 7 does, however, argue that two sorts of interpretation—ones according to which a ‘collapse’ is brought about by the measurement (e.g. the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation), and the Many Worlds interpretation or interpretations—should be ruled out. The concluding section suggests some possible morals of a cosmological character. 1. Background 2. Scientific realism is the premise of my discussion 3. What ‘quantum mechanics’ says—and some problems 4. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics 5. The problem of Einstein's bed 6. Classification of the possible kinds of interpretation 7. Which interpretations I think we can rule out 8. The ‘moral’ of this discussion
Abstract The book starts with a description of classical mechanics then discusses the quantum phenomena that require us to give up our commonsense classical intuitions. We consider the physical and conceptual arguments that led to the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics and how the standard theory explains quantum phenomena. This includes a discussion of how the theory’s two dynamical laws work with the standard interpretation of states to explain determinate measurement records, quantum statistics, interference effects, entanglement, decoherence, and quantum nonlocality. A careful understanding of how the standard theory works ultimately leads to the quantum measurement problem. We consider how the measurement problem threatens the logical consistency of the standard theory then turn to a discussion of the main proposals for resolving it. This includes collapse formulations of quantum mechanics like Wigner’s extension of the standard theory and the GRW approach and no-collapse formulations like pure wave mechanics, the various many-worlds theories, and Bohmian mechanics. In discussing alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we pay particular attention to the explanatory role played by each theory’s empirical ontology and associated metaphysical commitments and the conceptual trade-offs between theoretical options.
The indeterminacy and stochasticity of quantum mechanics have nurtured an illustrious gathering of critics including Einstein, Schrödinger, Bell, and Penrose. This has been good for quantum mechanics since it has become the most ruggedized and most battle hardened branch of physics. The one criticism that is often alluded to, now days, is ‘the measurement problem.’ First of all, from a pragmatic perspective it can be categorically stated that there is no measurement problem. Quantum mechanics exquisitely agrees with experimental measurements. Secondly, the so called ‘measurement problem’ is often related, by supporters of this concept, to the alleged ‘collapse of the wave function’ which is an unobserved phenomenon. In this chapter, several aspects of this experimentally nonexisting problem are discussed in order to inform the reader on the measurement reality of quantum mechanics.
Abstract Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) argued that quantum mechanics was incomplete. We consider their argument and the physical and philosophical intuitions that motivated it. Among their intuitions was a commitment to real physical properties and to local properties and interactions. For his part, Einstein’s commitment to locality was closely related to how he understood special relativity. We show why the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics is flatly incompatible with special relativity. Following Bell, we then see why no physical theory that satisfies EPR’s commonsense and philosophical intuitions can be empirically adequate over quantum phenomena.
From a phenomenological and experimental viewpoint, quantum mechanics is remarkably successful in explaining effects and processes in the microscopic world. Recently, however, a growing body of literature has revisited the theory's own formal foundations, specifically addressing issues of self-consistency and completeness. As a major historical example of these foundational challenges, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument famously claimed that the theory is incomplete. While many valid criticisms and refutations of the EPR logic exist, they generally rely on a combination of technical results and conceptual objections to EPR's interpretive assumptions, thus transcending the plain quantum framework itself. Motivated by these trends of examining the theory's structural limits, here we revisit the EPR argument. Focusing on elements essential to the EPR reasoning, we first analyze general quantum correlations for EPR states: (i) the fact that their observables are always associated with non-commuting operators, and (ii) the nature of the correlated information obtained through measurement. From these two points alone, and relying strictly on the core rules of quantum mechanics, we demonstrate how to overturn the alleged EPR incompleteness without invoking any extraneous propositions. Consequently, we show that the standard formalism alone suffices to resolve such type of skepticism regarding the theory's physical reach. This offers, at least in a paradigmatic instance, a powerful indication of a structurally well-founded, self-consistent quantum theory.