The most elementary empirical truth associated with any experiment involving light (electromagnetic radiation) propagation is the distinction between the source (region of cause) and the detector (region of effect), i.e. "cause/effect" distinction, based on which one can speak of "distance between source and detector", "propagation from source to detector" and, therefore, "action at a distance", "velocity of propagation". According to EPR's completeness condition, "cause/effect" distinction should be taken into account in a theory that is supposed to provide explanations for such an experiment, the simplest one being the Hertz experiment. Then, in principle, one can decide whether "cause before effect" or "cause after effect" i.e. the logic of causality remains decidable. I show that, working with Maxwell's equations and "cause/effect" distinction to explain Hertz experiment, Poynting's theorem is unprovable. It is provable if and only if "cause/effect" distinction is erased by choice through an act of free will, but the logic of causality becomes undecidable. The current theoretical foundation behind the hypothesis of 'light propagation' comes into question as theoretical optics is founded upon Maxwell's equations and Poynting's theorem. A revisit to the foundations of electrodynamics, with an emphasis on the interplay among logic, language and operation, seems necessary and motivated.
The most elementary empirical truth associated with any experiment involving light (electromagnetic radiation) propagation is the distinction between the source (region of cause) and the detector (region of effect), i.e. "cause/effect" distinction, based on which one can speak of "distance between source and detector", "propagation from source to detector" and, therefore, "action at a distance", "velocity of propagation". According to EPR's completeness condition, "cause/effect" distinction should be taken into account in a theory that is supposed to provide explanations for such an experiment, the simplest one being the Hertz experiment. Then, in principle, one can decide whether "cause before effect" or "cause after effect" i.e. the logic of causality remains decidable. I show that, working with Maxwell's equations and "cause/effect" distinction to explain Hertz experiment, Poynting's theorem is unprovable. It is provable if and only if "cause/effect" distinction is erased by choice through an act of free will, but the logic of causality becomes undecidable. The current theoretical foundation behind the hypothesis of 'light propagation' comes into question as theoretical optics is founded upon Maxwell's equations and Poynting's theorem. A revisit to the foundations of electrodynamics, with an emphasis on the interplay among logic, language and operation, seems necessary and motivated.
In 1905 A. Einstein, from the experiments of Michelson and Morley in 1887, enunciates the light speed constancy principle in the inertial frames of reference. However, this principle was pointed by the equations of the electromagnetism of J. C. Maxwell in 1865. The prediction of the Maxwell equations is due to in the most basic principle of the science, the principle of causality, is the reason of the light speed constancy. This article shown how, only with the causality principle, we can deduce the properties of the light. At the end of the article we used the causality relativistic definition to approach the local action principle, as well as to solve the paradox that implies the EPR theorem.
A fundamental error is identified in the foundations of current quantum theory. The error is shown to be the source of the various noncausal and unphysical aspects of the theory. When the error is corrected, a new theory arises, which is both local and deterministic, but which nonetheless does not conflict with Bell’s theorem. The new theory reproduces quantitatively all the predictions of current quantum mechanics, with the exception of double-delayed-choice Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) phenomena. A shortcoming in Aspect's experiment testing such phenomena is pointed out, and a definitive experiment is proposed. The EPR paradox is resolved. The uncertainty principle is derived on a causal, deterministic basis. The theory is “automatically ” relativistic; that is, the constancy of the velocity of light c relative to all observers follows as an immediate consequence of the new quantum theory, which constancy thus acquires a simple physical explanation. General relativity also acquires a simple, physical explanation. A pictorial interpretation of Feynman diagrams is obtained. The theory provides a clear physical explanation for the Aharonov–Bohm effect and suggests an explanation for the irreversibility of quantum statistical processes. Quantum statistics, Bose and Fermi, are explained in a simple, pictorial manner. Overall, it is shown that quantum and relativistic phenomena can be understood in an objective manner, in which facts are facts, causality is valid, and reality is real. The theory provides a single framework in which all known physical phenomena can be comprehended, thus accomplishing the objective of a unified field theory. Key words: quantum theory foundations, Bell’s theorem, delayed choice, special relativity, Feynman diagrams, Aharonov–Bohm effect, general relativity, unified theory, reality
Introduction Important advances in scientific knowledge may, not infrequently, be looked at from several angles. Here, in investigating the question the article title defines, part of our attention will have to be turned on the relationships of Bell's theorem to the old, but still not fully cleared up, question of the nature of causality. The word “nonlocality” means the violation of local causality, the initial meaning of whichwas that no influence, that is, no causal action , can be propagated faster than light. For a long time it was a received view that actions somewhat akin to the basically time-directed ones that living beings perform also take place within inanimate nature. This conception of causality may be called the causality–action theory . But later, having in view Hume's serious reservations concerning it, renowned philosophers of science claimed it might and should be dropped, since the effects it was meant to account for could be explained just as well by considering that what is at work is simply a conjunction of physical laws expressed by means of differential equations – a view that later Hempel and Oppenheim generalized and called the D-N (deductive–nomological) model of explanation (reprinted in [1]). Here the (widely accepted, as it seems) corresponding conception of causality will, for simplicity, be called the law-centered theory of causality . But does the latter theory subsume, at least within physics, all the meanings of the word ‘cause’ that true understanding calls for? Among philosophers the matter is not settled. Hempel himself granted that in several respects the D-N model is somehow inadequate for analyzing the cause–effect relationship [2]. And it seems indeed that a significant argument favoring a ‘no’ answer to the question might have been put forward as early as 1907 (although, to our knowledge, it was not), when Einstein pointed out that according to his then two years old special relativity (SR) theory, if we assumed an effect could follow its cause sooner than light velocity permits, then in some other frames of reference it would occur before its cause. For, concerning this consequence of the assumption, he wrote, “in my opinion, regarded as pure logic … it contains no contradiction; however it absolutely clashes with the character of our total experience, and in this way is proved the impossibility of the hypothesis” [3].
On the Limits of “Undecidability”: Quantum Physics, Deconstruction, and Anti-realism Christopher Norris (bio) I Philosophers of science have responded in various ways to the conceptual and interpretative problems thrown up by quantum mechanics. These problems emerged a century ago from Planck’s researches into black-body radiation and have scarcely been resolved—rather, if anything, deepened and complicated—by the intensive debate that has surrounded them since that time.1 For some theorists, the resultant dilemmas (of observer “interference,” wave/particle dualism, quantum superposition, nonlocal causality, superluminal [faster-than-light] propagation, etc.) are such as to entail drastic revisions to our very idea of the physical world as existing and exerting its causal powers quite apart from our current best theories or investigative methods.2 For others again, quantum mechanics just is the best theory currently available, whatever the problems that it happens to create for our normal habits of logical thought or consistent reasoning on the evidence. Thus logic itself may have to be revised—right down to putative “laws of thought” such as noncontradiction and excluded middle—if these turn out to conflict with the results of quantum-mechanical theory or experiment.3 This is the view taken by Hilary Putnam in his writings on quantum logic and also by others, von Neumann among them, for whom the working rule in any such trade-off is to keep the physics as simple as possible even if the result is to complicate logic by introducing values other than those of determinate (bivalent) truth or falsehood.4 Very often it consorts with the argument that if quantum mechanics is right—at any rate on the standard Copenhagen interpretation—then we had best give up any hope of retaining a “classical” Einsteinian ontology, that is to say, a Lorentz-invariant account of space-time coordinates where the speed of light is the limiting value for assignments of position, velocity, and causal propagation.5 Hence Einstein’s famous series of debates with Niels Bohr when he devised a whole range of increasingly elaborate thought-experiments designed to prove that the quantum-mechnical description of reality had to be in some way “incomplete,” or not to have reckoned with some crucial factor that would bring it into line with logical reasoning and a causal-realist ontology. For on Einstein’s view there was simply no room in science for a theory—such as Bohr’s—that involved either the suspension of classical truth/falsehood [End Page 407] values or the idea of some “spooky action-at-a-distance” which contravened both commonsense realism and the requirements of Special Relativity.6 However it is Bohr who is generally thought to have carried the day in these debates. In which case—so it is argued—we are left with a choice between three possible “solutions.” These are (1) the hypothesis that quantum mechanics is “incomplete” or open to an alternative (“hidden-variables”) interpretation;7 (2) the adoption of an alternative (many-valued or non-bivalent) quantum logic that effectively conjures such problems away;8 or (3) the conclusion that realism may have to be abandoned in favour of some radically different ontology or worldview which counts this a price worth paying in order to conserve the predictive power of the standard quantum formalisms.9 On option (3) there is a further choice of interpretative views according to the theorist’s preferred choice between the various models (or possible-world scenarios) currently on offer. Thus the model may be one that embraces nonlocal simultaneous particle interaction, or which gives up space-time covariance (relative to the speed of light) as required by Einstein’s Special Theory. Or again it may be one that somehow envisions—strangest of all—the splitting-off of multiple coexistent but non-interacting “worlds” whenever the wave-packet collapses or whenever an act of measurement is performed upon any such quantum-system whose properties must be thought of as strictly indeterminate until that moment.10 For, according to its partisans, this theory is the most economical—i.e., involves least conflict with the standard quantum formalisms—despite its baroque proliferation of alternative worlds and its well-nigh unthinkable implications when applied...
It is well recognized that two of the foundational theories of modern physics, relativity and quantum mechanics, are inconsistent. Efforts to overcome this through intensive pursuit of unifying theoretical frameworks or improvements in experimental precision as pursued by Robertson-Mansouri-Sexl and Standard-Model-Extension test theory protocols, have so far proven unsuccessful. Nonetheless, empirical evidence deriving from investigations inspired by the twentieth-century 'EPR' polemic, can now claim to have identified 'locality' and 'separability' as notions integral to special relativity theory inconsistent with quantum mechanics and experimental evidence supporting it. Following intimations of J.S. Bell, L. Smolin, Maudlin and others, the history and philosophy of science are engaged as research tools to uncover the origins of the assumptions underlying such incompatibility. In particular, known but prevalent fallacies and the deprecation of processes as described by Whitehead, together with recent insights into the functional distinctions between representative models and explanatory theories, are engaged. Analysis of the evolution of optical and electromagnetic theorizing is then suggested to demonstrate that the choice of a mechanically compatible model of electromagnetic radiation, as has conventionally underwritten development of the light-speed postulate of special relativity, is inappropriate. Pursuing options made available within a multiple models idealization of optical and electromagnetic phenomena, replacement of the sponsoring model by a nonlocal and non-separable wavefront process of radiation of the form advanced by Fresnel and Kirchhoff on the basis of Huygens' principle, suggests the possibility of reformulation of relativity theory without incurring such conflicts. However, choice of a wavefront electrodynamic model including the extinction theorem of Ewald and Oseen, equally suggests possible theory reformulation without necessitating a four-dimensional construct of space and time or postulating an absolute constancy of light-speed in vacuum. Such a constancy can in turn be considered as demonstrating an innate limitation on empirical observation resulting from the loss of relative velocity information during electromagnetic transmission due to the memorylessness of the Markov propagation process of refraction together with information flow discontinuity resulting from dielectric boundary extinction events. Such characteristics are shown to be applicable to electromagnetic radiation of all frequencies. Further, from a wavefront reformulated hypothesis of inertial relative motion, it appears possible to demonstrate that the Galilean principle of relativity can be preserved. However, Lorentz invariance would then require reinterpretation wherein the Lorentz transform group would be deemed to quantify the degree of information distortion inherently experienced by any empirical enquiry into electrodynamics involving relative motion.
We argue that for the proof of Bell's theorem no assumptions about realism or free will are necessary. The key formula E(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,b,λ)B(a,b,λ)ρ(λ)dλ follows from the logic of plausible reasoning (the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability theory) taken alone, without any further assumptions about realism. The space Λ, usually interpreted as some space of `hidden variables', can be constructed for an arbitrary `field of discourse' using Stone's theorem. The rejection of superdeterminism follows from logical independence -- the non-existence of information which suggest a dependence -- of the free decisions of the experimenters from everything else. To prove the Bell inequality it is, then, sufficient to reduce this to E(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,λ)B(b,λ)ρ(λ)dλ. This follows for space-like separated measurements from Einstein causality alone. So, the consequence of the violation of Bell's inequality is that Einstein causality has been empirically falsified, without any loopholes left. We consider and reject the idea of weakening the logic of plausible reasoning could be used to create a loophole. Finally, we discuss what can be used to replace Einstein causality. While weak (signal) Einstein causality holds, it follows either from a notion of strong causality or from human inability to prepare states which violate quantum uncertainty, which makes it uninteresting for fundamental considerations. A notion of strong causality has either unacceptable causal loops or requires a hidden preferred frame. Given that a hidden preferred frame is completely compatible with modern physics, it is argued that this choice is preferable.