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Lecture notes in computer science

FESTA: Fast Encryption from Supersingular Torsion Attacks

Andrea Basso, Luciano Maino, Giacomo Pope

Published Jan 1, 2023• 57 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-981-99-8739-9_4

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Collision-resistant hashing and key exchange are two significant Post Quantum cryptography challenges based on isogeny. The challenge in isogeny-based encryption is to identify an isogeny ϕ : E1 → E2, between two given supersingular elliptic curves defined over a finite field Fq. Finding End(E1) and End(E2) is the analogous problem to this one. Supersingular isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH) key exchange is designed to be quantum secure. In this instance, we take advantage of the endomorphism ring’s non-commutative property. In SIDH, both the initiator and the response contribute equally to the shared secret. Here, we create both public and private keys and send them through an unsecured channel. Finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves is the fundamentally challenging problem. The needed isogeny is calculated using the torsion point information and the degree of the secret isogeny.In July 2022, Wouter Castryck and Thomas Decru devised a successful key recovery attack on SIDH/ SIKE. The attack heavily depends on the torsion point images that Alice and Bob communicate during the protocol and is based on Kani’s “reducibility criterion” for isogenies from products of elliptic curves. We shall present a successful technique to prevent the aforementioned attack in this paper.
Abstract The Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) protocol is a leading contender for post-quantum cryptography. However, recent advances, specifically the Castryck-Decru attack, have exposed significant security flaws, primarily related to the predictability of torsion points and vulnerabilities in curve parameters. This study proposes and evaluates enhancements to the SIDH protocol, including increasing the size of torsion subgroups, introducing randomized isogeny generation , and employing advanced obfuscation techniques. Experimental results demonstrate that these modifications substantially improve SIDH’s security, with a manageable increase in computational overhead, positioning SIDH as a more resilient candidate for post-quantum cryptographic applications.