Cloud computing offers abundant computing resources and scalable storage, but data leakage in the cloud storage environment is a common and critical concern due to inadequate protection measures. Revocable-attribute-based encryption (RABE) is introduced as an advanced form of identity-based encryption (IBE), which encrypts sensitive data while providing fine-grained access control and an effective user revocation mechanism. However, most existing RABE schemes are not resistant to quantum attacks and are limited in their application scenarios due to the revocation model. In this paper, we propose a RABE scheme constructed from lattices. Our scheme has several advantages, including a near-zero periodic workload for the key generation center (KGC), ensuring scalability as the number of users increases. Additionally, the encryptor is relieved from managing a revocation list. Moreover, our scheme guarantees the confidentiality and privacy of other ciphertexts even if the decryption key for a specific period is compromised. We validated the correctness of our scheme and demonstrated its security under the assumption of learning with errors (LWE), which is widely believed to be resistant to quantum attacks. Finally, we provide an application example of our RABE scheme in the electronic healthcare scenario.
Cloud computing offers abundant computing resources and scalable storage, but data leakage in the cloud storage environment is a common and critical concern due to inadequate protection measures. Revocable-attribute-based encryption (RABE) is introduced as an advanced form of identity-based encryption (IBE), which encrypts sensitive data while providing fine-grained access control and an effective user revocation mechanism. However, most existing RABE schemes are not resistant to quantum attacks and are limited in their application scenarios due to the revocation model. In this paper, we propose a RABE scheme constructed from lattices. Our scheme has several advantages, including a near-zero periodic workload for the key generation center (KGC), ensuring scalability as the number of users increases. Additionally, the encryptor is relieved from managing a revocation list. Moreover, our scheme guarantees the confidentiality and privacy of other ciphertexts even if the decryption key for a specific period is compromised. We validated the correctness of our scheme and demonstrated its security under the assumption of learning with errors (LWE), which is widely believed to be resistant to quantum attacks. Finally, we provide an application example of our RABE scheme in the electronic healthcare scenario.
Revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) enables data encryption without certificates and allows for the revocation of users, thereby offering a more streamlined and secure approach to dynamic member management. However, the existing revocation models lack strong scalability, rendering the RIBE scheme unsuitable for scenarios where the key generation center (KGC) experiences high workloads and users face heavy storage burdens. Therefore, this paper introduces an integrated revocation model that maintains both the workload for the KGC and the size of the secret keys at a constant level, while also relieving the encryptor of the burden of handling revocation information. By combining online and offline encryption, we construct an OO-IRIBE-EnDKER scheme from lattices, which possesses properties such as anonymity, decryption key exposure resistance (DKER), resistance to quantum computing attacks, and selective security. Finally, the effectiveness of the OO-IRIBE-EnDKER scheme is demonstrated through experimental results.
With the rapid development of quantum computing technology, data sharing systems in cloud storage may suffer from quantum computing attacks. Recently, many researchers have proposed encryption schemes to achieve quantum attack resistance and fine-grained data access control. However, single point of failure and secure attribute revocation are two critical problems for quantum-resistant encryption scheme in cloud storage environments. In order to deal with these problems, in this paper, we propose a revocable multi-authority attribute-based encryption from lattice (RMA-ABE-L) in cloud storage. Firstly, RMA-ABE-L scheme can achieve fine-grained data access control with quantum computing attack resistance. We design efficient anti-quantum algorithms based on R-LWE problem and merge them with ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) structure. Secondly, RMA-ABE-L scheme can solve the single point of failure problem. We design the multi-authority structure to so that the compromise of some authorities does not affect the functioning of the whole data sharing system. Moreover, RMA-ABE-L scheme can realize secure attribute revocation. We design a secure attribute revocation mechanism and set special identity construction. The performance analysis shows that RMA-ABE-L scheme is more efficient than other related schemes.
Cloud storage faces significant security and access control challenges due to reduced user oversight and the emerging threat of quantum computing to traditional cryptographic methods. Existing revocable Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes are limited by their lack of post quantum security, inefficient revocation mechanisms that require re-encryption of data, and cumbersome key update procedures. We propose a post-quantum secure Ring-LWE IBE scheme with dynamic time-based revocation tailored for cloud environments. Our solution is built on the hardness of the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem to ensure quantum resistance and introduces a novel time-based revocation framework. In our approach, user access is bound to discrete periods and managed through a hierarchical binary tree structured over identities and time. This design eliminates the need to re-encrypt stored data upon user revocation. Instead, a trusted authority periodically distributes lightweight key updates exclusively to non-revoked users. Thanks to the binary tree structure, non-revoked users can compute updated decryption keys with only O (log Nₘₐₓ) overhead in both computation and communication, where Nₘₐₓ is the maximum number of users or periods. Revoked users, having no access to future updates, lose decryption capabilities. We provide formal security proofs showing the schemes resistance against adaptive identity and time-period-based attacks, grounded in the RLWE assumption. Overall, our scheme offers an effective combination of post-quantum security, efficient access control, and simplified key management, making it suitable for secure cloud data sharing in the quantum era.
The emergence of quantum computing threatens many classical cryptographic schemes, leading to the innovations in public-key cryptography for postquantum cryptography primitives and protocols that resist to quantum attacks. Lattice-based cryptography is considered to be one of the promising mathematical approaches to achieving security resistant to quantum attacks, which could be built on the learning with errors (LWE) problem and its variants. The fundamental building blocks of protocols for public-key encryption (PKE) and key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) submitted to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) based on LWE and its variants are called key consensus (KC) and asymmetric key consensus (AKC) by Jin et al. They are powerful tools for constructing PKE schemes. In this work, we further demonstrate the power of KC/AKC by proposing two special types of PKE schemes, namely, revocable attribute-based encryption (RABE). To be specific, on the basis of AKC and PKE/KEM protocols submitted to the NIST based on LWE and its variants, combined with full-rank difference, trapdoor on lattices, sampling algorithms, leftover hash lemma, and binary tree structure, we propose two directly revocable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (DR-ABE) schemes from LWE, which support flexible threshold access policies on multivalued attributes, achieving user-level and attribute-level user revocation, respectively. Specifically, the construction of the ciphertext is derived from AKC, and the revocation list is defined and embedded into the ciphertext by the message sender to revoke a user in the user-level revocable scheme or revoke some attributes of a certain user in the attribute-level revocable scheme. We also discuss how to outsource decryption and reduce the workload for the end user. Our schemes proved to be secure in the standard model, assuming the hardness of the LWE problem. The two schemes imply the versatility of KC/AKC.
In the last decade, lattices have become one of the most powerful tools in constructing cryptographic schemes, which enjoy conjectured resistance against quantum computers and strong security guarantees from worst-case to average-case reductions, as well as asymptotic efficiency. For a multi-user cryptosystem, user revocation has been a necessary but challenging problem. However, all known revocable schemes are either based on number-theoretic assumptions or lattice-based but less efficient compared to the art-of-date systems. In this thesis, we focus on investigating user revocation model and the associated lattice-based instantiations. Our constructions have two goals: (i) to improve the existing revocable lattice-based cryptosystems in terms of efficiency and security; (ii) to consider the revocation functionality in new contexts from lattices. For the former, we carefully adapt the very recent revocation model into the lattice setting. The latter can be achieved either by using the existing revocation models (without concrete constructions from lattices) or by proposing new revocation models. We construct a series of cryptosystems supporting efficient revocations as follows. A revocable identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, which is more efficient than all existing such schemes from lattices. We follow the architecture of the server-aided revocable encryptions, proposed by Qin et al. (ESORICS 2015). This paradigm provides significant efficiency advantages over previous revocation techniques in the setting of IBE. In the server-aided revocation model, most of the workloads on the user side are outsourced to an untrusted server, which can be untrusted since it does not possess any private information. With the help of this server, non-revoked users do not need to update anything when the system revokes other users. We equip Agrawal, Boneh, and Boyen's IBE (EUROCRYPT 2010) with the server-aided revocation method. In the technical view, we observe that a ``double encryption'' mechanism is well-suited in such a server-aided system. We also show that our scheme is provably secure provided with the strong hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. A revocation model called server-aided revocable predicate encryption (SR-PE) and an instantiation from lattices. We consider the server-aided revocation mechanism in the predicate encryption (PE) setting and formalize the notion of SR-PE with rigorous definitions and security model. Moreover, we introduce a construction of SR-PE for the scheme introduced by Agrawal, Freeman, and Vaikuntanathan (ASIACRYPT 2011) and prove that our scheme is selectively secure in the standard model. The correctness of our scheme relies on a special property of lattice-based encryption schemes. A lattice-based construction of predicate encryption following the direct revocation mechanism. In such a mechanism, it forces the ciphertexts to carry on the revocation information. Nieto, Manulis, and Sun (ACISP 2012) considered direct revocations in the PE setting and suggested the notion of full-hiding security for revocable PE schemes, which demands that the encrypted data keeps the privacy of not only the plaintext and the associated attribute, but also the revocation information. Following their pairing-based construction, we introduce a corresponding instantiation from lattice assumptions. Regarding efficiency, our lattice-based scheme is somewhat comparable to the construction by Nieto, Manulis, and Sun. Our scheme achieves the full-hiding security thanks to the anonymity of one IBE instance we additionally introduce into the system.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens to undermine classical cryptographic primitives, creating an urgent need for post-quantum secure alternatives. Lattice-based Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) has emerged as a promising direction, combining fine-grained access control with quantum resistance derived from lattice assumptions such as Learning With Errors (LWE) and Ring-LWE. This paper presents a systematic literature review of lattice-based ABE schemes published between 2022 and 2025, following the PRISMA methodology to ensure a rigorous and transparent study selection process. From an initial corpus of more than 7,800 studies retrieved across IEEE Xplore, SpringerLink, Elsevier ScienceDirect, MDPI, and Google Scholar, 1,236 studies were screened, resulting in 90 works selected for in-depth qualitative and quantitative synthesis. The review analyzes the evolution of lattice-based ABE in terms of mathematical foundations, security models, performance characteristics, and application domains. Particular emphasis is placed on emerging use cases in cloud computing, the Internet of Things (IoT), healthcare, financial systems, and government compliance, each evaluated against requirements such as revocation support, lightweight design, searchability, and multi-authority governance. Quantitative synthesis reveals uneven feature coverage across the literature: searchability is supported in 45.6% of schemes and lightweight constructions in 36.7%, whereas policy hiding (16.7%) and revocation (22.2%) remain comparatively underexplored. Performance trends indicate ciphertext sizes averaging 5.8 kB per attribute, with only 12% of schemes achieving compact representations below 2 kB. Moreover, fewer than 36% of surveyed constructions provide IND-CCA security, highlighting persistent challenges in achieving robustness against adaptive adversaries. By integrating structured research questions with quantitative trend analysis, this study offers both descriptive and evidence-backed insights into the current state of lattice-based ABE. The findings identify critical gaps in efficiency, security guarantees, and standardization, and inform a forward-looking research roadmap emphasizing lightweight revocation mechanisms, efficient policy hiding, stronger IND-CCA security models, and the need for standardized benchmarking frameworks. This survey thus serves as a comprehensive reference for researchers and practitioners working on post-quantum secure access control systems, particularly in privacy-sensitive domains such as healthcare.