Secure computation is a kind of cryptographic techniques that enables to compute a function while keeping input data secret. Komano and Mizuki (International Journal of Information Security 2022) proposed a model of coin-based protocols, which are secure computation protocols using physical coins. They designed AND,XOR, and COPY protocols using so-called hand operations, which move coins from one player's palm to the other palm. However, hand operations cannot be executed when all players' hands are occupied. In this paper, we propose coin-based protocols without hand operations. In particular, we design a three-coin NOT protocol, a seven-coin AND protocol, a six-coin XOR protocol, and a five-coin COPY protocol without hand operations. Our protocols use random flips only as shuffle operations and are enough to compute any function since they have the same format of input and output, i.e., committed-format protocols.
Secure computation is a kind of cryptographic techniques that enables to compute a function while keeping input data secret. Komano and Mizuki (International Journal of Information Security 2022) proposed a model of coin-based protocols, which are secure computation protocols using physical coins. They designed AND,XOR, and COPY protocols using so-called hand operations, which move coins from one player's palm to the other palm. However, hand operations cannot be executed when all players' hands are occupied. In this paper, we propose coin-based protocols without hand operations. In particular, we design a three-coin NOT protocol, a seven-coin AND protocol, a six-coin XOR protocol, and a five-coin COPY protocol without hand operations. Our protocols use random flips only as shuffle operations and are enough to compute any function since they have the same format of input and output, i.e., committed-format protocols.
Abstract In the history of cryptography, many cryptographic protocols have relied on random coin tosses to prove their security. Although flipping coins is indispensable in this manner, the coins themselves have never been in the spotlight. Therefore, we would like to make physical coins rise to the level of cryptography, just as a deck of physical playing cards has been used to perform a secure multi-party computation. Such a card-based protocol is known to be helpful both to perform a secure computation without any black-box computers and to understand the principles of secure protocols. In this paper, we propose a new framework of secure multi-party computation using physical coins, named a coin-based protocol. One advantage of the use of coins is that they are more ubiquitous than cards. Whereas a face-down card can conceal the information about its face side, one side of a coin reveals the information of its other side. Hence, more careful design is required for a secure coin-based protocol than for a card-based one. We formalize a computational model of the coin-based protocol and explicitly give protocols for NOT, AND, COPY, OR, and XOR computations. We also discuss the composability of the extended protocols and how to implement them in practice.
A card-based protocol enables parties to securely compute a desired function by using physical cards instead of computer devices. Most of the previous works have aimed to achieve protocols with a smaller number of cards for elementary functions (e.g., AND/XOR/COPY). Mizuki and Shizuya's protocols achieve the smallest numbers of cards among the existing protocols. Their XOR and COPY protocols can be done easily, however, their AND protocol does not have an easy physical implementation due to the complicated underlying shuffle. We propose a new shuffle, tornado shuffle, which has an easy physical implementation and is also sufficient to construct three-card AND protocol.
Abstract This paper shows new card-based cryptographic protocols using private operations that are secure against malicious players. Physical cards are used in card-based cryptographic protocols instead of computers. Operations that a player executes in a place where the other players cannot see are called private operations. Using several private operations, calculations of two variable Boolean functions and copy operations were realized with the minimum number of cards. Though private operations are very powerful in card-based cryptographic protocols, there is a problem that it is very hard to prevent malicious actions during private operations. Though most card-based protocols are discussed in the semi-honest model, there might be cases when the semi-honest model is not enough. Thus, this paper shows new protocols that are secure against malicious players. We show logical XOR, logical AND, n-variable Boolean function, and copy protocols. We can execute any logical computations with a combination of these protocols. We use envelopes as an additional tool that can be easily prepared and used by people.
This paper shows new card-based cryptographic protocols with the minimum number of rounds, using private operations under the semi-honest model. Physical cards are used in card-based cryptographic protocols instead of computers to achieve secure multiparty computation. Operations that a player executes in a place where the other players cannot see are called private operations. Using three private operations—private random bisection cuts, private reverse cuts, and private reveals—the calculations of two variable Boolean functions and copy operations were realized with the minimum number of cards. Though the number of cards has been discussed, the efficiency of these protocols has not been discussed. This paper defines the number of rounds to evaluate the efficiency of the protocols, using private operations. Most of the meaningful calculations using private operations need at least two rounds. This paper presents a new two-round committed-input, committed-output logical XOR protocol, using four cards. Then, we show new two-round committed-input, committed-output logical AND and copy protocols, using six cards. Even if private reveal operations are not used, logical XOR, logical AND, and copy operations can be executed with the minimum number of rounds. Protocols for general n-variable Boolean functions and protocols that preserve an input are also shown. Lastly, protocols with asymmetric cards are shown.
Card-based protocols are cryptographic protocols that use a deck of physical cards. In this paper, we deal with card-based protocols using a standard deck of playing cards, which are commonly and commercially available. For finite-runtime committed-format protocols, Mizuki (CANS 2016) proposed an eight-card AND protocol with four random bisection cuts and a six-card COPY protocol with one random bisection cut. In this paper, we propose a partial-open action, which reveals any position of the face of cards, by generalizing the half-open action introduced by Miyahara and Mizuki (IJTCS-FAW 2022). Using the partial-open action, we propose four-card AND protocols with three random cuts, a four-card COPY protocol with three random cuts, and a four-card base conversion protocol with a random cut. We note that, without partial-open actions, these AND and COPY protocols with random cuts only are known to be impossible to construct using four cards. Therefore, the partial-open actions are inherently necessary to obtain our results.
Coin flipping is one of the most fundamental tasks in cryptographic protocol design. Informally, a coin flipping protocol should guarantee both (1) Completeness: an honest execution of the protocol by both parties results in a fair coin toss, and (2) Security: a cheating party cannot increase the probability of its desired outcome by any significant amount. Since its introduction by Blum, coin flipping has occupied a central place in the theory of cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we explore what are the implications of the existence of secure coin flipping protocols for complexity theory. As exposited recently by Impagliazzo, surprisingly little is known about this question. Previous work has shown that if we interpret the Security property of coin flipping protocols very strongly, namely that nothing beyond a negligible bias by cheating parties is allowed, then one-way functions must exist. However, for even a slight weakening of this security property (for example that cheating parties cannot bias the outcome by any additive constant ε > 0), the only complexity-theoretic implication that was known was that PSPACE ⊈ BPP. We put forward a new attack to establish our main result, which shows that, informally speaking, the existence of any (weak) coin flipping protocol that prevents a cheating adversary from biasing the output by more than 1/4 - ε implies that NP ⊈ BPP. Furthermore, for constant-round protocols, we show that the existence of any (weak) coin flipping protocol that allows an honest party to maintain any noticeable chance of prevailing against a cheating party implies the existence of (infinitely often) one-way functions.